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Summary
This dissertation is concerned with the management of testing processes to reduce uncertainty
about products’ values and the subsequent use of the gathered information. It consists of
three independent essays and is motivated by two business examples, which, while differ-
ing at first sight, exhibit several similarities with regard to the acquisition of product value
information through testing, namely, new product development (NPD) and used-product
acquisition management. Additionally, the investigated settings involve strategic actors and
related information asymmetries. These are the issues that we analyze. The first essay
investigates a situation in new product development in which a firm delegates the testing
of different design alternatives to experts to subsequently select the most promising design.
The central undertaking in this work comprises finding the optimal incentive schemes for
delegation of testing and, based on that, characterizing the optimal testing mode and how
it is driven by delegation. The key results are that delegation favors sequential testing and
that the heterogeneity of testing outcomes’ qualities has an impact on the optimal number
of experts under sequential testing: if qualities are homogeneous, a single expert should run
all tests; otherwise, each design should be tested by a different expert. The second essay
investigates a setting related to used-product acquisition at firms in the recommerce busi-
ness. Here, quality-dependent acquisition prices are offered on a firm’s website in combination
with a certain acquisition process with counteroffers in which product holders provide upfront
product-quality statements. We analyze how to optimally set up this acquisition process and
compare it to an alternative process with regard to profitability. The key results are that
product holders have an incentive to lie about products’ qualities, whereas in the alternative
process, holders can be incentivized to be truthful; however, neither of the processes out-
performs the other under any circumstances. The third essay investigates another setting
present in the business field of recommerce. Here, a firm acquires used products through a
retailer that tests products and offers quality-dependent acquisition prices. We answer how
to optimally manage this acquisition channel. The key results include the characterization
of the optimal contracts and acquisition prices, determination of conditions for upfront test-
ing and quality-dependent offers being beneficial, and the observation that the investigated
acquisition channel is efficient.
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Chapter I
Introduction
In several business areas, firms apply testing processes to reduce uncertainty about certain
product aspects. The information gathered serves as a basis for subsequent decision making
and eventually for firms’ success. This dissertation is concerned with the management of such
testing processes and the subsequent use of the acquired information. It is motivated by two
business examples, which, while differing at first sight, exhibit several similarities with regard
to acquisition of product information through testing, namely, new product development
(NPD) and used-product acquisition management. In NPD, the testing of different design
alternatives is necessary to separate those that exhibit promise from those that do not. Only
promising designs are further developed. Regarding the second example, used products are
heterogeneous with regard to quality. Therefore, testing them before acquisition enables firms
to offer differentiated, quality-dependent prices. This process is standard in the recommerce
business.
Both investigated business areas share a number of common characteristics. First, product
values are uncertain. Second, this uncertainty can be partly resolved through testing. Testing
is costly, and the reliability of the obtained results depends on the effort exerted. Third, the
firms that are reliant on the testing information do not exclusively test the products by
themselves but rather have independent actors execute the testing. These parties may act
strategically, potentially taking advantage of the firms’ ignorance regarding products, i.e., of
information asymmetries.
In order to provide a clear picture of the business examples, both are presented separately
and in more detail with regard to the discussed characteristics. In NPD, different designs for
a future product are created. Initially, each design’s technological feasibility, its durability,
and attractiveness for future customers are unknown to the firm. Those aspects determine
a design’s value for the firm. Here, testing is used to eliminate that lack of knowledge and
comprises, for instance, experiments, simulations, and/or prototype building. The testing
outcomes serve as a basis for resource allocation decisions, on which the most promising
designs are selected for further development, whereas others are omitted. Prior academic
work regarding NPD has identified many aspects that bear on the efficacy of a firm’s design
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testing process—including such diverse factors as test efficiency, testing costs, lead times,
and learning effects—and thus on the firm’s optimal testing strategy (see, e.g., Weitzman
1979, Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008). Nevertheless,
additional complexities that come into play through the presence of independent actors and
information asymmetries have so far only received scant attention, despite the fact that in
many industries, information asymmetries between senior management and testing experts
distort the outcomes of a testing process (Sommer and Loch 2009, Mihm 2010, Schlapp et al.
2015).
In used-product acquisition, products that firms want to buy in order to process and sell
them again are heterogeneous with regard to the time for which and intensity with which they
were used by their owners. This results in, e.g., differing optical conditions and technical func-
tionality, which determines how much effort to put into processing and how much to charge
for sale and, hence, the products’ values for the firm. The testing process comprises, e.g.,
optical inspection, disassembly, or testing software. The gathered product value information
serves as basis for quality-dependent acquisition price offers. Research regarding quality-
dependent acquisition pricing (see, e.g., Guide et al. 2003, Ray et al. 2005, Karakayali et al.
2007, Bulmus¸ et al. 2014), which builds on the assumption that products are tested before
acquisition, has barely considered the presence of information asymmetries between indepen-
dent actors. However, regarding an example from the recommerce business, in which product
holders must provide product-quality statements before acquisition, Hahler and Fleischmann
(2017) report that a non-negligible proportion of actual product submissions exhibit a signif-
icant mismatch between those quality statements and the true qualities determined by the
firms. This discrepancy hints at inefficiencies related to the presence of multiple actors in
used-product acquisition processes.
This dissertation consists of three essays. Each essay is concerned with one of the presented
business examples that are characterized by a firm’s uncertainty about products’ values and
the potential ability to resolve this uncertainty. Additionally, the natural presence of self-
interested actors and the corresponding information asymmetries are taken into account.
The first essay presented in Chapter II (joint work with Jochen Schlapp) examines the
presented NPD business example in which a firm must resolve uncertainties about valuation
of possible product designs in order to subsequently select the most promising design for
further development. This is performed via costly and time-consuming tests, which the
firm delegates to experts due to their knowledge and expertise. The basic decision of how to
delegate testing in the sketched situation comprises the choice of testing mode, i.e., whether to
2
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let the experts test different designs simultaneously or in sequence and the setup of contracts
that are used to prevent problems resulting from misaligned incentives. Motivated by this
business situation, we raise the following questions: what is the optimal testing mode and
what are the corresponding optimal incentive structures to offer the experts? How does
delegation drive the testing mode choice?
To answer those questions, we apply principal-agent theory in order to find the optimal
incentive schemes for each testing mode that induce high-effort testing and truth telling by
each expert. A comparison of the resulting profits under each testing mode leads to a charac-
terization of when to apply which testing mode: parallel testing is only optimal if testing is
sufficiently cheap and if time consumption is expensive. Otherwise, tests should be executed
sequentially. In addition, we show how testing outcomes’ qualities for different designs drive
optimal setup of sequential testing: if outcomes’ qualities are rather homogeneous across
different designs, the firm should mandate a single expert to execute all tests, whereas under
rather heterogeneous qualities, each test should be executed by a different expert. Further-
more, based on a profit comparison, we investigate how delegation drives optimal testing
mode choice. We find that delegation is in favor of sequential testing.
The second essay (joint work with Moritz Fleischmann) presented in Chapter III considers a
setting related to used product acquisition that is situated in the business field of recommerce.
The examined firm’s main activities can be broken down into acquisition, re-processing and
re-marketing of used products (mostly small electronic devices). The most prominent means
to acquire used products for such a firm is the online channel. Here, product holders interested
in selling can visit the firm’s website, determine their products’ conditions based on various
aspects, and, depending on the determined conditions, receive acquisition price offers. If
satisfied with the offers, the products are sent to the firm at the firm’s expense. There, actual
qualities are determined, and depending on their relation to product holders’ statements,
counteroffers can be made. Those can in turn be accepted or rejected, where rejections
result in products being sent back. Rejections thus induce losses for the firm. The setting
is on the one hand characterized by the firm’s uncertainty about products’ values for their
holders, which is crucially linked to the counteroffer decision. On the other hand, product
holders are uncertain about products’ values for the firm in terms of how efficiently the firm
reprocesses products and what can be achieved through remarketing. Those uncertainties
may cause inefficiencies in the process. Motivated by this scarcely investigated acquisition
process, we address the following questions: how can we optimally set up the online used-
product acquisition process? What are the optimal acquisition prices? Can the presented
3
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process be improved?
To answer the questions, we first build a sequential game-theoretical model incorporating
the described information asymmetries. We find the corresponding equilibrium given the
acquisition prices. We observe that product holders have an incentive to upward deviations
from true quality statements. Based on the equilibrium, we build an optimization model
that gives the optimal quality-dependent acquisition prices. Furthermore, we present an al-
ternative acquisition process. For this process, we build an optimization model that gives the
optimal quality-dependent acquisition prices that make product holders state their products’
true qualities. Finally, both processes are compared with regard to profitability. We find
that the extent of uncertainty at product holders about products’ quality-dependent values
for the firm is negatively correlated with firm’s profit for both processes. Furthermore, the
larger the gaps between quality-dependent values for the firm, the more profitable the newly
presented process is compared to the current process. Nevertheless, neither of the processes
outperforms the other under any circumstances.
The third essay (joint work with Moritz Fleischmann and Jochen Schlapp) presented in
Chapter IV investigates another setting related to used product acquisition in the business
field of recommerce. The considered firm collaborates with a retailer to achieve additional
used-product supply, where the retailer is equipped with the ability to test products before
acquisition. Based on the obtained testing information, the retailer makes differentiated
acquisition price offers. Here, the retailer has more information than the firm with regard
to the effort put into testing and testing outcomes. From the firm’s perspective, this may
result in an undesired testing and acquisition behavior by the retailer. It is reported that the
testing outcomes of a firm and retailer sometimes differ with regard to valuation of products
and hence the paid acquisition prices. This difference could suggest both inaccurate testing
and misaligned incentives. We address the following related research questions: should a firm
acquire used products through an intermediary with or without quality-differentiation and
upfront testing? How should the collaboration be set up and the intermediary made to act
in the firm’s favor?
In order to answer the questions, we undertake the following steps: first, we separately
investigate how to optimally set up the acquisition policies based on principal-agent models.
This comprises finding the optimal contracts and quality-(in)dependent acquisition prices.
Based on the resulting profits, we determine conditions under which to apply which policy.
We find that differentiated acquisition is only profitable if products in different conditions
significantly differ in value for the firm or for product holders, if testing is cheap, and if the
4
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likelihood for products being in different conditions is significant. Furthermore, we discuss
the efficiency of the acquisition channel and find that the optimal contracts coordinate the
supply chain, thus resulting in the optimal centralized supply chain profit, irrespective of the
acquisition policy. Finally, we discuss under what conditions collaboration can be simplified
by the application of simpler contracts. For acquisition without upfront testing and differen-
tiated prices, close collaboration with extensive information exchange is not necessary. For
differentiated acquisition, this is not always the case. Here, both parties have to be willing
to truthfully share information.
5
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Chapter II
Delegated Testing of Design
Alternatives: Incentives and Testing
Strategy
with Jochen Schlapp1
2.1. Introduction
Scholars have long acknowledged the crucial role that design testing plays in the success of
any research and development (R&D) or new product development (NPD) initiative (Simon
1969, Allen 1977, Clark and Fujimoto 1989, Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Thomke 1998). This
view is confirmed by the significant amount of time and resources that firms invest in activ-
ities related to testing their new products. Thus the automotive industry spent more than
$100 billion (US) on R&D activities in 2015, with a large portion of this budget dedicated to
design testing (Jaruzelski and Hirsh 2016); Airbus spent more than seven years evaluating dif-
ferent design options for its next-generation A380 aircraft before deciding on the final design
(The Economist 2007); and the high-tech sector is expected to invest 40% of its information
technology budget in new testing processes—such as “virtual” testing and robotics—by 2019
(Buenen and Muthukrishnan 2016). These numbers indicate that firms continuously seek to
improve their testing processes, from both a technological and a managerial perspective, as
a way of reducing costs and resource consumption yet without compromising the quality of
their testing efforts.
Prior academic work has identified many aspects that bear on the efficacy of a firm’s design-
testing process—including such diverse factors as test efficiency, testing costs, lead times, and
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Delegated Testing of Design
Alternatives: The Role of Incentives and Testing Strategy”, coauthored with Jochen Schlapp.
7
II. Delegated Testing of Design Alternatives: Incentives and Testing Strategy
learning effects—and thus on the firm’s optimal testing strategy (see, e.g., Weitzman 1979,
Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008). So far, however,
one critical aspect has received only scant attention in the literature: design testing is often
delegated to self-interested experts who may pursue their own respective agendas. It is
an organizational reality in many industries that information asymmetry between senior
management and these testing experts distorts the outcomes of a testing process (Sommer
and Loch 2009, Mihm 2010, Schlapp et al. 2015). The goals of this paper are to determine
(i) precisely how information asymmetry affects a firm’s testing process and (ii) how the firm
can mitigate the negative effects of associated agency issues by devising appropriate incentive
structures and an adequate testing strategy.
One can more clearly understand the effect of information asymmetry on a firm’s testing
process by considering a wind turbine manufacturer that seeks to set up a new “wind farm”—
a grid-connected installation of multiple wind turbines—in a pre-determined location.2 Wind
farms are built to convert the wind’s kinetic energy into electricity (Krohn et al. 2009). A wind
farm is a viable (i.e., an economically rational) contender in the production of electricity
only if it satisfies three basic requirements: “(1) produce energy, (2) survive, and (3) be cost
effective” (Manwell et al. 2009, p. 505).
In fact, the “produce energy” requirement has become a moot point. Wind turbine man-
ufacturers can now produce a variety of wind turbine designs that have proven their techno-
logical effectiveness through standardized testing procedures and widespread application in
practice. Moreover, technical developments are pushing modern wind turbines closer to the
theoretical efficiency limits dictated by Betz’s law3 (Burton et al. 2011, p. 63); hence cur-
rent wind turbine designs are an excellent choice also for future wind farms. Yet one crucial
question remains: Which turbine design is the best choice for a given wind farm location?
The answer to this question is closely tied to evaluating Manwell et al.’s requirements (2)
and (3). A wind farm can be cost effective and long-lived only if the wind turbines used are
technically reliable and do not result in strong negative externalities on the environment. In
other words: wind farm builders are looking for the wind turbine designs that best match
site-specific wind conditions, climatic factors, and regulatory constraints yet have minimal
effects on animal wildlife, emit little noise, and do not generate severe electromagnetic inter-
ference (Manwell et al. 2009, pp. 321ff). Unfortunately, many of these factors are known only
2The siting of wind farms usually proceeds in close collaboration with regulatory bodies. Therefore,
wind turbine manufacturers can influence but not ultimately control decisions about where new
wind farms will be located.
3According to Betz’s law, no turbine can capture more than 59.3% of the wind’s kinetic energy.
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imperfectly ex ante, and there are no standardized testing procedures for evaluating them
(in contrast to the purely mechanical testing of the energy produced by a particular wind
turbine design). Instead, wind farm builders must rely on teams of experts that acquire and
deliver information regarding the suitability of different wind turbine designs for a given loca-
tion. Since there is no standard testing procedure, this information acquisition process—and
the interpretation of the acquired information—is a process that creates tacit knowledge and
that relies strongly on the experts’ prior experience and knowledge, the quality of information
sources, the synthesis of implicit information, and often also on gut feeling.
As a result, it is almost impossible for a wind farm builder to assess the quality of the
information on which expert recommendations are based, let alone to verify that the experts
have actually shared their knowledge (and all acquired information) with senior management.
To overcome this information asymmetry, wind farm builders must adequately incentivize
those experts to investigate design suitability in a thorough manner and to share the test
outcomes with senior management in a truthful manner. These incentives must, of course, be
aligned with the firm’s overall testing strategy (e.g., parallel vs. sequential testing). Hence
the questions that arise are: What is the firm’s optimal testing strategy, and what are the
corresponding optimal incentive structures? Our paper’s main contribution is development
of a game-theoretic model that delivers answers to these questions.
In particular, this study makes three main contributions to the literature. First we show
that—almost regardless of the firm’s testing strategy—the optimal compensation schemes
that adequately incentivize the experts have a surprisingly simple two-payment structure: a
success bonus; and a consolation award if an expert’s design is not chosen for development.
The optimal balance between these two payments depends on the informational quality of an
expert’s test outcomes. For rather simple designs that can be tested with high precision, the
firm should place a strong emphasis on the success bonus. Yet designs that are more complex
and subject to a less precise testing process demand more tolerance for failure, so in these
cases the firm should offer higher consolation awards. In short, a one-size-fits-all approach
to incentives is not advisable.
Second, we find that the firm’s optimal testing strategy depends primarily on two parame-
ters: the testing costs and the test efficiency. For low testing costs, the firm prefers a parallel
testing strategy whereby all design alternatives are tested simultaneously; for higher testing
costs, a sequential testing approach is the firm’s preferred choice. We also address the ques-
tion of how best to conceptualize a sequential strategy under delegation; that is, in which
order should the designs be tested, and how many experts should be hired for the testing
9
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process? Our analysis reveals that the greater the heterogeneity in test efficiency across the
design alternatives, the more experts the firm should hire. The reason is that employing many
experts makes it more difficult for any one expert to extract high information rents—an issue
that is most salient when the quality of testing is unbalanced across designs. With regard to
the optimal order in which design alternatives should be tested, we challenge results in the
literature that argue for the optimality of “reservation price rules” (Weitzman 1979, Adam
2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008). We establish that, when there is information asymmetry, it
might be better for the firm to test less promising designs first in order to reduce agency
costs.
Our third main contribution is to show that information asymmetry always results in a
suboptimal testing process; of perhaps even more importance is our finding that the negative
effect of information asymmetry is greater on parallel than on sequential testing strategies.
These results indicate that, under delegation, a parallel testing approach is less suitable
than promised by extant research (Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001). This
finding likely also explains why so few parallel testing efforts are observed in practice despite
sharply reduced testing costs in recent years: firms simply want to avoid the high agency
costs associated with parallel design testing.
2.2. Related Literature
The challenges associated with managing the design process of a novel product have been
a long-standing and central concern in the NPD literature (Simon 1969, Allen 1977, Clark
and Fujimoto 1989, Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Thomke 1998, Loch et al. 2001, Pich et al.
2002, Erat and Kavadias 2008, Sommer et al. 2009). In his foundational work, Simon (1969,
pp. 128f) describes the product design process “as involving, first, the generation of alterna-
tives and, then, the testing of these alternatives”. This view has served as the foundation of
much of the subsequent academic literature, and as such it has triggered numerous exten-
sions (see, e.g., Clark and Fujimoto 1991, Wheelwright and Clark 1992, Thomke 1998, 2003).
Following the seminal classification of Simon (1969), the extant literature can be divided into
two broad categories. The first group of studies focuses on the search dimension of prod-
uct design by investigating successful strategies for finding design alternatives. In contrast,
research in the second group emphasizes the testing dimension of product development by
analyzing how best to evaluate the performance of a given design alternative.
The literature on optimal search dates back to the pioneering work of March and Simon
10
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(1958) and Simon (1969), who were among the first to describe organizational problem solv-
ing as a search process. This notion of viewing the innovation process as a search over a
complex design landscape inspired the subsequent proposal of different conceptual models to
describe the underlying search spaces. The two most influential models of search spaces are
the exploration–exploitation trade-off described in March (1991) and Manso (2011) and the
NK landscape of Kauffman and Weinberger (1989) and Kauffman (1993). Building on these
conceptualizations of a search space, scholars have extensively investigated how the efficiency
of the search process—and thus the firm’s innovation performance—changes with the com-
plexity of the problem (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004, Mihm et al. 2003, Billinger et al. 2014),
organizational hierarchy (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003, Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005, Mihm et al.
2010), team structure (Kavadias and Sommer 2009, Girotra et al. 2010), unforeseeable un-
certainties (Sommer and Loch 2009, Sommer et al. 2009), the particular search strategy
employed (Sommer and Loch 2004, Kornish and Ulrich 2011), and competition (Oraiopoulos
and Kavadias 2014). More recently, Erat and Krishnan (2012), Lewis (2012), and Ulbricht
(2016) have analyzed how delegation affects both the breadth and overall performance of a
search process. All these cited papers focus on how to discover a set of potentially promising
design alternatives, which is the quintessential first step in an innovation process. However,
we are concerned with the second step in that process: determining the most reliable way to
select the best alternative from among the candidates. As a consequence of that different
focus, the formal model we propose differs considerably from those in the search literature.
Much closer to our work is the literature on design testing as initiated by Weitzman (1979).
In his terminology, any design alternative can be considered a “black box”, and uncertainty
about its value can be resolved only by costly testing activities. This generic model of a
testing process has become a building block for almost all research on design testing, and it
has proven itself flexible enough to accommodate two very different kinds of testing processes:
feasibility testing and selection testing.
The primary purpose of feasibility testing is to discover whether (or not) a given design
is technologically feasible. Answering this question requires that the design in question be
repeatedly tested until there is sufficiently strong evidence either for or against its feasibility.
Prime application areas for this testing procedure include the pharmaceutical industry, where
a new molecule is tested and retested during clinical trials to evaluate whether it reliably
produces the desired effects. Research on feasibility testing seeks to answer such questions
as when in the development process to test the design as well as how many tests to pursue
and at what level of fidelity to a real-world counterpart (see, e.g., Thomke and Bell 2001,
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Terwiesch and Loch 2004). In the economics literature, the question of how to motivate an
expert’s participation in this dynamic information acquisition process has recently gained
traction (Gromb and Martimort 2007, Gerardi and Maestri 2012, Ho¨rner and Samuelson
2013), leading to a theory of optimal incentives for feasibility testing. There are two ways
in which our paper is connected to that stream of literature. First, from previous work on
feasibility testing we borrow the insight that nearly all testing processes are imperfect and so,
even with the most thorough of testing efforts, there will still be uncertainty about a design’s
true value. Second, we answer the question of how the firm should manage delegated testing
activities when it is concerned with selection testing—the second main challenge in design
testing. Thus our work complements the extant literature and broadens our knowledge about
devising optimal incentives and strategies for delegated design testing.
In contrast to feasibility testing, which focuses on the technological feasibility of a single
design, selection testing is concerned with choosing the best alternative out of a set of different
candidate designs. For instance, as explained in the Introduction, wind farm builders are
confronted with such a selection issue when choosing a particular wind turbine design for a
new wind farm. The existing literature describes two diametrically opposed testing strategies
to tackle this issue: sequential and parallel testing. Weitzman (1979) advocates the use
of a sequential testing approach, in which the different designs are tested in sequence and
the testing process can be stopped after each design test. In his seminal contribution, he
establishes the now classical reservation price rule (a.k.a. “Pandora’s rule”) for determining
both the order in which to test the alternatives and also when to stop testing. Adam (2001)
and Erat and Kavadias (2008) study how these results are affected by the firm’s ability to learn
between design tests. In contrast to those papers, Dahan and Mendelson (2001) promote the
use of a parallel testing approach in which all design alternatives are tested simultaneously.
Loch et al. (2001) build on these results by directly comparing the performance of sequential
and parallel testing strategies. They find that sequential testing is preferable when design
tests are expensive and test efficiency is low whereas parallel testing is preferable when testing
processes are slow and the firm needs quick results.
It is remarkable that past work on selection testing has not considered the role played
by information asymmetry in the design of an optimal testing process—that is, given the
ubiquity of such asymmetries in practice. Our principal contribution is to investigate how,
exactly, delegation affects a firm’s optimal testing strategy; we derive simple yet optimal
incentive structures that counter the effects of information asymmetries. The analysis yields
several new insights regarding the management of delegated testing processes. First, our
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derivation of the firm’s optimal testing strategy reveals that information asymmetry is much
more detrimental to a parallel than to a sequential testing strategy. This finding implies
that, when testing is delegated, parallel strategies are probably less effective than advertised
(e.g., Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001). Second, the existing literature is silent
about how to conceptualize a sequential testing approach; that is, should the firm hire mul-
tiple experts to test the different design alternatives, or should it rather assign all testing
activities to a single expert? We show that the multi-expert approach is preferable when
test efficiency varies considerably across the design alternatives whereas the single-expert
approach is preferable when test efficiency is relatively homogeneous. As a corollary we also
find that, under delegation, the classical reservation price rules (promulgated in Weitzman
1979, Adam 2001, Erat and Kavadias 2008) no longer generate the optimal order for testing
alternative designs. Finally, we derive the optimal incentive structures for delegated design
testing, which turn out to be extremely simple irrespective of the chosen testing strategy.
2.3. Model Setup
Consider a firm engaged in NPD; it faces the challenge of selecting one out of N ≥ 1 possible
design alternatives for the new product being developed. The value that the firm receives
from choosing a certain design depends on two factors: the design’s technological feasibility,
which is uncertain at the outset and can end up being either good or bad; and the design’s
inherent economic potential. The firm’s goal is to choose and develop the design alternative
that offers the highest value upon implementation.
At the core of our model is a testing phase in which the firm can acquire costly but imper-
fect information regarding each design’s technological feasibility and, eventually, its value.
Yet the firm cannot access this information directly. Instead, it must delegate the desired
testing activities to experts who then collect information about the designs’ technological
feasibility through experiments, simulations, and/or prototype building. Each design test
gives the corresponding expert more refined information about the evaluated design’s feasi-
bility, which enables that expert to provide a more informed recommendation vis-a`-vis the
firm’s decision on whether or not to develop the focal design. Once the firm has collected
enough recommendations, it develops the most promising design alternative; if no alternative
is sufficiently convincing, then the development process may be abandoned.
In the real world, the delegated nature of this testing process gives rise to information
asymmetry between the firm and the experts. Thus it is difficult if not impossible for the
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firm to verify the informational quality of an expert’s recommendation. Two factors are
responsible for this adverse situation. First, testing activities are costly for the expert, who
may therefore choose to be less diligent with respect to some tests than others. However, firms
cannot ascertain the diligence of experts because the interpretation of testing outcomes relies
critically on an expert’s gathering and synthesis of information and—most notably, owing to
the tacit nature of such knowledge—prior experience. Second, experts may be reluctant to
share their testing outcomes truthfully with the firm. This form of information asymmetry
captures the reality that experts can use their recommendations strategically to influence the
firm’s design choice. So in practice, delegated design testing involves two different forms of
information asymmetry: moral hazard during the testing phase and adverse selection during
the recommendation phase. It follows that the firm must offer an appropriately designed
compensation scheme if it hopes to incentivize experts to test the focal design(s) thoroughly
and then to communicate the testing outcomes truthfully. This compensation scheme, in turn,
should be carefully coordinated with the firm’s second major decision: the choice of testing
strategy. In particular, the firm must decide about whether the design alternatives should be
tested in parallel or in sequence, how many experts to employ, how many design alternatives
to test, and (if tested in sequence) the best order in which to test the different designs. In
the rest of this section we provide more detail on our model setup and assumptions.
2.3.1. Delegated Design Testing
The value Vi that the firm receives from developing design i ∈ N = {∞, . . . ,N} depends
on the design’s technological feasibility Θi ∈ {G,B}, its inherent economic potential vi > 0,
and the development costs K ≥ 0. We assume more specifically that, once developed, a
technologically feasible design (Θi = G) generates a value of vi − K whereas an unfeasible
design (Θi = B) results in a loss of −K. Prior to development, however, each design’s
technological feasibility is uncertain; that is, neither the firm nor the experts know the
design’s true feasibility ex ante. To simplify the presentation, we assume also that each state is
ex ante equally likely.4 Experts engage in costly testing activities in their efforts to (partially)
resolve this uncertainty. We represent the testing activities for design i by an expert’s testing
effort ei, which can be either high (ei = h) or low (ei = l) and is not observable by the firm.
An expert who engages in high-effort testing incurs a private cost c > 0, whereas the costs
of low-effort testing are normalized to zero. Of course, the chosen testing effort affects the
4The sole purpose of this assumption is to reduce the complexity of our mathematical exposition.
From a structural standpoint, all our results continue to hold for arbitrary prior probabilities.
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quality of collected information. Formally, we model testing outcomes for each design i as
an imperfect signal si ∈ {g, b}, which is received only by the expert testing design i and that
indicates whether the design is technologically feasible (si = g) or not (si = b). We denote
the precision (or quality) of this signal q(ei) because it depends on the expert’s testing effort:
an expert who exerts high effort receives a signal of quality q(ei = h) = qi ∈ (1/2, 1]; in
contrast, low effort leads to an uninformative signal q(ei = l) = 1/2. We assume that signals
are stochastically independent across designs.
After receiving signal si, the expert updates—in accordance with Bayesian rationality—
her belief about design i’s technological feasibility. Using this refined information, the expert
gives the firm an unverifiable recommendation ri ∈ {g, b}, which states whether design i is
considered to be technologically feasible (ri = g) or unfeasible (ri = b).
2.3.2. The Firm’s Decisions
The ultimate goal of a firm is to maximize expected profits by selecting the most valuable
design for its product while minimizing the costs of a delegated testing process. For this
problem to be relevant, we assume that qivi ≥ K ≥ (1− qi)vi for all i ∈ N . Otherwise, the
firm’s decision would be a trivial one: if qivi < K then the firm could safely exclude design i
from consideration because of the economic irrationality of developing such a design; at the
other extreme, if (1− qi)vi > K then design i is so promising that the firm would develop it
even without prior testing.
Designing an optimal testing process requires that the firm determine the testing strategy
and also a scheme for compensating the experts. With regard to the former decision, we
assume that the firm can select among three different testing strategies: parallel testing,
multi-expert sequential testing, and single-expert sequential testing. Under a parallel testing
strategy, the firm first decides on the number |IP | and identity IP ⊆ N of design alternatives
to test; it then assigns a separate expert to each design i ∈ IP , and all testing processes are
carried out simultaneously. After reviewing the experts’ recommendations, the firm decides
which design (if any) to develop. Under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm
again decides on the number (here, |IM |) and identity (IM ⊆ N ) of design alternatives
to test—but it also determines the order in which the different designs will be tested. The
firm then assigns a different expert to each design i ∈ IM and the designs are tested, one
after the other, in the order specified. After each design test, the firm can choose to stop
the testing process and develop the latest design alternative; we assume that the firm always
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does so after receiving a good/feasible recommendation for the current design alternative. An
intuitive consequence of this assumption is that, once a firm in this position continues with
the testing process, it can no longer implement any previously tested design.5 Throughout
the modeled testing process, all payments are discounted at a constant rate of δ ∈ (0, 1] after
each design test. Under a single-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm makes the same
decisions as in the multi-expert case (viz., deciding on |IS |, on IS ⊆ N , and on the order of
tested designs); the only difference here is that just one expert is assigned to perform all the
tests. As before, the firm can stop the testing process after each design test and develop the
latest design alternative (which always occurs if the firm is given a good recommendation)
yet does not have the option of developing any formerly tested design.
As regards the firm’s schemes for compensating the experts, we allow the firm to offer
asymmetric and nonlinear contracts that include any combination of action- and evidence-
based payments.6 An action-based payment is contingent on a specific action taken by the
firm—for instance, developing design i.7 In contrast, an evidence-based payment depends on a
design’s true technological feasibility Θi. In practice, any pay-for-performance contract must
be action-based and/or evidence-based; the reason is that only such criteria are verifiable
and thus enforceable by courts. In our model, then, an expert who is testing design i is
eligible for the following payment types: (i) a “success bonus” uig if the firm successfully
develops design i (i.e., Θi = G); (ii) an “allowance” uib if the firm’s development of design i
fails (i.e., Θi = B); (iii) a “consolation award” uia if the expert tested design i but the
firm did not choose it for development; and (iv) a “termination bonus” uit if none of the
available design alternatives is chosen for development. We assume throughout that the firm
must make all wage payments immediately when due; that is, it cannot hold back any wages.
It is intuitive that the evidence-based payments uig and uib incentivize an expert to test the
design thoroughly and also to recommend the design’s development in the event of a favorable
signal. In contrast, uia and uit reflect the firm’s tolerance for failure. That is to say, the firm
appreciates an expert’s testing efforts even in the case of negative testing outcomes; hence this
payment incentivizes experts to refrain from recommending a bad design for development.
Given such compensation schemes, the utility pii received by an expert for testing design i is
5As discussed in Sections 2.4.2 and 2.6, this assumption greatly reduces mathematical complexity
yet has almost no bearing on the generalizability of our results. Furthermore, if the firm were
unwilling to develop favorably recommended designs, then experts would have no motive to
expend effort testing design alternatives.
6Note that, without loss of optimality, we do not need to consider fixed wages because in optimum,
such a fixed wage must be zero as experts are shielded by limited liability.
7Payments cannot depend on the expert ’s action because such actions cannot be verified.
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the (discounted) sum of all his wage payments net of his effort costs. We follow the principal–
agent literature in assuming that all experts are risk neutral and protected by limited liability;
in other words, the compensation of each expert must be nonnegative at all times. The firm
is risk neutral, too, and its profit Π consists of the realized value of the developed design (net
of any development costs) minus the compensation paid to experts.
2.4. Incentives for Delegated Testing
In this section we characterize the optimal compensation schemes for the different testing
strategies, given that the set of design alternatives I ⊆ N (with |I| = n ≥ 1) is exogenously
fixed.8 In line with the revelation principle, we limit our attention to contracts that incentivize
all experts to evaluate design(s) thoroughly and to reveal test outcomes truthfully. We begin
by identifying the optimal compensation scheme for parallel testing (Section 2.4.1), after
which we characterize the optimal contract for multi-expert sequential testing and derive the
optimal testing order (Section 2.4.2). Finally, we examine the optimal incentive scheme and
testing order for the single-expert sequential testing strategy (Section 2.4.3).
2.4.1. Parallel Testing
Under a parallel testing strategy, the firm assigns a different expert to each design i ∈
I = {1, . . . , n}, and all experts then perform their testing activities simultaneously. This
setup allows the firm to receive refined information on each design’s value and to use this
information to select, ex post, the most promising alternative for development. The firm’s
overarching goal is to maximize expected profits, which amount to the expected market
value of the developed design net of development costs and compensation paid to experts.
Formally, the firm solves the following optimization problem P (the mathematical derivation
8We endogenize the firm’s choice of design alternatives in Section 2.5.1.
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and all other formal proofs, has been relegated to the Appendix):
P : max
u,y
Π :=
n∑
j=1
1
2j
[
n∑
i=1
y
(j)
i (qivi − qiuig − (1− qi)uib − (2j − 1)uia − 2j−nuit)
]
−
n∑
j=1
1
2j
K
(2.1)
s.t. y
(j)
i (qiuig + (1− qi)uib) ≥ y(j)i (uia + 2j−nuit) ∀i, j ∈ I (2.2)
y
(j)
i ((1− qi)uig + qiuib) ≤ y(j)i (uia + 2j−nuit) ∀i, j ∈ I (2.3)
y
(j)
i (uig − uib) ≥ y(j)i 2j+1c/(2qi − 1) ∀i, j ∈ I (2.4)
y
(j)
i [qi(vi − uig)− (1− qi)uib −
∑
k 6=i
uka]
≥ y(j)i
n∑
l=1
y
(j+1)
l [ql(vl − ulg)− (1− ql)ulb −
∑
k 6=l
uka] ∀i ∈ I, j ∈ I\{n}
(2.5)
n∑
i=1
y
(j)
i = 1,
n∑
j=1
y
(j)
i = 1, y
(j)
i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j ∈ IP : maxu,y (2.6)
uig, uib, uia, uia + uit ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.7)
Although complex at first sight, this optimization problem P has an intuitive structure.
As a starting point, note that y
(j)
i is an indicator variable that reflects whether design i is the
firm’s jth most preferred alternative (constraint (2.6) ensures that this mapping is indeed one-
to-one). That is, if y
(j)
i = 1 then the firm chooses design i for development only if it receives an
unfavorable recommendation for all designs with a lower ranking j′ < j. Clearly, a design’s
attractiveness is not exogenously given and instead depends endogenously on the offered
compensation scheme. This fact is reflected by (2.5), which guarantees that the firm makes
an ex post optimal selection decision. Conditions (2.2)–(2.4) represent each expert’s incentive
compatibility constraints, which depend on the relative attractiveness of the design she has
been assigned to evaluate. Thus (2.2) and (2.3) ensure that each expert truthfully reveals,
respectively, a “good” and a “bad” signal. These constraints eliminate the adverse selection
problem during the recommendation phase. Condition (2.4) similarly negates the moral
hazard problem during the design-testing phase because it ensures that each expert prefers
high-effort to low-effort testing. Finally, experts are protected by limited liability; hence (2.7)
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ensures that all wage payments are nonnegative. The following proposition characterizes—
under mild conditions on the properties of designs in I—the optimal incentive structures for
parallel testing and the resulting firm profits.9
Proposition 2.1 (Parallel Testing). Suppose the designs in I can be ordered such that
qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 + 2i+1c[qi/(2qi − 1) − 2qi+1/(2qi+1 − 1)]+ for all i ∈ I\{n}, where [x]+ =
max{0, x}. Then the following statements hold.
(i) Under a parallel testing strategy, the optimal contract that induces truth telling and
high-effort testing for each design satisfies uig = 2
i+1c/(2qi − 1), uib = 0, uia = 0, and
uit = 2
n+1(1−qi)c/(2qi−1) for all i ∈ I. Moreover, uit/uig = 2n(1−qi)/2i < 2n−i−1 ≤ 2n−2
for all i ∈ I.
(ii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠP =
∑n
i=1((qivi −K)/2i − 2c/(2qi − 1)).
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this proposition is the simplicity of the optimal
contract’s structure. For each design (and thus for each expert) i ∈ I, the firm need offer
only two payments: a success bonus uig if design i is successfully developed, and a termination
bonus uit if none of the design alternatives is chosen for development (i.e., if test outcomes
indicate that all designs are technologically unfeasible). But what respective roles do these
payments play in the firm’s incentive system? As (2.4) reveals, the primary purpose of uig is
to motivate expert i to engage in high-effort testing. Put differently, uig is a purely individual
incentive that resolves each expert’s moral hazard concern. In contrast, uit is a common (or
shared) incentive that collectively compensates the experts if all designs are considered to
be technologically unfeasible. It therefore decreases the likelihood of an expert giving a
positive recommendation despite receiving a negative test outcome—and thereby induces
truth telling; see constraint (2.3).
It is intuitive that, when effort becomes less rewarding (i.e., effort costs c increase) and
recommendations become less reliable (the signal quality qi decreases), expert i becomes
more reluctant to invest high effort and to report test outcomes truthfully. Under these
circumstances, the firm must provide stronger incentives; this explains why uig and uit are
increasing in c and decreasing in qi. Conversely, in the extreme case of perfect testing
(qi = 1), expert i has no incentive to misrepresent the test outcomes because such a false
recommendation would be easily detected by the firm and so would not benefit him. It follows
that if testing is perfect then the firm can forgo payment of any shared incentives (uit = 0).
9The condition in Proposition 2.1 holds unless I contains a design for which the test is of excep-
tionally low efficiency.
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Whereas neither uig nor uit depends directly on a design’s inherent economic potential vi,
these terms are affected by the total number n of designs to be tested and by a design’s
relative value, which we also index via i. In particular, uig increases with i because, with a
higher index i, it becomes more likely for tests to indicate that a design with a smaller index
is technologically feasible—which would render futile the expert’s testing efforts. Similarly,
with a higher n it becomes less likely that all n designs are technologically unfeasible; hence
the termination bonus uit is correspondingly less likely to be paid out. To compensate the
experts for this reduced payment probability, the firm must offer a higher uit.
Proposition 2.1(i) also sheds light on the severity of adverse selection—as compared with
moral hazard—when the firm employs a parallel testing strategy. For designs that are ex-
tremely promising ex ante (i.e., those with a small index i), the ratio uit/uig is high; the
implication is that, for these designs, the firm’s central concern is to incentivize truth telling.
For ex ante less promising designs (those with a large index i) the ratio is low; in that event,
the firm becomes relatively more concerned with incentivizing experts to exert high effort.
This shifting priority of the optimal compensation scheme has an appealing explanation.
From an expert’s perspective, admitting that her own testing outcome is bad increases the
odds of receiving no payments. This conclusion follows from the extreme unlikelihood of all
tested designs being pronounced technologically unfeasible. The firm’s concern on this point
is especially strong for designs that show the most promise. At the same time, an expert as-
signed to a promising design has a significant intrinsic motivation to exert high effort because
the potential rewards from receiving a good test outcome are high. In contrast, an expert
assigned to a less promising design fears that her efforts are futile because, in all probability,
a more promising design will receive a good recommendation and so the results of her testing
could be irrelevant to the firm. Therefore, relatively higher individual incentives must be
offered to the experts who are assigned to test less promising designs.
Finally, Proposition 2.1(ii) reveals that the firm’s expected profit is decreasing in c and
increasing in qi. The reason is that, with a higher c and a lower qi, expert i is less willing
to exert high effort and to disclose the test outcomes truthfully. Hence the incentive mis-
alignment between the firm and expert i widens, which enables the expert to extract higher
information rents.
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2.4.2. Multi-Expert Sequential Testing
Under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm assigns a different expert to test
each design i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} and announces the testing sequence; then the experts carry
out their design tests one after the other. A sequential testing approach allows the firm
to stop the testing process when it receives a positive recommendation (i.e., so it can start
developing that design) or to test the next viable alternative when it receives a negative
recommendation.
For a given I and any testing order, the firm must solve the following optimization problem
to derive the optimal compensation schemes. For expositional simplicity, we relabel the design
alternatives such that a design’s index i is identical to its position in the testing order; thus
design i = 1 is tested first, i = 2 second, and so on. The optimization problem M is expressed
formally as follows:
M : max
u
Π :=
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qivi −K)
−
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia + 2i−nδn−iuit)
(2.8)
s.t. qiuig + (1− qi)uib ≥ uia + 2i−nδn−iuit ∀i ∈ I (2.9)
(1− qi)uig + qiuib ≤ uia + 2i−nδn−iuit ∀i ∈ I (2.10)
uig − uib ≥ 4c
2qi − 1 ∀i ∈ I (2.11)
uig, uib, uia, uit ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I\{n}, ung, unb, una + unt ≥ 0 (2.12)
The structure of the optimization problem M is similar to the firm’s optimization prob-
lem P under a parallel testing strategy. Specifically, constraints (2.9) and (2.10) ensure that
all experts truthfully reveal their testing outcomes, (2.11) guarantees that each expert en-
gages in high-effort testing, and (2.12) accounts for the experts’ limited liability. In the next
proposition we derive the firm’s optimal compensation schemes, describe the optimal testing
order, and state the resulting firm profits for a multi-expert sequential testing strategy.
Proposition 2.2 (Multi-Expert Sequential Testing). (i) Under a multi-expert se-
quential testing strategy and for any given testing order, the optimal contract that induces
truth telling and high-effort testing by all experts satisfies, for all i ∈ I: uig = 4c/(2qi − 1),
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uib = 0, uia = 4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1), and uit = 0. In addition, uia/uig = 1− qi < 1/2.
(ii) It is optimal to test the designs in I in decreasing order of Ri ≡ qivi − 4c/(2qi − 1).
(iii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠM =
∑n
i=1 δ
i−1(qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1))/2i.
As in the optimal contract for parallel testing, there are only two payments in the optimal
compensation scheme for multi-expert sequential testing. To resolve each expert’s moral
hazard, the firm must again reward expert i with a success bonus uig in the event design i is
developed successfully. Yet in this case the firm does not rely on shared incentives to induce
truth telling; that is, uit = 0. Instead the firm provides an individual consolation award uia
to reimburse expert i for his effort costs whenever the firm dismisses the design he tested
owing to the subsequent unfavorable recommendation.
This focus on purely individual incentives has two immediate consequences. First, the
optimal payments depend not on a design’s position in the testing order but only on its
informational quality qi: the higher the informational quality, the more aligned are the inter-
ests of firm and experts and so the lower is the compensation offered. Second, as the ratio
uia/uig indicates, if testing is sequential then moral hazard is a much greater concern than
adverse selection, especially when qi is high. This finding may be better understood if one
notes that, from an expert’s perspective, recommending a technologically unfeasible design
for development leads to zero income (uib = 0). So once an expert has invested high effort
in testing, there is hardly any point in trying to pass off a technologically unfeasible design
as a good one. Even so, motivating the expert to engage in high-effort testing at the outset
requires a high effort incentive (high uig).
The optimal testing order is given in part (ii) of Proposition 2.2, the essence of which is
that the firm should test designs in decreasing order of their expected net contribution Ri.
This result is in the spirit of Weitzman’s (1979) reservation price rule but extends it to
include the costs of delegation. That is, the testing order depends not only on the designs’
expected values qivi but also on the experts’ information rents. Since these information rents
are decreasing in qi and invariant with respect to vi, it follows that the firm—as compared
to the reservation price rules advocated by Weitzman (1979), Adam (2001), and Erat and
Kavadias (2008)—more strongly prefers first to test designs of high informational quality. The
structure of Ri indicates that the firm’s optimal testing order is myopic: a design’s expected
net contribution depends only on its own properties and so is independent of other design
alternatives.
Recall our argument that an expert’s information rents are decreasing in the quality of her
information and increasing in her effort costs. From these relations it clearly follows that
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the firm’s expected profit should be increasing in qi and decreasing in c. Proposition 2.2(iii)
confirms this intuition and also underscores how the firm’s profit is adversely affected when
δ, the time value of money, is low.
Finally, we emphasize that the compensation scheme and testing order presented in Propo-
sition 2.2 remain optimal even if the firm is allowed to develop formerly tested (yet rejected)
design alternatives, that is, if the firm can test “with recall”. To see this, note that if the firm
receives a good recommendation for some i ∈ I then it can immediately realize an expected
profit of qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−1) by developing design i right away. If instead the firm chooses
to test the next design alternative, then the optimal ordering in Proposition 2.2(ii) implies
that the firm’s expected continuation profit is strictly smaller. We conclude that, as soon as
the firm receives a good recommendation for a particular design, it is optimal to develop this
design at once—rendering a recall option superfluous.
2.4.3. Single-Expert Sequential Testing
Under a single-expert sequential testing strategy, the firm assigns a single expert to test in
sequence the design alternatives in I. It is easy to see that—as compared with a multi-expert
strategy—such reliance on the testing efforts of only a single expert will have a strong bearing
on the required incentives. On the one hand, a single expert is much more inclined (than
is one in a group of experts) to acknowledge an unfavorable test outcome because there is
always the chance of finding a technologically feasible design later in the testing process.
On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to continue incentivizing an expert to exert high
testing efforts. Thus an expert’s behavior during the testing process is strongly affected by
his anticipation of future actions and payments.
For a given I and any testing order, the firm’s incentive design problem is as follows.
As in the preceding section, we relabel the design alternatives such that a design’s index i is
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identical to its position in the testing order. The incentive design problem S is then
S : max
u
Π(u) :=
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qivi −K)−
n∑
i=1
δi−1
2i
(qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia) (2.13)
s.t. qiuig + (1− qi)uib ≥ uia + δpˆii ∀i ∈ I (2.14)
(1− qi)uig + qiuib ≤ uia + δpˆii ∀i ∈ I (2.15)
uig − uib ≥ 4c
2qi − 1 ∀i ∈ I (2.16)
pˆii−1 = (qiuig + (1− qi)uib + uia − 2c+ δpˆii)/2, pˆin = 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.17)
uig, uib, uia ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I (2.18)
Some peculiarities of the optimization problem S warrant further discussion. First, with a
single expert it is unnecessary to have an additional termination bonus ut that compensates
her when none of the design alternatives is developed. In fact, such a payment can—without
loss of optimality—be folded into the expert’s consolation award for testing the last design
alternative (una). This follows because both payments have the same requirements and are
executed simultaneously. Second, pˆii−1 as defined in (2.17) is the expert’s expected continu-
ation utility immediately before testing design i. Since the expert’s decision-making process
accounts for her own future utility, it is only natural for pˆii to become an integral part of her
incentive constraints; see (2.14) and (2.15). More precisely: as compared with a multi-expert
sequential testing strategy, a single sequentially testing expert is more (resp. less) likely to
report an unfavorable (resp. favorable) signal truthfully. Our explanation is that the ex-
pert may enjoy additional information rents by artificially keeping the testing process alive
(i.e., by concealing a signal of feasibility). As shown by Proposition 2.3, that possibility has
important consequences for the optimal compensation scheme.
Proposition 2.3 (Single-Expert Sequential Testing). (i) Under a single-expert se-
quential testing strategy and for any given testing order, the optimal contract that induces
truth telling and high-effort testing for all designs satisfies, for all i ∈ I: uig = 4c/(2qi −
1) + [δpˆii/qi − 4c/(2qi − 1)]+, uib = 0, and uia = [4(1 − qi)c/(2qi − 1) − δpˆii]+. Moreover,
uia/uig ≤ 1− qi < 1/2.
(ii) If the design alternatives in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, qi ≥ qi+1, and
(1 − qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ I\{n}, then it is optimal to test in
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increasing order of i.
(iii) Ex ante, the firm’s expected profit is ΠS =
∑n
i=1 δ
i−1(qivi − K − max{4qic/(2qi −
1), δpˆii, 4c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii})/2i.
Although the optimal contract for a single-expert sequential testing strategy is structurally
similar to that for a multi-expert strategy, there are some important differences. First of all,
under single-expert sequential testing, the firm needs to place more emphasis on motivating
high-effort testing and less on inducing experts to report truthfully. Correspondingly, the
success bonus uig is higher under single-expert than multi-expert sequential testing while the
consolation award uia is substantially lower. In fact, it may be optimal for the firm to offer no
consolation award at all (uia = 0). That would be the case for sufficiently large values of pˆii,
the expert’s expected continuation utility. Here the single expert anticipates substantial
future payments if the testing process continues; therefore, under sequential testing, that
expert will always truthfully report an unfavorable signal. This dynamic has the effect of
eliminating the adverse selection problem.
Second, and in contrast to the multi-expert strategy detailed previously, the optimal pay-
ments related to each design i are not myopic in the single-expert setting; instead those
payments depend on the informational quality of all designs tested after design i. This re-
sult is a natural and direct consequence of the expert’s strategic behavior, and as such it
bears implications for the optimal testing order. Following the logic of Weitzman (1979)
and Proposition 2.2(ii), one might well suppose that it is still optimal to test the designs
in decreasing order of their expected net contribution. However, that supposition is not
true in general. We can see from Proposition 2.3(ii) that such a testing order is opti-
mal only if the expert anticipates a moderate level of continuation utilities (i.e., only if
(1− qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1)). However, if continuing with the testing process
promises continuation utilities that are exceptionally high or low, then the firm should not
test the designs in decreasing order of attractiveness. It might rather be optimal to test the
least promising designs first—with the goal of reducing the expert’s strategic rent extraction.
Finally, Proposition 2.3(iii) gives the firm’s expected profit under a single-expert sequential
testing strategy and yields a rather surprising result. Unlike the other testing strategies, under
single-expert sequential testing the firm’s expected profit need not increase with quality qi.
Because of the expert’s strategic behavior, a higher qi for one design might result in the
expert extracting higher information rents from the other designs being tested; this would,
of course, reduce the firm’s overall profits.
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2.5. Comparison of Testing Strategies
So far, we have characterized the optimal incentive structure for the three different testing
strategies given that the set of design alternatives was exogenously fixed. As a next step, we
relax this assumption and determine the optimal number and identity of designs to test for
each of the three testing strategies (Section 2.5.1). We then build on these results by deriving
the optimal testing strategy as a function of our main contextual parameters (Section 2.5.2).
Finally, we offer some insights regarding the question of how delegation, which entails infor-
mation asymmetry, alters the relative ranking of testing strategies—that is, from the ranking
in an otherwise identical setting but without information asymmetry (Section 2.5.3).
2.5.1. Optimal Set of Design Alternatives
In Section 2.4 we derived optimal compensation schemes for the different testing strategies
while assuming that the firm intended to test a fixed set I ⊆ N of design alternatives. A
more realistic scenario is one in which the set of designs to test is not given exogenously
but instead is chosen by the firm. In this section, then, we characterize the optimal sets of
designs to be tested for the different testing strategies. Our results reveal that these sets vary
considerably across those strategies.
Proposition 2.4 (Optimal Design Alternatives). (i) Under a multi-expert sequential
testing strategy, the optimal set of designs to be tested is IM = {i ∈ N | qivi−K − 4c/(2qi−
1) ≥ 0}.
(ii) Under a parallel testing strategy, the optimal set of designs to be tested satisfies IP ⊆
IM .
(iii) Let IS be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a single-expert sequential testing
strategy, and let n be the last design in the optimal testing order. If qnvn−K−4c/(2qn−1) ≥ 0
and if qnvn ≤ qivi and qn ≤ qi for all i ∈ IS\{n}, then IS ⊆ IM .
Part (i) of this proposition offers a detailed characterization of the optimal identity (i ∈ IM )
and number (|IM |) of designs to test under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy. In
particular, the firm should test any design i ∈ N for which the expected value qivi exceeds
the sum of (a) the expert’s information rents 4c/(2qi − 1) and (b) the development costs K.
That is, the firm should test only those designs that promise ex ante a positive contribution
margin.
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A similar argument applies to the optimal set of designs to be tested under a parallel
testing strategy IP . However, as indicated by Proposition 2.1(iii) and Proposition 2.2(iii),
the experts’ information rents under parallel testing are much higher than under sequential
testing, which explains why the firm always tests fewer designs than under a multi-expert
sequential testing strategy. There are two reasons for this difference. First, under parallel
testing the firm does not have the option to stop the testing process prematurely. Second,
experts testing a relatively undesirable design know that the firm will probably consider their
recommendations to be irrelevant; it is therefore costly for the firm to motivate these experts
to exert high testing efforts. Whereas the first dynamic has been well established by previous
academic work (see, e.g., Loch et al. 2001), little attention has been paid to the second source
of inefficiency.
Finally, Proposition 2.4(iii) derives some properties of the optimal set of designs to be tested
under a single-expert sequential testing strategy. A few observations merit discussion here.
We note that if the last design in the testing order is also the least promising alternative—yet
still offers a positive contribution margin—then the firm always tests fewer designs than under
a multi-expert sequential testing strategy. In other words, the expert’s strategic behavior
induces the firm to make reductions in the number of designs to test. Yet this generalization
does admit some exceptions. In some instances, it might be profitable for the firm to include
an ex ante unprofitable design in its test set IS for the sole purpose of influencing the
expert’s continuation utility and thereby reducing his strategic behavior. In such cases,
qnvn −K − 4c/(2qn − 1) < 0 and so the firm may find it optimal to increase the number of
designs to test: IS ⊃ IM .
In sum: the firm tests only ex ante profitable designs under both the parallel and multi-
expert sequential testing strategy; under single-expert sequential testing, however, it may be
optimal for the firm to test ex ante unprofitable designs in order to curtail rent extraction
by experts.
2.5.2. Optimal Testing Strategy
Given the optimal contract structures and the optimal set of design alternatives for the
different testing strategies, we can now turn to our main research question: What is the
firm’s optimal testing strategy under delegation? Propositions 2.1–2.3 have already indicated
that the answer to this question depends mainly on two contextual parameters: the costs of
effort (c) and the informational quality of test outcomes (qi). It seems clear that these two
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parameters determine how much information rent the firm must sacrifice in order to align
the experts’ interests with the firm’s agenda. The next proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 2.5 (Optimal Testing Strategy). Let Π∗P = ΠP (IP ), Π∗M = ΠM (IM ),
and Π∗S = ΠS(IS). Then the following statements hold.
(i) If δ < 1, then there exists a c > 0 such that Π∗P > max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} for all c < c.
(ii) Let IP be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a parallel testing strategy. If
those designs can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1+2i+1c[qi/(2qi−1)−2qi+1/(2qi+1−1)]+
for all i ∈ IP\{n}, then max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} > Π∗P provided that c > c ≡
∑
i∈IP ((1− δi−1)(qivi−
K)/2i)/
∑
i∈IP ((2(1− (δ/2)i−1)/(2qi − 1)).
(iii) Let IM be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a multi-expert sequential testing
strategy, and let those designs be optimally ordered according to Proposition 2.2(ii). Then
Π∗S ≥ Π∗M provided that qi+1 ≥ qi ≡ 1/2 + δ(2qi − 1)/(4qi − δ(2qi − 1)) for all i ∈ IM\{n}.
Moreover, q
i
≤ min{qi, 5/6}.
In Figure 2.1, part (a) illustrates the key properties of the optimal testing strategy. First,
a parallel testing strategy is undertaken only when the testing costs are sufficiently small
(c < c). Otherwise, the burden of paying all experts immediately for their testing efforts is
greater than the value of information received; in that case, the firm decides to implement
a sequential testing strategy. Thus design tests that are more expensive—and the resulting
higher information rents—make sequential testing more economical. In this respect, parts (i)
and (ii) of Proposition 2.5 extend previous findings of Loch et al. (2001) to testing processes
that are prone to information asymmetry.
However, it remains an open question exactly how the firm should implement a sequential
testing strategy. That is, should the firm hire multiple experts to test the different design
alternatives, or should it rather assign all testing activities to a single expert? Proposi-
tion 2.5(iii) shows that this question’s answer is closely tied to the test efficiency, qi, of the
different designs. Relying on a single expert is especially beneficial when the informational
quality of the different design tests is relatively homogeneous (i.e., when qi+1 ≥ qi). In con-
trast, if test efficiency is heterogeneous across designs then the firm is better-off assigning
a different expert to each design alternative. The explanation for this finding is instructive.
When the designs’ test efficiencies are very different, then the firm prefers testing the designs
of highest informational quality first and testing those of lowest quality last (cf. Proposi-
tion 2.3(ii)). However, the informational rents extracted from the firm by a single expert
increase with any decline in the informational quality of a design test. Hence the expert tries
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Figure 2.1.: The Firm’s Optimal Testing Strategy
(a) Delegation (b) First-Best
The graphs plot, for an example with N = 2 design alternatives, the firm’s optimal testing strategy
under (a) delegation and (b) first-best conditions. Under a parallel testing strategy it is optimal to
test both designs simultaneously. Under any sequential testing strategy (i.e., multi-expert, single-
expert, or first-best) it is optimal to test design i = 1 first and i = 2 second. The other parameter
values are v1 = 1000, v2 = 400, q1 = 0.9, K = 200, and δ = 0.9.
to keep the testing process alive as long as possible—even if that requires reporting a nega-
tive assessment of what is actually a good design. There can be no question that exposure
to such strategic behavior is suboptimal for the firm, which should therefore rely instead on
multi-expert sequential testing.
Figure 2.1(a) also shows the role that the discount factor δ plays in the firm’s choice of an
optimal testing strategy. As expected, sequential testing strategies are preferable when the
time factor is less critical for the firm—that is, as δ increases. Less obvious, though, is δ’s
effect on the firm’s preferred sequential testing strategy. We find that a higher δ facilitates
the single expert’s strategic extraction of rent because prolonging the testing process is then
less costly for her. It follows that the size of the region in which the firm prefers multi-
expert to single-expert sequential testing increases with δ (cf. the sensitivity of q
i
as given in
Proposition 2.5(iii)).
Finally, Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 together reveal an interesting non-monotonicity in the
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optimal number of designs to test. For very low testing costs c, the firm pursues a parallel
testing strategy and simultaneously tests a moderate number |IP | of designs. As c increases,
the firm moves to a sequential testing strategy and, in so doing, increases the number of
designs to test (recall that |IM | ≥ |IP | by Proposition 2.4(ii)). Yet when c becomes too
large, design testing becomes so costly that the firm is impelled to reverse course and reduce
the number of design tests. These results contradict the conventional wisdom—which is true
in the absence of information asymmetry—that lower testing costs unequivocally lead to
more design tests.
2.5.3. Costs of Delegation
Our aim in this section is to discover precisely how information asymmetries distort the firm’s
design-testing process. We start by describing, as a basis for comparison, the firm’s first-best
testing strategy: one in which both experts and firm behave as a single entity. Then, in
Proposition 2.6, we compare this first-best strategy with the optimal testing strategy under
delegation.
If the incentives of experts and the firm are aligned, then the latter need not pay any
action- or evidence-based bonuses to motivate the former to engage in high-effort testing
and to reveal their testing outcomes truthfully. So absent incentive misalignment, the firm
can simply reimburse the experts for their testing efforts by paying them their effort costs c
for each design test conducted. Given the resulting lack of information asymmetry, the
firm’s first-best (fb) expected profit under a sequential (seq) testing strategy is given by
Πfbseq =
∑
i∈Ifbseq δ
i−1(qivi − K − 2c)/2i; here I fbseq = {i ∈ N | qivi − K − 2c ≥ 0} is the
optimal set of designs to be tested, and the firm tests the designs in decreasing order of qivi.
Analogously, the firm’s first-best expected profit under a parallel (par) testing strategy is
Πfbpar =
∑
i∈Ifbpar((qivi −K)/2i − c); here the designs in I fbpar are ordered in decreasing order
of qivi, and I fbpar ⊆ I fbseq. Our final proposition leverages these insights to identify how
information asymmetry affects the firm’s optimal testing strategy.
Proposition 2.6 (First-Best vs. Delegation). (i) Under delegated sequential testing,
the optimal set of designs to be tested is a subset of the first-best set : IS , IM ⊆ I fbseq.
(ii) Under delegated parallel testing, the firm may choose a completely different set of
designs to test than under first-best conditions; thus there are cases in which IP ∩ I fbpar = ∅.
(iii) Suppose qi = q for all i ∈ N . If Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar, then max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} ≥ Π∗P ; however, the
converse is not true in general.
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The main finding of Proposition 2.6 is that information asymmetry has fundamentally
different effects on parallel than on sequential testing. Consider first the implications of dele-
gation on the optimal design of a sequential testing strategy. Part (i) of the proposition shows
that—as expected—the presence of information asymmetry results in a suboptimal testing
process. In particular, the firm is testing too few designs and therefore stops the testing
process too early; that is, IS , IM ⊆ I fbseq. This result reflects that an expert’s information
rent makes design testing unequivocally more expensive (for the firm) than under first-best
conditions.
One might suppose a similar reasoning to apply also with regard to parallel testing. In
this respect, however, part (ii) of Proposition 2.6 holds a surprise. Note that even though
the firm tests too few designs under a sequential testing strategy, it does still test those
designs that are also the most promising ones under first-best conditions. Yet this statement
does not necessarily hold for a parallel testing strategy. In fact, Proposition 2.6(ii) reveals
that the optimal sets of designs to be tested with and without information asymmetry may
be disjoint; under delegation, then, the firm may test an entirely different set of design
alternatives. How can we explain this split? Recall from our discussion after Proposition 2.1
that the information rents extracted from the firm by experts are decreasing in the quality
of those experts’ information. Hence the firm never tests designs that offer relatively poor
information quality—that is, with almost complete disregard for their economic potential vi.
In contrast, under first-best conditions the firm’s testing costs are constant and thus do not
depend on a design’s informational quality; in that case, it makes sense for the firm always
to test those designs promising the highest expected value qivi. Evidently, these different
priorities under first-best and delegated testing can lead to disjoint optimal test sets. This
phenomenon is most likely to occur when some design alternatives are of exceptionally high
economic value vi but low test efficiency qi.
Finally, Proposition 2.6(iii) hints at an important managerial insight: delegation favors se-
quential testing. This result is also clearly illustrated in part (b) of Figure 2.1, which plots the
firm’s optimal testing strategy vis-a`-vis the first-best benchmark. Under symmetric test effi-
ciencies (qi = q for all i ∈ N ), we can demonstrate formally that if the firm prefers sequential
testing under first-best conditions then it does so under delegation as well. Although we are
unfortunately not able to generalize this result analytically to heterogeneous test efficiencies,
our numerical experiments confirm that the claim does indeed hold much more generally; see
Figure 2.1(b), which allows for such heterogeneity. Our finding has implications both for the
academic literature and for practice. It relativizes the claims about the effectiveness of par-
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allel testing strategies (e.g., Dahan and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001). In the presence
of information asymmetry, the benefits of such a parallel approach may be outweighed by
high agency costs. This result finds further support in practice. In recent years, testing costs
have declined significantly owing to technological advancements in the realms of robotics,
virtualization, and computer-assisted test systems (among others). Following conventional
wisdom—and previous academic insights—these developments should have led firms to focus
more strongly on parallel testing strategies. However, there is no substantial evidence to date
that such a general trend is underway (though the software industry is a notable exception).
Our results offer a plausible and straightforward explanation for this observation: firms are
reluctant to incur the high costs of delegation that come with parallel testing.
2.6. Conclusions
Design testing is an integral part of virtually any new product development initiative because
it enables firms to identify the best possible designs for their new products. In reality,
however, managing such testing processes is a daunting challenge. The reason is that in most
cases the firm does not itself conduct the desired testing activities and so has no direct
accesses to the precious information; the firm must instead rely on the recommendations of
experts, who may be pursuing their own agendas. This delegated nature of the testing process
gives rise to information asymmetry between the firm and the experts, which can result in
a worrisome misalignment of objectives. The primary goal of this paper is to understand
how the firm can set up an effective testing process that will reliably select the best design
alternative—that is, notwithstanding the adverse consequences of delegation. More precisely,
our main contribution is to provide insights on the questions of (i) which testing strategy the
firm should choose and (ii) how the firm can optimally incentivize the experts it hires.
It is remarkable that, regardless of the chosen testing strategy, the optimal compensation
scheme—one that motivates experts to test their designs with high effort and to reveal their
test outcomes truthfully—always involves but two payments: a success bonus if an expert’s
design is developed and turns out to be technologically feasible, and a reward that reimburses
an expert for his efforts in case the firm dismisses the design he is testing or terminates the
testing process altogether. We show in addition that the balance between these two payments
is fundamentally different for designs with different levels of test efficiency. Designs that can
be tested with high precision require a strong focus on individual success bonuses, whereas
designs that are evaluated with lower quality demand a stronger emphasis on consolation
32
II. Delegated Testing of Design Alternatives: Incentives and Testing Strategy
awards.
Our findings have immediate managerial implications. Although design testing is a complex
organizational process, the structure of the optimal compensation schemes is fairly simple.
As a result, the optimal contracts derived in this paper should be relatively easy to implement
in practice. Regarding the relative sizes of the two payments, we emphasize that the firm
must carefully adjust its contracts to reflect the quality of test outcomes. Firms that adopt
a one-size-fits-all approach cannot help but sacrifice, eventually, their testing effectiveness.
As for the firm’s optimal testing strategy, we find that two parameters critically determine
the firm’s optimal choice: testing costs and the quality of information. In line with previous
research, we show that a parallel testing strategy is optimal only when testing costs are
sufficiently small. In contrast, the higher the testing costs, the more beneficial a sequential
testing strategy becomes. Yet it is an unanswered question just how the firm should set up its
sequential testing strategy. Should it mandate a single expert to carry out all test activities,
or should it rather assign a different expert to each design test? Our results indicate that
the former approach is optimal when the informational quality of the different design tests
is relatively homogeneous. When test efficiency is very heterogenous across designs, however,
the firm should hire multiple experts because in that case a single expert might artificially
keep the testing process alive in order to receive ongoing payments—to the firm’s obvious
detriment.
These results have clear consequences for practice. We identify two levers the firm can use
when designing an effective testing strategy: the order of the different design tests (parallel
vs. sequential), and the number of experts to employ. Whereas the former option has been
extensively discussed in the academic literature, the latter option has yet to receive serious
attention. It is important to recognize that the two levers address two different concerns.
The choice of whether to use a parallel or sequential testing strategy depends on the testing
costs, whereas the ideal number of experts depends on the extent to which the efficiency of
tests (for the different designs) is heterogeneous.
Finally, we show how the presence of information asymmetry affects the various testing
strategies. Overall, our results point to the same conclusion: the delegation of testing leads to
a suboptimal testing process whose information asymmetries are significantly more harmful
to parallel than to sequential testing strategies. In other words, our findings indicate that
parallel testing may be less effective than usually claimed in the academic literature (Da-
han and Mendelson 2001, Loch et al. 2001) when the testing process involves information
asymmetries. This finding may also explain the practical observation that, even though tech-
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nological advancements have lowered testing costs in recent years, no significant shift toward
parallel testing efforts is evident.
To maintain tractability and develop a parsimonious model, we necessarily made some
assumptions about the specific trade-offs inherent to a sequential testing strategy. In partic-
ular, we assumed that the design alternatives are sufficiently different that the firm cannot
exploit any between-design learning effects. Also, we did not allow the firm to choose pre-
viously tested designs for development. Both assumptions clearly lead to an underestimate
of the performance of sequential testing strategies, from which it follows that relaxing these
assumptions could only strengthen our main message that delegation favors sequential test-
ing. Furthermore, one can readily verify that the optimal contract structures would remain
relatively intact even without these assumptions; hence our results are applicable to a wide
range of practical scenarios. With regard to the firm’s choice of testing strategy, we focused
on “polar” cases: fully parallel versus fully sequential testing, and a single expert versus
n experts. In reality, firms are free to use any mixture of parallel and sequential testing
strategies, and they may also hire any arbitrary number of experts. Whether such hybrid
strategies can improve the efficacy of delegated testing processes is an important question for
future research. Another interesting research possibility is for empirical studies to examine
the relationship between a firm’s chosen testing strategy and the severity of its agency issues.
Our own theoretical results lead us to conjecture that firms (and industries) with relatively
strong agency problems are much more likely to use sequential than parallel testing strategies.
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Chapter III
Used-Product Acquisition Processes
with Quality Differentiation
with Moritz Fleischmann1
3.1. Introduction
Quality-dependent pricing is one means to balance quality, quantity, and timing of used-
product returns (e.g., Guide et al. 2003). As a basis, firms’ knowledge about products’
qualities before acquisition is inevitable. This is gained through upfront grading/testing of
those products. The application of a quality-dependent process for the acquisition of used
products is the common approach in the recommerce business. Product holders interested in
selling can submit quality statements on these firms’ websites and receive quality-dependent
acquisition price offers for their used devices. This process aims at shifting the quality
assessment to holders and to avert those how are not willing to sell their products for the
quality-specific prices. The statements, however, might not mirror the actual products’
qualities due to the strategic behavior of potential sellers, which might vitiate the process’
performance.
Our work is motivated by this widely applied acquisition process. On the one hand, we
are interested in the dynamics in this process and, based one these dynamics, the optimal
acquisition prices. On the other hand, we are interested in potential process improvements.
Among other products, recommerce providers (e.g., Gazelle, FLIP4NEW, and ReBuy)
buy small used electronic devices, such as mobile phones, process them (e.g., cleaning and
deletion of data), and re-sell them. For setting up their acquisition environment, those
firms determine quality-specific acquisition prices for the products that they want to buy. If
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Used-Product Acquisition
Processes with Quality Differentiation under Asymmetric Information”, coauthored with Moritz
Fleischmann.
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this has been done, the typical acquisition process comprises three stages. First, a product
holder visits the website, selects his specific product, determines its quality (depending on its
optical condition, technical functionality, etc.), and receives a quality-dependent, provisional
price offer. If satisfied with the offer, the product is shipped to the firm. Transportation is
usually paid by the firm. Second, after arrival, the product is tested, and its true quality
is determined. Subsequently, the firm decides whether to accept the offer or to make a
counteroffer. If accepted, the requested money is transferred to the holder, and the acquisition
is completed. Making a counteroffer leads to the third and final stage, in which the holder
decides to either accept or reject the counteroffer. Acceptance again leads to the conclusion
of the sale. If rejected, the product is sent back to the holder at firm’s expense. In this case,
the counteroffer induces a loss for the firm due to already-invested money for transportation,
testing, handling, etc.
This process raises incentive issues. It does not induce product holders to true quality
statements, potentially forcing the firm into counteroffers. Hahler and Fleischmann (2017)
mention that a non-negligible proportion of actual product submissions at FLIP4NEW, a
German recommerce provider, exhibits a significant mismatch between the quality stated by
product holders and the true quality determined by the recommerce provider.
Information asymmetries play a major role in this acquisition process. Naturally, firms do
not know how much a product holder is willing to accept for selling his product. Therefore,
making a counteroffer is risky. Furthermore, it is not obvious for product holders how effi-
ciently the firm refurbishes used products. This can be translated into uncertainty about the
margin of a product in a certain condition. The larger the margin is, the more the firm is
willing to pay for a product. This uncertainty might be an incentive for product holders to
not state the true quality.
Hahler and Fleischmann (2017) model and analyze the described acquisition as a sequential
game with complete information. We take into account information asymmetries by model-
ing the acquisition process with two-sided incomplete information. First, we determine the
equilibrium of the game given fixed prices. Then, based on the determined equilibrium, we
build an optimization model and find the optimal acquisition prices that maximize the firm’s
profit. Afterward, we present a modified process by introducing bonus payments that enable
the firm to incentivize product holders to true quality statements. Finally, both processes
are compared with regard to their profitability.
In summary, our paper contributes to the literature as follows:
• We determine the equilibrium in the acquisition process at many recommerce providers
36
III. Used-Product Acquisition Processes with Quality Differentiation
under two-sided incomplete information.
• We determine the optimal quality-dependent acquisition prices to maximize profit based
on the equilibrium.
• We propose a different acquisition process with bonus payments and determine how to
maximize profit while ensuring true quality statements by product holders.
• We compare both processes with regard to profitability and provide insights about
which circumstances favor one process over the other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 positions our work within
the extant research literature. Section 3.3 models the acquisition process applied in current
practice as game of incomplete information. In Section 3.4, the equilibrium of the game is
presented, given fixed prices. Section 3.5 presents the optimal acquisition prices based on the
equilibrium. In Section 3.6, we propose an acquisition process with bonus payments, discuss
how to incentivize product holders to true quality statements by the choice of bonuses, and
present the structure of the optimal bonus combination conditioned on truth-telling. Sec-
tion 3.7 compares both processes. Section 3.8 concludes with some managerial implications,
limitations, and suggestions for future research.
3.2. Related Literature
Our paper is situated in the research field regarding closed-loop supply chains. We refer the
reader to Guide and Van Wassenhove (2009), Souza (2013) and Govindan et al. (2015) for
literature reviews of this area. More specifically, we cover issues about the supply side of a
reverse supply chain, i.e., used-product acquisition. Fleischmann et al. (2010) provides an
overview of the literature regarding this field of research. Three specific research streams are
relevant to our work: quality-dependent acquisition pricing, the value of grading information,
and seller-buyer interaction in used-product acquisition.
Exploring the research field regarding product acquisition with a profit-oriented focus was
initiated by Guide and Jayaraman (2000) and Guide and Van Wassenhove (2001). Earlier
work mainly assumed an exogenous return process. Guide et al. (2003) introduced quality-
dependent acquisition pricing in order to manage the quantity and quality of product returns.
Ray et al. (2005) focus on trade-in rebates and assume a product’s quality to be a contin-
uous function of the product’s age. Karakayali et al. (2007) determine optimal acquisition
37
III. Used-Product Acquisition Processes with Quality Differentiation
prices for remanufactured parts for different reverse channel structures of an OEM. Hahler
and Fleischmann (2013) compare two collection system configurations. For the centralized
system, one quality-independent acquisition price is offered, whereas for the decentralized
system, there are finitely many quality-dependent acquisition prices. Bulmus¸ et al. (2014)
consider simultaneous quality-dependent acquisition pricing and sales pricing for new and
remanufactured products. Our paper contributes to this research stream regarding quality-
dependent acquisition pricing by considering the strategic behavior of both players in the
presented acquisition process for the pricing decisions.
The value of grading or yield information for subsequent processing of returned products
was first considered by Souza et al. (2002) and Ketzenberg et al. (2003). Souza et al. (2002)
concern themselves with the decision about remanufacturing returned products given a cer-
tain condition determined by imperfect grading. They find that reduction of grading errors
leads to decreased mean flow times in a remanufacturing network. Ketzenberg et al. (2003)
come to the same conclusion. Further studies analyze the value of grading information by
comparing remanufacturing systems with and without upfront grading. Aras et al. (2004),
Guide et al. (2005) and Zikopoulos and Tagaras (2008) contribute such studies. More re-
cently, Mutha et al. (2016) investigate whether third-party remanufacturers should acquire
used products with uncertain qualities or in sorted grades with known qualities and whether
to acquire and remanufacture cores before or after demand realization. We focus on grading
in a different manner. We present how grading can be shifted from firm to product holders by
incentivizing them to truthfully reveal their products’ qualities if interested in selling. This
is valuable for the firm because grading effort can be reduced if this information is given by
product holders.
Another stream of literature related to our work is on seller-buyer interaction in the ac-
quisition of used products. One aforementioned paper is Hahler and Fleischmann (2017).
They are the first to focus on the business field of recommerce and modeling this already-
mentioned specific acquisition process as a sequential game. They analyze the strategic
interaction under complete information and assume exogeneous acquisition prices. They de-
termine the optimal counteroffer under incomplete information using past data and applying
regression analysis. Another closely related paper is Go¨nsch (2014), which compares two
acquisition pricing strategies: offering one fixed price versus bargaining. For bargaining, no
specific negotiation process is considered, but the generalized Nash bargaining solution is
used. However, used products’ quality differences are not considered. We contribute to this
stream of literature by analyzing the currently applied process from the recommerce busi-
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ness under incomplete information. Additionally, we propose an acquisition mechanism that
enables the buying firm to incentivize product holders to state their products’ true qualities.
Finally, we introduce the quality-dependent pricing decision to this stream of research.
3.3. Model Setup
In this section, we formalize the initially presented common acquisition process, to which
we refer as ACP. Our model consists of four stages. The initial stage comprises the quality-
dependent pricing decision of the firm (she). Subsequent stages represent, first, the hand in
decision of a product holder (he), second, the counteroffer decision of the firm and, finally,
product holder’s decision whether to accept or reject the counteroffer. See Figure 3.1 for the
sequence of events.
We use the following notation and information structure: we assume the product holder
and firm to be risk-neutral expected payoff maximizers. Π denotes the firm’s expected profit,
whereas pi denotes the product holder’s expected payoff. We consider one type of product,
which can have finitely many qualities i ∈ {1, ..., n}. δi denotes the market share of the
quality i product in the used-product market that is accessible to the firm. We normalize
the whole market to 1, i.e.,
∑n
i=1 δi = 1. Every quality is characterized by the margin mi
that is achieved by the firm through reselling a product in quality i. This margin denotes
the reselling price net of all investments for transportation, handling, and reprocessing the
product except for the acquisition price. mi is not known by the product holder. We assume
the product holder to believe that mi is uniformly distributed on [mi,mi]. A product in
quality i exhibits a non-negative residual value vi for its holder. The distribution of these
values is common knowledge to the firm and product holders, and we assume the residual
values to be uniformly distributed on [vi, vi]. The firm, however, does not know a product
holder’s specific vi if a product submission takes place. We assume the quality-dependent
parameters mi,mi,mi, vi, vi to be increasing in i. Furthermore, we assume vi < mi for all
qualities i.
We model ACP as a four-stage sequential game, with stages 0, I, II, and III. In stage 0,
the firm sets the quality-dependent acquisition prices a1, ..., an. By aˆ = max1≤i≤n ai, we
denote the largest acquisition price value, which plays a special role in our analysis. In stage
I, the product holder decides to either keep his product or submit it and to state a quality
j ∈ {1, ..., n}, thereby requesting price aj . This decision is based on the following information
and beliefs that the holder has: the true quality of his used product i, the residual value vi,
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Figure 3.1.: Sequence of Events
the acquisition prices on the website corresponding to the quality levels, his prior belief about
the margin mi, and the assumption about rational behavior of the firm. If the product is
kept, the game ends, the product holder has payoff vi and the firm has payoff 0. If there is a
statement j, the product is sent to the firm. Then, in stage II, the firm determines the true
quality i. We assume perfect grading. Depending on the true quality i and stated quality j,
the firm decides to either accept to pay aj or to make a counteroffer coij ≥ 0. Acceptance ends
the game. The holder has payoff aj , and the firm has payoff mi − aj . Counteroffering leads
to stage III. Here, the product holder either accepts or rejects the counteroffer. Acceptance
leads to payoff coij for the holder and mi − coij for the firm. Rejection leads to payoff vi for
the holder and −c for the firm. Loss through rejection, c, comprises all investments made so
far for acquiring the product plus the transportation costs for sending the product back to
the holder.
Finally, we assume that if players are indifferent between two decisions regarding their
payoffs, they choose the decision that ends the game more quickly.
3.4. Equilibrium
In this section, we present the actions of the product holder and firm in equilibrium when
acquisition prices are fixed, i.e., the actions in stages I-III. Before we come to the formal
characterization of equilibria, we provide some preliminary thoughts about the optimal be-
havior of the firm and product holder to build up intuition and derive the most important
ingredients for the analysis.
First, note that the optimal action in stage III is straightforward. The product holder
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only has to compare counteroffer and residual value and choose the larger value by either
accepting or rejecting the counteroffer.
This behavior is anticipated by the firm in stage II when deciding about the counteroffer.
Furthermore, the firm knows quality statement j made in stage I and true quality i. This
equips the firm with an updated belief about vi according to Bayesian rationality, i.e., a
probability of whether a certain counteroffer is accepted, P(vi ≤ coij |j). The firm’s expected
payoff for making a counteroffer, which the firm seeks to maximize, is therefore the aver-
age of payoff for accepted counteroffer and payoff for rejected counteroffer weighted by the
probabilities for the corresponding outcomes:
Π(coij |j,mi) = P(vi ≤ coij |j)(mi − coij)
+ P(vi > coij |j)(−c)
If the maximum value of this function is greater than the payoff for accepting offer aj ,
mi − aj , then it is optimal for the firm to make the corresponding counteroffer.
In stage I, the product holder makes his hand in and quality statement decision based on
anticipation of the optimal actions in stages II and III, his knowledge about the true quality
i and residual value vi, and his belief about margin mi. His beliefs about the margin and
about the firm’s optimal behavior equip him with a probability for an offer aj being accepted,
P(Π(co∗ij |j,mi) ≤ mi − aj), where co∗ij = arg max Π(coij |j,mi). With the complementary
probability, the firm makes an optimal counteroffer which, depending on its size, is accepted
or rejected by the holder. Bringing this together, product holder’s expected payoff for handing
in and stating quality j is
pi(j|i, vi) =P(Π(co∗ij |j,mi) ≤ mi − aj)aj
+P(Π(co∗ij |j,mi) > mi − aj)
∫
Π(co∗ij |j,mi)+aj>mi
max{vi, co∗ij}dmi
If the maximum value of this function is greater than the payoff for keeping the product,
vi, then it is optimal for the holder to hand in and state the corresponding quality j.
Finally, note that it cannot be optimal for the firm to make counteroffers that are greater
than a requested acquisition price aj , i.e., coij < aj . She is always better off accepting the
offer. It follows that it cannot be optimal for a product holder to state j if aj < vi due to no
payoff in subsequent stages being greater than vi.
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The following proposition characterizes the equilibria of stages I-III. For brevity and ex-
positional clarity, all proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium Strategies). The following actions characterize the equi-
libria for stages I-III:
(I) Let v∗i = min{(mi + c + vi)/2, vi}. The product holder keeps the product if and only if
vi ≥ min{v∗i , aˆ}. If the holder hands in and states j, j satisfies aj ≥ min{v∗i , aˆ}.
(II) Let co∗i = min{(mi+c+vi)/2, vi}. The firm makes counteroffer co∗i if and only if offer
aj > co
∗
i . The firm accepts offer aj otherwise.
(III) The product holder accepts co∗i if and only if co
∗
i ≥ vi. The holder rejects the coun-
teroffer otherwise.
Since the optimal counteroffer only depends on the true quality i, not on the offer j, the
index j in co∗ij is dropped.
Regarding the optimal action in stage I, we observe that if there are several acquisition
prices greater than v∗i , all of them give the same (maximal) expected payoff for the holder and
hence are optimal. Nevertheless, aˆ always belongs to the set of optimal offers. Furthermore,
the course and payoffs of the game are the same for every such “likewise” optimal price.
Thus, aˆ is the only driver of the firm’s profit, which will be discussed in the upcoming section
in more detail.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the game dynamics depending on the relation between residual value
vi of the product of quality i for the holder and the largest acquisition price aˆ. If vi ≥ aˆ, then
it is not profitable for the holder to hand in (see the lower-right area). If co∗i > aˆ > vi, then
holder hands in for aˆ and the offer is accepted (see the lower-left area). If aˆ > co∗i , then the
holder hands in and triggers a counteroffer, which is either accepted or rejected, depending
on the relation between vi and co
∗
i (see the upper areas).
There are some noteworthy observations related to the game dynamics in equilibrium.
First, the firm does not learn the product’s true quality through the holder’s quality statement
because upward deviations from true quality statements are never bad for product holders.
Second, there can be product holders that hand in for aˆ > vi and have vi greater than
the optimal counteroffer co∗i . These holders cause losses to the firm due to reception of
counteroffers that they do not accept. Lowering the largest acquisition price can reduce the
amount of holders handing in and causing losses because handing in is only beneficial for
product holders if aˆ > vi.
Third, the two aspects of incomplete information drive the equilibria in different manners.
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Figure 3.2.: Equilibrium under ACP
If the firm knew product holders’ residual values, holders would not consider handing in
because it would never be beneficial for them. This is due to the fact that the firm would
always make a counteroffer that is less than or equal to the specific residual value, never
greater. Hence, perfect knowledge about residual values leads to a situation in which in
equilibrium, no acquisition occurs. If product holders knew the margins, no losses for the
firm in terms of rejected counteroffers would be caused. This is due to the fact that product
holders would perfectly anticipate the optimal counteroffers of the firm. Therefore, product
holders would know whether it is beneficial to hand in upfront and hence would only hand in
if this were the case, i.e., if they accepted the counteroffer. Hence, from the firm’s perspective,
knowledge about margins induces desirable behavior of product holders.
Finally, we present Corollary 3.1, which discusses a potential lever for the firm to increase
profits.
Corollary 3.1 (Payment for Participation - ACP). If product holders have to pay a
participation fee of  > 0 for a product submission, no one hands in, in equilibrium.
That charging product holders for participation results in this undesired equilibrium out-
come is basically due to the last mover advantage of the firm. It is always beneficial for
the firm to reduce the requested acquisition price by the cost for product holders because
product holders with a larger valuation than price net cost cannot gain anything by handing
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in. Hence, for this acquisition process, the firm is not able to charge money for participation.
Note that this also implies that the firm cannot transfer the payment of transportation cost
to product holders without deterring all of them from handing in.
3.5. Optimal Acquisition Prices
In this section, we investigate how acquisition prices have to be chosen to maximize the firm’s
expected profit. For this purpose, the previously determined equilibria and the probabilities
for submitted products having certain qualities are taken into account.
First, consider the firm’s profit in one quality class i. By Proposition 3.1 (compare also with
Figure 3.2), the firm’s equilibria payoffs depending on vi are as follows: if vi ∈ [min{v∗i , aˆ}, vi],
then the firm gains 0 because the holder does not hand in; if vi ∈ (min{co∗i , aˆ},min{v∗i , aˆ}),
then the firm has payoff −c because the holder triggers a counteroffer, which he rejects; and
if vi ∈ [vi,min{co∗i , aˆ}], then the firm has payoff mi−min{co∗i , aˆ} because either the product
holder is paid aˆ or he accepts the made counteroffer co∗i , depending on how aˆ and co
∗
i relate
to one another.
Note that the specific quality-dependent acquisition prices do not play a role in equilibrium.
The firm’s only decision variable that impacts its profit is the value of the greatest acquisition
price, aˆ. Therefore, after the optimal level of the largest price is found, one can arbitrarily
set the quality-dependent prices while making sure that all of them are not greater than aˆ
and that at least one price coincides with aˆ. One convenient choice is to set ai = min{co∗i , aˆ}.
This choice also ensures that there are no counteroffers for true quality statements.
With regard to the above interval boundaries which specify conditions for product holders’
behavior depending on vi, we define the upper bound for acceptance of the counteroffer,
cˆo∗i (aˆ) := min{co∗i , aˆ}, the upper bound for handing in, wi(aˆ) := min{v∗i , aˆ}, and an auxiliary
variable, wi(aˆ) := min{vi, aˆ} that ensures no profit or losses in quality i if aˆ ≤ vi.
Drawing on the above observations, the firm’s expected profit as a function of aˆ considering
only quality i is
ΠiACP (aˆ) = P(vi ≤ min{co∗i , aˆ})(mi −min{co∗i , aˆ})
+ P(min{co∗i , aˆ} < vi < min{v∗i , aˆ})(−c) + P(min{v∗i , aˆ} ≤ vi)0
=
1
vi − vi [(cˆo
∗
i (aˆ)− wi(aˆ))(mi − cˆo∗i (aˆ)) + (wi(aˆ)− cˆo∗i (aˆ))(−c)]
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Note that ΠiACP is equal to zero for aˆ < vi, quadratic concave in aˆ for vi < aˆ < co
∗
i ,
linearly decreasing in aˆ for co∗i ≤ aˆ < v∗i , and constant for aˆ > v∗i . Furthermore, ΠiACP is
differentiable except in vi and v
∗
i .
The following lemma presents the optimal largest price under negligence of all other quality
classes and the corresponding profit in quality class i.
Lemma 3.1 (Optimal Acquisition Price - Single Quality). Considering only quality
class i, it holds that aˆ∗ = min{(mi + vi)/2, vi} maximizes ΠiACP and
ΠiACP (aˆ
∗) =

(mi − vi)2/(4(vi − vi)) if (mi + vi)/2 ≤ vi
(mi − vi) otherwise
We observe that aˆ∗ is less than co∗i and plays the role of the hand-in cutoff level. It is
always paid for a quality i product submission, which implies that there are no losses due to
rejection.
In order to illustrate the single-quality case, we present Figure 3.3(a), which depicts the
profit and corresponding hand-in, sales, and rejection volumes in quality class 1 depending
on aˆ, given the stated parameter setting comprising three quality classes.
The classical price-volume trade-off reveals itself for aˆ less than co∗1. As the price increases,
the hand-in and sales volumes increase. If aˆ is greater than co∗1, the sales volume stays
constant, but the hand-in volume further increases. Here, product holders with residual
value greater than co∗1 are incentivized to hand in due to the high price, but they receive a
counteroffer that they reject. Product holders with v1 less than co
∗
1 accept the counteroffer.
As a next step, we investigate how to choose the highest price in order to maximize the
firm’s overall profit considering all quality classes. It is already intuitive that the choice of
aˆ is related to the trade-off between the achievable profits in different quality classes. The
firm’s total expected profit is just the weighted sum of all the quality-specific profits, where
the weights correspond to the market shares. The total profit is given by
ΠACP (aˆ) =
n∑
i=1
δiΠ
i
ACP (aˆ)
Due to the relation between ΠACP and the quality-specific profits, Π
i
ACP , the total profit
exhibits similar properties, i.e., it consists of constant, quadratic concave, and linear parts
and is differentiable except at finitely many (2n) points.
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Figure 3.3.: Firm’s Profit under ACP
(a) Quality 1 Profit and Volumes (b) Profit ΠACP
Parameters: c = 8; for quality 1: δ1 = 0.2 , m1 = 10, m1 = 14, m1 = 8, v1 = 12, v1 = 1; quality 2:
δ2 = 0.2, m2 = 25, m2 = 32, m2 = 20, v2 = 30, v2 = 12; quality 3: δ2 = 0.6, m3 = 30, m3 = 34,
m3 = 28, v3 = 32, v3 = 21.
In summary, the firm’s profit maximization problem is as follows:
P1 : max
aˆ
ΠACP (aˆ)
=
n∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi [(cˆo
∗
i (aˆ)− wi(aˆ))(mi − cˆo∗i (aˆ)) + (wi(aˆ)− cˆo∗i (aˆ))(−c)]
(3.1)
s.t. cˆo∗i (aˆ) = min{co∗i , aˆ} ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.2)
wi(aˆ) = min{v∗i , aˆ} ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.3)
wi(aˆ) = min{vi, aˆ} ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.4)
The following proposition characterizes the highest acquisition prices aˆ that locally solve
optimization problem P1.
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Proposition 3.2 (Locally Optimal Acquisition Prices). aˆ∗ locally maximizes ΠACP
if and only if there are 0 ≤ j ≤ k < l ≤ n such that
(i) aˆ∗ = (
∑k
i=j+1 δi(−c)/(vi− vi) +
∑l
i=k+1 δi(mi + vi)/(vi− vi))/(2
∑l
i=k+1 δi/(vi− vi)),
(ii) aˆ∗ > v∗i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j,
(iii) co∗i ≤ aˆ∗ < v∗i for all j < i ≤ k,
(iv) vi < aˆ
∗ < co∗i for all k < i ≤ l,
(v) aˆ∗ < vi for all l < i ≤ n.
The resulting total profit is given by
ΠACP (aˆ
∗) =
j∑
i=1
δi[(co
∗
i − vi)(mi − co∗i ) + (v∗i − co∗i )(−c)]/(vi − vi)
+
k∑
i=j+1
δi[(co
∗
i − vi)(mi − co∗i ) + (aˆ∗ − co∗i )(−c)]/(vi − vi)
+
l∑
i=k+1
δi(aˆ
∗ − vi)(mi − aˆ∗)/(vi − vi).
There are at most 3n− 2 local maxima.
Note that j, k, l determine how aˆ relates to co∗i , v
∗
i and vi for all quality classes i. The
profit-relevant intervals for aˆ are [vi, v
∗
i ] for all qualities i. Holders only hand in and cause
either losses or profits if the residual values belong to those intervals. If some of these quality-
specific intervals overlap, then the essential trade-off concerning the choice of aˆ within such
an overlap comprises balancing the profits of the corresponding quality classes.
The following corollary presents a simple procedure for determining the globally optimal
largest acquisition price aˆ by applying Proposition 3.2.
Corollary 3.2 (Finding the Global Optimum). Due to the profit function’s character-
istics, there has to be at least one global optimum. Considering Proposition 3.2, for every
triple (j, k, l) with k 6= l, determine aˆ∗ according to (i). Select all aˆ∗ for which conditions
(ii)-(v) are satisfied, and determine ΠACP (aˆ
∗). The one that yields the maximum profit is
the globally optimal one.
To illustrate Proposition 3.2, we present Figure 3.3(b), which depicts the total profit and
the quality-dependent profits times their market shares depending on aˆ for the indicated
setting comprising three quality classes. The profit concerning a single quality class depends
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on how all corresponding parameters relate to one another. No single parameter that drives
the optimal highest price can be identified. For example, there are identical market shares
for classes 1 and 2, but how losses and profits through sales relate to one another is quite
different when considering the shape of quality specific profit-curves. Contrarily, the market
shares of qualities 1 and 3 deviate from one another, but the distances between the remaining
parameters coincide. Therefore, the profits follow the same “shape”, with the difference that
the slope is steeper for quality 3, and therefore, the profits are magnified.
Considering the globally optimal largest price, we observe the mentioned trade-off of bal-
ancing the profits of quality classes 2 and 3. We see that the profit in class 2 has a negative
slope in the optimal price, whereas the slope of the class 3 profit is positive here. Consider-
ing Proposition 3.2, the globally optimal price is equal to aˆ∗ = (δ2(−c)/(v2 − v2) + δ3(m3 +
v3)/(v3 − v3))/(2δ3/(v3 − v3)) = 24.69. Hence, one optimal choice for the acquisition prices
is to set a3 = aˆ
∗, a2 = co∗2 = 22.5, and a1 = co
∗
1 = 9.5. By this choice, product holders
with quality-1 and quality-2 products request aˆ∗, thereby triggering corresponding counterof-
fers that coincide with the respective quality-specific acquisition prices. Quality-3 product
holders are paid acquisition price a3 = aˆ
∗. Hence, the firm incurs losses through rejection
in quality class 1 caused by product holders with v1 ∈ (co∗1, v∗1) = (9.5, 11.5) and in class 2
caused by holders with v2 ∈ (co∗2, aˆ∗) = (22.5, 24.69) .
Finally, we remark that ACP leads to higher profit than the acquisition without quality
differentiation. Acquisition without quality differentiation means offering only one fixed
acquisition price independent of the condition of the product. To this end, assume that the
optimal acquisition price, which does not depend on a product’s quality, is given. Then, for
ACP, aˆ can be set equal to this price. If it is profitable to make counteroffers for submissions
of products with certain qualities, the firm can do so if ACP is applied. This is not the case
for having only one fixed quality-independent acquisition price. Thus, basically, the benefit is
that reacting to low-quality product submissions is feasible when ACP is applied. Therefore,
ACP is always preferable to the acquisition without quality differentiation.
3.6. Alternative Acquisition Process
Now that have we analyzed ACP with regard to the dynamics between the involved parties
and found how to choose prices to maximize the firm’s profit, we turn our attention to modi-
fying this process. The reasons for modification are as follows: we have observed that in ACP,
losses for the firm are caused due to rejections of counteroffers. Counteroffers are triggered
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by product holders because they have an incentive to exaggerate their products’ qualities.
Those exaggerations are mainly due to product holders imperfectly anticipating the firm’s
optimal counteroffers. Hence, if the firm wants to avoid losses, she has to incentivize holders
to not trigger counteroffers. This can be achieved by two means: (i) the firm’s commitment
to and upfront communication of counteroffers to avoid product holders’ speculation about
the firm’s reaction to quality statements and (ii) the correct balance of acquisition prices to
signal to holders that they will not receive counteroffers for true quality statements. Addi-
tional potential benefits of having true quality statements are the following: testing effort
and time could be reduced due to the firm being certain about products having the stated
qualities, the cost factor comprising the organizational unit for sending products back could
be reduced because holders are paid the requested money for true statements, and the firm’s
long-term relation to product holders could be enhanced due to product holders not receiving
counteroffers being better publicity.
In order to introduce the firm’s commitment to a counteroffer to the acquisition process,
we modify ACP in the following manner: we give up the quality-dependent acquisition prices
and instead introduce a quality-independent counteroffer as a fixed guaranteed price that is
paid independently of the quality statement if the product is sold. Additionally, we intro-
duce quality-dependent bonus payments paid for true quality statements. Then, the bonus
payment plus a fixed price takes the role of the quality-dependent acquisition price of ACP,
and the fixed price takes the role of any counteroffer. We denote this modified acquisition
process by ABP.
Regarding Figure 3.1, the formal differences between ABP and ACP are the following: in
stage 0, the firm sets the fixed price a and the quality-dependent bonus payments bi for all
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. Moreover, for the payoffs in subsequent stages, aj is replaced by a + bj , and
coij is replaced by a.
3.6.1. Inducement to Truth-Telling
As initially discussed, incentivizing product holders to provide true quality statements and
paying corresponding prices resolves the issue of rejections and has beneficial consequences.
Therefore, we investigate how ABP can be used to assure true quality statements. To this end,
we present conditions for the payments that induce true quality statements, i.e., conditions
that cause the following equilibrium in stages I-III: for every quality i, a product holder with
quality-i product either hands in, states the true quality of his product, and is paid fixed
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price plus bonus or else does not hand in at all. This is accomplished by fixing a and bi in a
manner such that every product holder’s expected payoff for stating the true quality is not
less than the payoff for stating the wrong quality. Formally, those conditions for the choice
of a and bi for all quality classes i are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 (Incentives for True Quality Statements). Assume that the fol-
lowing hold:
(i) bi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n},
(ii) 0 ≤ a ≤ v1,
(iii) a+ bi ≤ mi + c for all i ∈ {1, ..., n},
(iv) bi = bi−1, or a+ bi ≥ mi−1 + c for all i ∈ {2, ..., n}.
Then, in equilibrium, for all i ∈ {1, ..., n}, product holder with quality-i product hands in,
states the true quality and is paid a+ bi if and only if vi < a+ bi. Otherwise, the product is
kept.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) together signal to the product holder that if he states true quality
i, he will receive a + bi with probability 1. Conditions (ii) and (iv) signal to the product
holder that if a quality related to a higher bonus is stated instead of the true quality, the
firm will not pay this requested higher bonus with probability 1.
Compared to ACP, we observe that here also, the extent of product holders’ uncertainty
about margins has an impact on the firm’s acquisition performance. This dependence is
due to the fact that the narrower the margin related intervals are, the more freedom for the
choice of bonuses is given (see conditions (iii) and (iv)). The impact of c, the loss through
rejection, on ABP is different from its impact on ACP. The larger c is, the larger is the upper
bound for bi regarding (iii), but the lower bound for bi is larger too, regarding condition (iv).
Hence, it is not obvious upfront whether an increase in the loss through rejection could even
be beneficial for the firm regarding the choice of bonuses.
Finally, we present the following corollary, which, as for ACP, discusses payment for partic-
ipation as another potential lever for the firm to increase profits when ABP with true quality
statements is applied.
Corollary 3.3 (Payment for Participation - ABP). Assume that product holders have
to pay a participation fee of  > 0 for a product submission, conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) from
Proposition 3.3 hold, and condition (ii) is replaced by 0 ≤ a ≤ v1 − . Then, in equilibrium,
for all i, product holders with quality i product hand in, state the true quality, pay , and are
paid a+ bi if and only if vi < a+ bi − . Otherwise, the product is kept.
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In contrast to ACP, the firm is able to charge product holders for participation without
deterring all of them from handing in. This possibility entails another means for the firm to
influence profit. This option is not further investigated in our analysis but is still a noteworthy
benefit of ABP.
3.6.2. Optimal Bonus Payments Inducing Truth-Telling
Similarly as for ACP, we now turn our attention towards the optimal fixed price and bonus
payments for ABP-inducing true quality statements. We follow the same structure as in
Section 3.5 and start by considering a single quality class. Afterward, we extend the analysis
to the general case comprising multiple quality classes.
If the conditions of Proposition 3.3 are satisfied (i.e., product holders are truthful and the
firm pays bonuses for truthfulness), the firm’s payoffs depending on vi in one quality class i
are as follows: if vi ∈ [vi,max{min{vi, a + bi}, vi}), then the firm has payoff mi − (a + bi).
If vi ∈ [max{min{vi, a + bi}, vi}, vi], then the firm has payoff 0. Note that the firm never
has payoff mi − a or −c if the conditions of Proposition 3.3 hold. With regard to the above
interval boundaries, we define wi(a, bi) := max{min{vi, a+bi}, vi}, which is the upper bound
for vi for handing in. The firm’s expected profit considering only one quality class i is given
by
ΠiABP (a, bi) = P(vi < a+ bi)(mi − (a+ bi)) + P(vi ≥ a+ bi)0
=
1
vi − vi (wi(a, bi)− vi)(mi − (a+ bi))
The firm’s total expected profit under consideration of all qualities is just the weighted
sum of all these quality-specific profits and given by
ΠABP (a, b1, ..., bn) =
n∑
i=1
δiΠ
i
ABP (a, bi)
Furthermore, to ensure true quality statements, the conditions from Proposition 3.3 have
to be incorporated into the model as constraints. This is straightforward except for condition
(iv). We introduce quality-dependent, binary variables yi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ {2, ..., n} to
properly capture this condition. Intuitively, yi = 0 implies that bi and bi−1 have to differ and
both have to meet different lower bounds, whereas yi = 1 forces bi = bi−1 sharing the same
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(less restrictive) lower bound. The firm’s optimization problem is as follows:
P2 : max
a,b1,...,bn,y2,...,yn
ΠABP (a, b1, ..., bn)
=
n∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi (mi − (a+ bi))(wi(a, bi)− vi)
(3.5)
s.t. wi(a, bi) = min{max{a+ bi, vi}, vi} ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.6)
a+ bi ≤ mi + c ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.7)
a+ bi ≥ (1− yi)(mi−1 + c) ∀i ∈ {2, ..., n} (3.8)
yi(bi − bi−1) = 0 ∀i ∈ {2, ..., n} (3.9)
a ≤ v1 (3.10)
a, bi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n} (3.11)
yi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ {2, ..., n} (3.12)
Note that if a∗, b∗1, ..., b
∗
n solve the problem, then a
′∗ = 0 and b′∗i = a
∗+ b∗i for all i solve the
problem as well. Therefore, without loss of generality, we set a = 0 for the rest of the paper
and do not consider a as a decision variable anymore.
Next, we investigate the structure of the locally optimal bonus payments given fixed binary
variables yi, i ∈ {2, ..., n}. The reason for this choice is that if we are able to characterize the
optimal solutions given fixed binary variables, we can simply go through the finitely many
possibilities for the choice of values for those variables and thereby find the global optimum.
Note that yi = 1 has to hold if mi < mi−1. Otherwise, satisfying both constraints (3.7)
and (3.8) is not feasible. Furthermore, note that having all binary variables fixed induces
disjunctive index sets I1,...,Ir, where
⋃r
k=1 Ik = {1, ..., n} and r = n −
∑n
i=2 yi, with the
following characterization: if yi = 1, then i− 1 and i belong to the same index set. If yi = 0,
then i − 1 ∈ Ik and i ∈ Ik+1 for some k ≤ r − 1. Then, for indices in the same index set,
we have identical corresponding bonuses, whereas for indices in different sets, the bonuses
must differ. Making use of those index sets, we can define ΠIkABP :=
∑
i∈Ik δiΠ
i
ABP . Then,
for fixed binary variables, we have ΠABP =
∑r
k=1
∑
i∈Ik δiΠ
i
ABP =
∑r
k=1 Π
Ik
ABP .
Now, if the binary variables are fixed, problem P2 can be split up into r independent
subproblems. Each subproblem only contains bonuses corresponding to indices of the same
index set. Hence, there is only one decision variable per subproblem due to those bonuses
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having to coincide by constraint (3.9).
Considering only one subproblem, we drop index k ∈ {1, ..., r} and assume that I =
{j, ..., j + u}, which means that yj+1 = ... = yj+u = 1 and yj = yj+u+1 = 0 by definition
of such an index set. Furthermore, instead of writing bj , ..., bj+u, we write bˆ because the
bonuses corresponding to I have to coincide. Since all considered yi are fixed, we insert the
corresponding values into the subproblem, which is then as follows:
P2− S : max
bˆ
ΠIABP (bˆ) =
j+u∑
i=j
δi
vi − vi (mi − bˆ)(wi(bˆ)− vi) (3.13)
s.t. wi(bˆ) = min{max{bˆ, vi}, vi} ∀i ∈ I (3.14)
bˆ ≤ mj + c (3.15)
bˆ ≥ mj−1 + c (3.16)
m0 = 0 (3.17)
Bridging the gap with Section 3.5, we again have an optimization problem with only one
decision variable, in which the objective function exhibits a similar structure as the one in
problem P1: it consists of constant and quadratic concave parts and is differentiable except
in vi and vi. New are the truth-telling constraints, which represent lower and upper bounds
on bˆ.
The following lemma characterizes all possible locally optimal solutions for P2− S.
Lemma 3.2 (Locally Optimal Bonus Payment - P2-S). bˆ∗ locally solves problem
P2 − S if and only if mj−1 + c ≤ bˆ∗ ≤ mj + c, and there are s, t ∈ I such that bˆ∗ ≥ vl for
j ≤ l ≤ s, vl < bˆ∗ < vl for s < l ≤ t, bˆ∗ ≤ vl for t < l, and
(i) bˆ∗ = (
∑t
i=s+1 δi(mi + vi)/(vi − vi)−
∑s
i=j δi)/(2
∑t
i=s+1 δi/(vi − vi)), or
(ii) bˆ∗ = vp, some p ∈ I, limx↑vp(∂ΠIABP /∂bˆ)(x) ≥ 0, limx↓vp(∂ΠIABP /∂bˆ)(x) ≤ 0, or
(iii) bˆ∗ = mj−1 + c and (∂ΠIABP /∂bˆ)(bˆ
∗) < 0, or
(iv) bˆ∗ = mj + c and (∂ΠIABP /∂bˆ)(bˆ
∗) > 0.
The resulting profit for index set I is given by
ΠIABP (bˆ
∗) =
s∑
i=j
δi(mi − bˆ∗) +
t∑
i=s+1
δi
vi − vi (bˆ
∗ − vi)(mi − bˆ∗).
By using Lemma 3.2, we are now able to characterize all locally optimal solutions for
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problem P2. When the binary variables are fixed, there is no interrelation between the index
sets and corresponding bonuses. All bonuses can be chosen according to the preceding lemma.
Then, one only has to sum over the index sets. This is formally summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.4 (Locally Optimal Bonus Payments). Let yi = 1 if mi < mi−1, and
let all other yi be arbitrarily fixed. Let I1, ..., Ir be such that
⋃r
k=1 Ik = {1, ..., n}. If yi = 0,
let i − 1 ∈ Ik and i ∈ Ik+1 for one k ∈ {1, ..., r − 1}, and if yi = 1, let i, i − 1 ∈ Ik for one
k ∈ {1, ..., r}. Let a = 0 in problem P2. Then, bˆ∗1, ..., bˆ∗r locally solve P2 if and only if for all
k ∈ {1, ..., r}, bˆ∗k locally solve P2 − S for Ik in the sense of Lemma 3.2. The resulting total
profit is given by
ΠABP (bˆ
∗
1, ..., bˆ
∗
r) =
r∑
k=1
[
sk∑
i=jk
δi(mi − bˆ∗k) +
tk∑
i=sk+1
δi
vi − vi (bˆ
∗
k − vi)(mi − bˆ∗k)].
A similar procedure as for finding the globally optimal solution for P1 given in Corollary 3.2
can be specified for the globally optimal solution for P2 by use of Lemma 3.2 and Proposition
3.4. This procedure is summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.4 (Finding the Global Optimum). Due to the profit function’s characteris-
tics, there must be at least one global optimum. Considering Proposition 3.4, for every feasible
value combination of binary variables yi, do the following: for every index set I1, ..., Ir, find
bˆ∗k, k ∈ {1, ..., r} that globally solves P2− S for Ik by going through the different possibilities
given in Lemma 3.2. The resulting bonus combination is the globally optimal solution given
the fixed value combination of binary variables. The value combination of binary variables
that generates the highest overall profit ΠABP is the globally optimal one.
To illustrate our findings, we again draw on the example comprising three quality classes
already indicated in Figure 3.3. Furthermore, we fix the new corresponding binary variables
to y2 = 0 and y3 = 1, thus inducing index sets I1 = {1} and I2 = {2, 3}. Therefore, two
corresponding bonuses bˆ1 = b1 and bˆ2 = b2 = b3 are considered. The resulting profits are
depicted in Figure 3.4.
The feasible range for bonus bˆ1 is between 0 and m1 + c. The range for bonus bˆ2 cor-
responding to qualities 2 and 3 is located between m1 + c and m2 + c. The lower bound
ensures that product holders with a quality-1 product do not state quality 2 or 3. They know
upfront that stating the incorrect quality will result in not getting paid the corresponding
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Figure 3.4.: Firm’s Profit under ABP
(a) Profit in I1 = {1} (b) Profit in I2 = {2, 3}
Parameters: c = 8; for quality 1: δ1 = 0.2 , m1 = 10, m1 = 14, m1 = 8, v1 = 12, v1 = 1; quality 2:
δ2 = 0.2, m2 = 25, m2 = 32, m2 = 20, v2 = 30, v2 = 12; quality 3: δ2 = 0.6, m3 = 30, m3 = 34,
m3 = 28, v3 = 32, v3 = 21.
bonus. The upper bound ensures that product holders with a quality-2 or quality-3 product
know that they will definitely be paid the corresponding bonus.
Deciding about bonuses within the allowed ranges comprises the natural price-volume
trade-off. For I1, it is obvious that the larger the bonus is, the more holders are willing to
sell. The optimal bonus is given by bˆ∗1 = (δ1(m1 + v1)/(v1 − v1))/(2δ1/(v1 − v1)) = 5.5 by
Lemma 3.2. The corresponding maximum profit is ΠI1ABP (bˆ
∗
1) = 0.37. The profit in I2 has its
maximum in an area where the intervals for residual values of qualities 2 and 3 overlap. By
Lemma 3.2, we have bˆ∗2 = (
∑3
i=2 δi(mi + vi)/(vi − vi))/(2
∑3
i=2 δi/(vi − vi)) = 24.32. The
corresponding maximum profit is ΠI2ABP (bˆ
∗
2) = 1.12. Hence, the total maximum profit if the
binary variables are fixed such that quality classes 2 and 3 are combined is ΠABP (bˆ
∗
1, bˆ
∗
2) =
0.37 + 1.12 = 1.49.
To find the globally optimal solution for the example, by Corollary 3.4, we have to consider
every feasible combination of binary variable values. Note that y3 = 1 must hold because
m2 > m3. Otherwise, satisfying (3.7) and (3.8) simultaneously is not possible. Hence, the
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remaining possibility is to consider y2 = y3 = 1. Solving the problem leads to ΠABP = 0.37.
Therefore, choosing y2 = 0 and y3 = 1 is optimal. This conclusion is basically due to
the following: if y2 = y3 = 1, all bonuses have to coincide and respect the upper bound
m1 + c = 16 to signal to product holders that the bonus is paid for true quality statements.
However, since 16 < v3, no product holder with a quality-3 product hands in, and 60%
of potential sales are lost. Additionally, in this situation, it is suboptimal to even access
quality-2 product holders because the firm would pay too much for quality-1 products. If
y2 = 0 and y3 = 1, then the firm receives the same gains in class 1 as in the other situation,
but additionally, she profitably buys products from quality-2 and quality-3 product holders
because the bonuses for class 1 and for classes 2 and 3 must differ.
Before proceeding to the next section, in which ACP and ABP are compared with regard
to profitability, we briefly summarize the most important structural differences between the
investigated acquisition processes: due to the dynamics of ACP, the firm’s only lever to
affect profit is the level of the highest acquisition price. Quality-dependent acquisition prices
can be arbitrarily fixed as long as they are not greater than this level. Moreover, the firm
can react to incorrect quality statements with quality-specific counteroffers. For ABP, the
firm’s decision variables are the quality-dependent bonus payments, which have to satisfy
several constraints to ensure truth-telling, and binary variables, which cause combination of
neighboring quality classes by offering identical or different bonuses. Here, the firm does not
have any freedom in the choice of counteroffers during a single submission because they are
fixed beforehand.
3.7. Process Comparison
Now that we know how the maximum profit for ACP and ABP with true quality statements
can be determined with the corresponding prices/bonuses, we turn our attention to comparing
both processes with regard to profitability. To this end, let Π∗ACP be the profit resulting
from the solution for P1 and Π∗ABP the profit resulting from the solution for P2. As a first
important result, note the following corollary.
Corollary 3.5 (Benchmark Profit). If b∗i = min{vi, (mi + vi)/2} for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} is
a feasible solution for P2, then it is optimal, and Π∗ABP ≥ Π∗ACP .
Corollary 3.5 reveals that the optimal solution for the unconstrained problem P2 always
leads to higher profits than the optimal solution for P1. Intuitively, this observation tells
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us that the closer the optimal bonus payments solving P2 are to the stated solution of the
unconstrained problem, the more likely ABP is to be more profitable than ACP. This means
that product holders’ truth-telling is desirable from firm’s perspective as long as it is cheap
with regard to truth-telling constraints for bonuses.
Optimization problems P1 and P2 differ structurally, and the complexity of an insightful
comparison strongly increases with the number of quality classes. Therefore, for the following,
we make simplifying assumptions about parameter constellations in order to allow for an
analytical investigation about when which process is more profitable. Afterward, we illustrate
the findings, and based on the analysis, we conclude with general conjectures.
Assumptions for Comparison:
(i) v1 = 0.
(ii) There are nonnegative parameters K,L,R, such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, K = mi− vi =
vi −mi, L = mi −mi = mi −mi and for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n, R = mi −mi−1.
(iii) R ≥ 2K and R ≥ K − L+ c.
(iv) δi/δi−1 ≥ δi+1/δi for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} and δ0 = δn+1 = 0.
Assumption (i) is just a rescaling that does not have any effect on structural properties.
Assumption (ii) ensures that every quality class has the same structure, i.e., the distances
between parameters within one quality class are the same for all quality classes, which sup-
ports an insightful comparison. R denotes the distance between quality-dependent margins,
L captures the uncertainty about margins, and K captures the product holder heterogeneity
with regard to residual values. Assumptions (i) and (ii) imply the following representation
of parameters for all i: mi = (i− 1)R+K, mi = (i− 1)R+K − L, mi = (i− 1)R+K + L,
vi = (i − 1)R + 2K, vi = (i − 1)R. Note that L ≤ K has to hold to satisfy vi ≤ mi.
The first inequality of assumption (iii) says that the vi intervals do not overlap for different
qualities: vi ≤ vi+1 for all i ≤ n − 1. The second inequality implies that mi + c ≤ vi+1 for
all i ≤ n − 1. Assumption (iv) limits the possibilities for how market shares relate to one
another. Still, it captures various imaginable scenarios. For instance, if δi+1/δi ≥ 1 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, then δi is non-decreasing in i, which potentially applies to products shortly
after market launch. If δi+1/δi ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, then δi is non-increasing in
i, which potentially applies to products that are close to the ends of their life cycles or to
products that have an inherent high abrasion. Uniform distribution is also representable.
The maximal profits for the assumptions are presented in Proposition 5. The corresponding
terms follow from Propositions 3.2 and 3.4.
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Proposition 3.5 (Optimal Profit). Under assumptions (i)-(iv), it holds that
Π∗ACP =

δj
K
8 +
∑j−1
i=1 δi[
K
8 − c(2L+c)8K ] with j = maxi≤n i :
δi
δi−1 ≥
c(2L+c)
K2 if
L+c
2 ≤ 32K
δj
K
8 +
∑j−1
i=1 δi[
K
8 − c(6K−c)8K ] with j = maxi≤n i :
δi
δi−1 ≥
c(6K−c)
K2 if
c
2 ≤ 32K ≤ L+c2
δj
K
8 −
∑j−1
i=1 δiK with j = maxi≤n
i : δiδi−1 ≥ 9 if 32K ≤ c2
Π∗ABP =

δ1
K
8 if R ≤ L+ c
K
8 − 18K (1− δ1)(K − 2(R− L− c))2 if R− K2 ≤ L+ c ≤ R
K
8 if L+ c ≤ R− K2 ≤ R− L+ c
K
8 − 18K (2(L− c)−K)2 if R− L+ c ≤ R− K2
The three cases for Π∗ACP differ in terms of the structure of the cutoff levels for handing
in, v∗i , and the optimal counteroffers, co
∗
i , mainly depending on the size of loss through
rejection c. The four cases for Π∗ABP differ in how the upper and lower truth-telling bounds
for bonuses indicated by constraints (3.7) and (3.8) of problem P2 relate to the solutions for
the unconstrained problem P2 indicated in Corollary 3.5.
Based on the assumptions and the presented terms in Proposition 3.5, the following lemma
captures insights about when one of the processes is more profitable than the other.
Lemma 3.3 (Profit Observations). Under assumptions (i)-(iv), the following hold:
(i) If L ≤ c+K/2 ≤ R− L, then Π∗ABP ≥ Π∗ACP .
(ii) If L+ c ≥ 3K, and δi+1/δi ≤ 6 for all i, then Π∗ABP ≥ Π∗ACP .
(iii) If L+ c ≥ R, then Π∗ABP ≤ Π∗ACP .
(iv) If c ≤ K/16, L ≥ 3K/4, and δi+1/δi ≥ 1/7 for all i, then Π∗ABP ≤ Π∗ACP .
(v) Π∗ACP and Π
∗
ABP are non-increasing in L. Π
∗
ACP is non-increasing in c.
The sufficient condition in observation (i) implies that the optimal solution of the uncon-
strained problem P2 is a feasible solution for the constrained problem P2 and hence optimal
(see also Corollary 3.5). Intuitively, if the distance between margins is sufficiently large to
compensate loss due to rejection and uncertainty about margins, then product holders are
naturally incentivized to truth-telling if bonuses are chosen optimally without considering the
truth-telling constraints. Observation (ii) states that if c is large compared to the residual
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value heterogeneity, K, it is beneficial to apply ABP because in ACP, it is crucial for the
firm to avoid costly rejections, and therefore, it is optimal to set the highest acquisition price
to be very low. This results in only quality-1 product holders handing in, whereas acqui-
sitions of products with better quality does not occur. Observation (iii) states that if c is
large compared to the distance between margins, R, ABP is less profitable than ACP. Here,
having differing bonuses for different quality classes would be costly for the firm. Therefore,
it is optimal to combine all quality classes by offering identical bonuses. Then, for ABP,
only quality-1 product holders hand in. If the conditions of observations (ii) and (iii) apply
simultaneously, it makes no difference in terms of profits whether ABP or ACP is applied.
Observation (iv) states that a very small loss due to rejection in combination with a quite
large uncertainty about margins favors applying ACP over ABP. Here, it is optimal to choose
bonuses to be quite small to signal to product holders that they are paid the bonuses for
true quality statements. This results in only few product holders handing in. For ACP, a
very small loss due to rejection implies no fierce consequences of rejections. Consequently,
under these circumstances, it is optimal to choose a very high highest acquisition price to
access all quality classes. Finally, observation (v) shows that both profits are non-increasing
in the uncertainty about margins, L, and Π∗ACP is non-increasing in loss due to rejection, c.
Intuitively, the higher the uncertainty about margins is, the more holders that cause losses
by rejecting counteroffers are incentivized to hand in if ACP is applied. For ABP, considering
one quality class, an increase in uncertainty might force a lower bonus to signal to product
holders that they are paid the bonus for a true statement. Moreover, an increase in the
uncertainty corresponding to a lower quality class might force a larger bonus to ensure that
holders with lower-quality products are signaled that they will not be paid the bonus for the
considered quality if stated.
For illustration, Figure 3.5 displays how the profits change for varying parameters c, L,
R, and K based on the indicated parameter setting, which comprises five quality classes and
satisfies assumptions (i)-(iv).
Not surprisingly, the loss due to rejection c always has a negative impact, if any, on ACP’s
profit, which is in line with Lemma 3.3 (v). For ABP, the effect varies. In the depicted
situation, Π∗ABP is first increasing, then constant, and then decreasing in c. For very small
c and if the uncertainty about margins, L, is quite large, bonuses are chosen to be small
compared to the solution of the unconstrained problem P2 to signal to product holders that
bonuses are paid for true statements. For large c, bonuses are large. This signals to holders
that they are not paid larger bonuses for upward deviations from true quality statements.
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Figure 3.5.: Firm’s Optimal Profit - Comparison of ACP and ABP
Parameters: δ1 = 0.05, δ2 = 0.25, δ3 = 0.3, δ4 = 0.25, δ5 = 0.15, K = 6, L = 5, R = 15, c = 9.
The uncertainty about margins, L, has a negative impact on both profits, as indicated in
Lemma 3.3 (v). One can observe that for ABP, the impact is much more crucial. For ACP,
the effect is constantly negative, until it no longer has an effect. The distance between
margins, R, does not have any effect on ACP, which is in line with the terms in Proposition
3.5. For ABP, there is either no effect, or it is positive because that distance compensates
the negative effects of margin uncertainties or loss through rejection. Finally, profits are
increasing in the heterogeneity of residual values, K which is mainly due to the price-volume
trade-off when deciding about payments (acquisition prices, counteroffers, or bonuses). For
larger heterogeneity, smaller payments must be chosen to generate the same sales volumes.
To conclude our comparison of ABP and ACP with regard to profitability, we summarize
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the most significant impacts of the parameters in the following conjectures.
Conjecture 3.1. Applying ABP with truth-telling is more profitable than applying ACP if
the distance between quality-dependent margins is large.
This implies that the acquisition mode choice is closely related to a product’s architecture.
For example, if a product consists of expensive components that must be replaced instead
of repaired if damaged, then there might be large gaps between quality-dependent margins
due to high expenses for every component that has to be replaced. For acquisition of those
products, it is advisable to apply ABP with truth-telling.
Conjecture 3.2. Applying ACP is more profitable than applying ABP with truth-telling if
the uncertainty about quality-dependent margins of product holders is high.
This implies that the trade-off for the firm between revelation of business data to con-
vincingly inform product holders about margins and closeness about that information with
regard to market competition is more crucial for ABP than for ACP.
To summarize, neither of the presented acquisition processes dominates the other in terms
of profit. Firms must thoroughly analyze products’ and the used-product market’s character-
istics to decide which process to implement. Both presented processes exhibit special benefits
and drawbacks.
3.8. Conclusions
Our work is concerned with the question of how a firm should acquire used products in
order to reprocess and sell them. As a starting point, we investigate an acquisition process
with quality differentiation widely applied in the business field of recommerce with game-
theoretical methods under incomplete information. We characterize the equilibrium, which
serves as the basis for determining the optimal quality-dependent acquisition prices. The
equilibrium reveals that product holders have an incentive to upward deviations from true
quality statements, which is in line with existing observations. Due to this incentive issue,
which induces losses for firms, we propose a modified process with bonus payments, which
allows for incentivizing product holders to provide true quality statements if the bonuses
satisfy certain conditions. We determine the optimal quality-dependent bonuses that induce
true quality statements. After investigation of both processes in isolation, we investigate
under what conditions one process is more profitable than the other one. To the best of
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our knowledge, we are the first to bring together quality-dependent acquisition pricing and
strategic interaction between the seller and buyer under information asymmetries in reverse
logistics, which is crucial for firms reprocessing and selling used products in order to secure
sufficient and cheap supply.
From a managerial perspective, we find that being transparent about cost and profit struc-
ture can be beneficial for firms to reduce product holders’ uncertainty about firm perfor-
mance. This aspect of incomplete information of product holders has a negative impact on
profit in both processes. However, firms might be reluctant to share this information due to
competitive advantages.
Another important, but less surprising, observation is that reduction of the loss through
rejection is beneficial for the firm if the common process is applied. Due to the fact that
transportation costs constitute a large share of this parameter, firms should carefully decide
about how centralized or decentralized the network should be set up. Interestingly, for
the process with bonus payments, the impact of loss due to rejection on profit can, under
certain circumstances, also be positive. Moreover, we identified a participation fee as another
potentially profitable lever for the firm when the process with bonus payments is applied.
There are some noteworthy limiting assumptions underlying the presented models and
some potential extensions that should be mentioned. That the heterogeneity of product
holder’s residual values and uncertainty about margins are common knowledge to firm and
product holders is one sacrifice we must make to be able to analyze the process as a game
with incomplete information. Furthermore, we assume that product holders can perfectly
determine products’ qualities. In many cases, there are helpful explanations and examples on
websites that afford product holders quite precise quality assessments. Still, there might be a
small amount of uncertainty left, which could be taken into account in further investigations.
We account for competition only in a static manner. We assume that there is a market for used
products that is segmented in a certain manner depending on quality and that is accessible
by the firm depending on the pricing. Future research regarding dynamic competition in such
an acquisition environment might provide interesting new insights for firms. Although we
consider volume and long-term effects in our analysis, given the prevalence customer reviews
on the Internet about the service of and their experience with firms, another possible direction
for future research is to analyze repeated acquisition games with reputation effects. Moreover,
one could also consider having a proportion of product holders stating true qualities. We
suspect that this will have an interesting impact on the pricing decision and is probably more
realistic than assuming that all product holders act strategically. Furthermore, empirical
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research regarding product holders’ behavior when confronted with such acquisition processes
is an interesting subject for future work. Finally, the investigation of how product holders
value their products and of their beliefs about the potential margins of products for a firm,
are, from our perspective, fruitful avenues for the future.
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Chapter IV
Used-Product Acquisition Through an
Intermediary
with Moritz Fleischmann and Jochen Schlapp1
4.1. Introduction
Quality-dependent pricing policies are one important lever to exploit used products’ quality
differences in the acquisition (Guide et al. 2003). Recommerce providers, such as Gazelle,
ReBuy, and FLIP4NEW (F4N), whose success is crucially dependent on the economic supply
with used products are one prime example for such policies. F4N, a German recommerce
provider operating in parts of Europe, buys, re-processes, and re-sells mostly small electronic
devices. Besides its prominent online acquisition channel (see, e.g., Hahler and Fleischmann
2017), F4N also runs oﬄine channels in which it collaborates with various partner stores
to reach additional, potential used-product sellers that are not accessible otherwise. This
collaboration is accompanied by asymmetric information concerning the acquisition process
at those partner stores, which can result in incentive conflicts.
Our work is motivated by this business situation. We address questions about how to ac-
quire used products through an intermediary under the natural presence of products’ quality
heterogeneity and asymmetric information.
The detailed acquisition process in the motivating example is as follows. Before products
can be acquired, F4N (from now on, “the firm”) has to fix acquisition prices for products of
different qualities. In practice, the prices coincide with those on the firm’s website for the
online acquisition. A product holder interested in selling an old product can visit the partner
store (from now on, “the retailer”), where it is tested using similar but simpler criteria as
1The research presented in this chapter is based on a paper entitled “Used-Product Acquisition
through an Intermediary under Quality Heterogeneity”, coauthored with Moritz Fleischmann
and Jochen Schlapp.
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at the firm. Testing means determining a product’s quality in terms of various aspects (e.g.,
optical condition, technical functionality, etc.) through searching for errors by use of, e.g.,
disassembly, optical inspection, and testing software. After testing, an acquisition price is
offered depending on the determined quality. If accepted, the holder receives the offered
price in form of a voucher from the retailer, for which the retailer is later on compensated by
the firm. Acquired products are stored until they are shipped to the firm at predetermined
intervals (1-2 weeks). There, the products are perfectly tested, and the actual qualities are
determined, which provides the basis for the subsequent reprocessing steps. It is reported
that testing results of the firm and retailer sometimes differ with regard to valuation or even
determination of the correct product type.
Several characteristics of this process may cause inefficiencies. The retailer can decide
about how much effort to put into testing through, e.g., training of employees, and the time,
steps, and means considered for testing. More effort implies higher costs but also more
reliable testing outcomes for the retailer. In the presented setting, the chosen testing effort
and testing outcome are hardly observable by the firm and can be assumed to be the retailer’s
private information. Additionally, the vouchers that were offered are only known in hindsight
by the firm and only if the offers were accepted.
Those circumstances could incentivize the retailer to not thoroughly test products and/or to
not adhere to testing outcomes with offers. However, one could imagine that in-depth testing
is actually not really worth the additional costs from firm’s perspective. Those arguments
imply that finding contracts to correctly steer the retailer is one essential part of answering
our initial question.
Taking one step back, another valid question is whether upfront testing is beneficial at
all. Of course, testing and quality-dependent acquisition are actually applied in our busi-
ness example, which is probably due to the firm not wanting to deviate from the online
acquisition policy. However, do the benefits of quality-differentiated prices really outweigh
the additional complexities and efforts introduced by testing? Are there no imaginable sit-
uations in which offering just one fixed price without the whole testing procedure is more
beneficial? Those questions also indicate that acquisition pricing (both quality-dependent
and quality-independent) is another important means to fully answer the posed question.
In summary, our work’s contribution comprises the investigation of the optimal used-
product acquisition policy when acquiring through an intermediary. This is accomplished
by answering the following questions. (i) Should a firm acquire used products through an
intermediary with or without quality-differentiation/upfront testing? (ii) How should the ad-
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ditional complexities introduced by testing under quality-differentiated acquisition through
an intermediary be managed? Our means for answering those questions are the optimal con-
tracts and the optimal acquisition prices. Furthermore, we clarify the considered acquisition
channel’s efficiency and, additionally, discuss how and when the investigated collaboration
can be simplified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 positions our work within
the extant research literature. Section 4.3 models the acquisition process with and without
quality-differentiation. In Section 4.4, we investigate the optimal undifferentiated acquisition
policy. In Section 4.5, we find the optimal differentiated acquisition policies with upfront
testing. Based on the findings in the previous two sections, we characterize when to apply
which acquisition policy in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 discusses the efficiency of the present
acquisition channel. In Section 4.8, possible simplifications of the collaboration are discussed.
Section 4.9 concludes with some managerial implications, limitations, and suggestions for
future research.
4.2. Related Literature
Our work builds on and contributes to research on used-product acquisition management (see
Fleischmann et al. 2010, for a broad overview regarding this literature), which is a subfield of
literature concerned with closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) and reverse logistics. Various
papers in the area of CLSCs consider active supply with used products under negligence of
quality differences (e.g., Savaskan et al. 2004, Debo et al. 2005). These papers are concerned
with long-term considerations such as which acquisition channel to use for supply for reman-
ufacturing or whether to produce remanufacturable products. Research about used-product
acquisition management, however, takes a closer look at the control of quantity/timing and
quality of product returns or purchases. Due to products’ qualities playing a central role,
testing/grading is considered in several papers from that research field.
The substream on quality-dependent acquisition pricing, in particular, takes upfront test-
ing into account. This stream is more related to tactical issues and was initiated by Guide
et al. (2003), who investigated how to manage the quantity and quality of returns via the
choice of quality-dependent acquisition and sales prices. The work discussed in the following
is in line with Guide et al. (2003) and considers quality-dependent acquisition pricing. Ray
et al. (2005) investigate pricing of new products and how to use trade-in rebates for the supply
with remanufacturable products. Karakayali et al. (2007) investigate optimal acquisition and
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selling prices under different reverse channel structures and provide insights regarding under
what conditions collection and/or processing operations should be outsourced. Furthermore,
they show that two-part tariffs do coordinate the decentralized supply chain. Hahler and
Fleischmann (2013) address the question of whether to acquire used products under a cen-
tralized system in which only one quality-independent acquisition price is offered or to acquire
those under a decentralized system in which upfront testing and quality-dependent prices are
offered. Bulmus¸ et al. (2014) consider joint quality-dependent acquisition pricing and sales
pricing for new and remanufactured products. Cai et al. (2014) explore acquisition pricing
and production planning in a hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing system under two core
quality levels. Wei et al. (2015) study quality-dependent refund policies for cores. Mutha
et al. (2016) investigate whether third-party remanufacturers should acquire used products
with uncertain qualities or in sorted grades with known qualities and whether to acquire and
remanufacture cores before or after demand realization.
The presented work on quality-dependent acquisition pricing implicitly assumes perfect
initial testing. Besides pricing, we do consider testing effort as a further decision that affects
the reliability of testing outcomes and therefore also the optimal acquisition prices. More-
over, we introduce a not-yet-investigated setting to research about used-product acquisition
management in which the buying party is not the one setting the prices but rather only
decides which of the predetermined prices to offer. Furthermore, besides Karakayali et al.
(2007), none of the mentioned papers also investigate the aspect of having a decentralized
supply chain.
There is another literature stream with a focus on testing/grading information. On the
one hand, it is concerned with the value of information about a product’s condition for its
processing (e.g., Souza et al. 2002, Aras et al. 2004, Zikopoulos and Tagaras 2008). On
the other hand, different grading systems are compared (e.g., Tagaras and Zikopoulos 2008,
Ferguson et al. 2009, Denizel et al. 2010). This stream of research, however, is not concerned
with the value of testing products before acquisition and how it affects acquisition pricing,
which is, among other aspects, what we investigate.
Moreover, we contribute to literature regarding coordination/contracting in reverse sup-
ply chains. We refer to Guo et al. (2017) for a recent overview of research in that area.
First, as already indicated, except for Karakayali et al. (2007), we do not find any literature
simultaneously concerned with coordination and quality-dependent acquisition pricing.
Some studies in that field are more loosely related to our work, as they consider contracting
under asymmetric information (e.g., Zheng et al. 2017, Zhao et al. 2017, Wang et al. 2017),
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or they investigate similar reverse supply chain settings consisting of remanufacturers and
collectors/retailers (e.g. Hong et al. 2008, Zeng 2013, Gu and Tagaras 2014, Jena and Sarmah
2016). Nevertheless, the considered asymmetries and decisions/responsibilities of involved
parties are very different from those in our investigated setting.
Summarizing, to the best of our knowledge, there is no paper that examines used-product
acquisition through an intermediary and considers the questions of whether to have a quality-
differentiated process and, if so, how to manage and exploit upfront testing. Especially, to
the best of our knowledge, the setting that we investigate and the trade-off between testing
cost and testing quality in used-product acquisition have not been recognized so far.
4.3. Model Setup
Consider a firm that is faced with the decision of acquiring one type of used product with
initially unknown qualities through a retailer. Depending on the quality, each product rep-
resents a certain value to the firm entailing the cost of performing rework and the selling
price. The firm is a price taker, which means that the values are exogenously given. The firm
(perfectly) determines products’ actual qualities to decide about the subsequent treatment
only after the retailer has acquired and transferred them.
The retailer acquires products through offer and payment of financial incentives, which we
refer to as acquisition prices. Acquiring a product does not imply that the retailer loses the
whole amount given out to the product holder. For example, giving out vouchers or discounts
comprising a certain value makes the retailer lose less due to not every consumer actually
using vouchers and due to the mark up between the procurement/production cost and the
selling prices of products in the retailer’s product range, from which product holders then
have to buy.
Used products do represent residual values for their holders, which are characterized by,
e.g., emotional values or the prices that they would achieve through selling via eBay or other
platforms. A product holder accepts an acquisition price and sells his product to the retailer
only if the offered price exceeds the residual value. Naturally, neither the firm nor retailer
know those residual values exactly but do have some prior beliefs about them.
There are different means for a firm to address such a market situation in terms of acqui-
sition policy, about which the firm has to decide before collaboration with the retailer. The
simplest method for the firm is to make the retailer offer a fixed, quality-independent acqui-
sition price for a specific product. Then, upfront testing is unnecessary. The retailer just
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collects product holders’ products from those who accept the offered price and transfers them
to the firm, which compensates the retailer for the acquisition according to a predetermined
contract.
Another method for the firm to acquire used products through the retailer is as presented
in the business case: when products are offered for sale, the retailer can gain some (imperfect)
information about products’ qualities through more or less thorough upfront testing. This
information and invested testing effort are the retailer’s private information. Based on this
information, the retailer then decides which acquisition price to offer. The quality-dependent
prices have been predetermined by the firm. Hence, there are two available levers for the
retailer in used-product acquisition with upfront testing to steer profit: how much effort (if
any) to put into upfront testing and the acquisition price offered (if any), depending on the
testing outcome.
The more effort is put into testing, the more reliable is the testing outcome, and therefore,
the risk of offering the “wrong” acquisition price is reduced. Thorough testing is costly,
however, due to not only time consumption but also training of employees and procurement
and use of testing equipment. Therefore, there is a trade-off between information accuracy
and testing cost.
As in the simpler case without testing, acquired products are transferred to the firm, which
compensates the retailer according to a predetermined contract.
In the rest of this section, we provide more detail about our model setup and assumptions.
4.3.1. Setting Features
We consider one type of used product that can be of good or bad quality (Θ ∈ {G,B}). We
normalize the value for the firm of a good quality product to 1 and denote the value of a
bad product m ∈ [0, 1]. The ex ante probability that an offered product is of good quality
is P(Θ = G) = β = 1 − P(Θ = B). We denote the retailer’s acquisition price offer p. The
acquisition of a product for p implies cost of δp for the retailer, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. We denote
a product’s residual value for its holder, which is quality-dependent, rΘ. It is the minimal
offer value for which the holder is willing to sell. We assume rΘ to have twice-continuously
differentiable distribution functions FΘ that are strictly increasing on support [0, τ ] where
1/δ < τ and FΘ(0) = 0. The density functions are denoted fΘ. We make two additional
assumptions:
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Assumption 4.1. FG and FB satisfy the monotone probability ratio order2, i.e., for all
x < y on [0, τ ], it holds that FG(x)/FB(x) ≤ FG(y)/FB(y).
This assumption is satisfied by many common families of distributions such as uniform,
exponential, binomial, Poisson, and normal distributions. Therefore, Assumption 4.1 is not
very restrictive. Still, it is very helpful in our analysis.
Assumption 4.2. FG(p)(1− δp) and FB(p)(m− δp) are concave on [0, τ ].
This assumption implies concavity of profit functions and guarantees uniqueness of the
optimal prices and corresponding orderings. Nevertheless, the key results and qualitative
insights remain valid without Assumption 4.2. In summary, FΘ(p) is the probability that a
product holder with quality Θ product accepts selling it for offered price p.
4.3.2. Undifferentiated Acquisition
When the firm chooses acquisition without upfront testing, the retailer makes an offer p ∈
{0, p0} when a product is put up for sale. p0 is the acquisition price that the firm fixed
beforehand, and offering 0 indicates that the retailer refrains from acquiring the product.
If the offer is accepted by the holder, the retailer pays p (thereby looses δp), transfers the
product to the firm, where the product’s actual quality is determined, and is compensated
according to a predetermined contract (to be discussed below). The firm gains 1 (m) if Θ = G
(Θ = B).
4.3.3. Differentiated Acquisition
When the firm decided for acquisition with upfront testing, the acquisition at the retailer
proceeds as follows. When a product is offered, it is first tested by the retailer. Testing
(partially) resolves uncertainty about products’ qualities and depends on the retailer’s testing
effort e, which can be either high (e = h) or low (e = l). The corresponding testing costs are
ch ≥ cl ≥ 0. We model the testing outcome as an imperfect signal s ∈ {g, b} that indicates
whether the product is of good (s = g) or bad (s = b) quality. To capture the fact that
effort level has an impact on quality of testing outcomes, we set the precision of outcome
s = b to P(s = b | Θ = B & e) = qe, where ql = 1/2, and qh = q ∈ (1/2, 1]. This result
implies that high-effort testing leads to more reliable outcomes than low-effort testing. For
2For more detailed discussion of this order see, e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000) or Hopkins et al.
(2003)
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outcome s = g, we set the precision to P(s = g | Θ = G) = 1 because testing basically means
searching for errors, which is why a good product forces a good outcome, since no errors can
be detected.3 Testing effort and testing outcome are retailer’s private information and not
observable by the firm.
After the reception of testing outcome s, the retailer updates his belief about the product’s
quality in accordance with Bayesian rationality. Based on this refined information, the retailer
offers p ∈ {pg, pb, 0}, where ps for s ∈ {g, b} are the quality-dependent acquisition prices that
have been predetermined by the firm. The indices indicate to which testing outcomes the
prices correspond. In principle, the firm wishes to have the prices for the correct, actual
qualities, which is not possible if testing is imperfect. Therefore, prices have to be chosen
as reactions to testing outcomes. Note that the retailer does not have to stick to outcome
s with his offer (p 6= ps given outcome s is possible). Offering 0 again indicates that the
retailer refrains from acquiring the product.
Through acquisition, the retailer loses δp and transfers the product. The firm determines
the actual quality Θ, compensates the retailer, and gains the product’s value.
4.3.4. Contracts for Collaboration
When the firm decided on an acquisition policy, a contract is offered in parallel with the
announcement of acquisition prices in order to constitute the collaboration. Because policies
differ structurally, the contracts do as well.
For undifferentiated acquisition, we consider the following generic contract consisting of
two payments: k = (kΘ), where Θ ∈ {G,B}. kΘ is paid to the retailer for a product transfer
depending on the actual quality Θ.
For differentiated acquisition, we consider a generic contract consisting of four payments:
k = (kΘ,s), where Θ ∈ {G,B} and s ∈ {g, b}. kΘ,s is paid for an acquired and transferred
product and depends on the product’s actual quality Θ and paid acquisition price ps.
Note that we assume that the paid acquisition price p is verifiable for the firm and that
firm’s testing outcome (actual quality Θ) is verifiable for the retailer. This makes the con-
sidered contracts action- and evidence-based and hence enforceable by courts: action-based
because payments depend on retailer’s offers, and evidence-based because payments depend
on products’ actual qualities.4
3All qualitative insights continue to hold for arbitrary signal precisions.
4Payments cannot depend on the retailer’s testing effort and outcome because those are not veri-
fiable.
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To capture that the retailer only participates if it is profitable for him, we introduce
value pi0 ≥ 0, which denotes the minimum expected profit that the retailer requires for
collaboration. The height of pi0 may also reflect the retailer’s negotiating power.
Given these compensation schemes, the retailer’s expected profit pi consists of expected
payments by the firm net testing costs, if any, and the expected cost for paying acquisition
prices. We assume the retailer and the firm to be risk-neutral expected profit maximizers.
The firm’s expected profit Π consists of the expected product value through acquisition net
expected payments to the retailer.
4.4. Acquisition without Quality Differentiation
In order to be able to decide about how to optimally acquire used products through a retailer,
we first separately investigate different policies in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, i.e., acquisition without
and with quality differentiation. This provides us with knowledge about how the firm can
optimally steer the retailer to execute those policies. Afterward, based on that, we are able to
compare profitability of those policies in Section 4.6. Following up on that, some more general
discussion about supply-chain efficiency and the simplification of collaboration is provided in
subsequent sections.
Now, we investigate used-product acquisition through a retailer without upfront testing
and price differentiation. We refer to undifferentiated acquisition as policy N .
The firm’s levers to steer policy N (which similarly applies to acquisition with quality
differentiation) are the choice of acquisition price p0 and the choice of contract payments
k. Structurally, the firm’s optimization problem for finding the optimal undifferentiated
acquisition policy is as follows (the concrete optimization models with all formal proofs and
mathematical derivations have been relegated to the Appendix.)
N : max
t=(k,p0)
Π(t|p = p0) (4.1)
s.t. pi(p = p0|t) ≥ pi(p = 0|t) (4.2)
pi(p = p0|t) ≥ pi0 (4.3)
Constraint (4.2) ensures that it is more profitable for the retailer to offer p0 instead of 0 if
a product is put up for sale. Constraint (4.3) ensures the retailer’s participation.
Determining the solution to the problem, which is also mirrored in the upcoming propo-
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sition, can be split up into two steps: first, the optimal contract kN for a fixed, but an
arbitrary price p0 is determined. Second, based on the optimal contract (insertion into the
firm’s profit), the optimal acquisition price pN0 is determined. Note that we use superscripts
of the corresponding policy to indicate optimality.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal undifferentiated acquisition policy,
consisting of an optimal contract and an optimal acquisition price.
Proposition 4.1 (Optimal Undifferentiated Acquisition). (i) A contract kN solves
problem N given fixed but arbitrary p0 if and only if
kNB ∈ R, kNG = δp0 + (pi0 − (1− β)FB(p0)(kNB − δp0))/(βFG(p0)).
(ii) The firm’s profit given price p0 and optimal contract k
N is
Π(kN , p0) = βFG(p0)(1− δp0) + (1− β)FB(p0)(m− δp0)− pi0. (4.4)
(iii) Acquisition price pN0 maximizes (4.4) if and only if
pN0 =
βfG(pN0 )(1− δFG(pN0 )/fG(pN0 )) + (1− β)fB(pN0 )(m− δFB(pN0 )/fB(pN0 ))
δ(βfG(pN0 ) + (1− β)fB(pN0 ))
. (4.5)
First, note that the contract characterized by kG = kB = δp0 + pi0/(βFG(p0) + (1 −
β)FB(p0)) satisfies the conditions in (i), which proves that even a fixed fee contract is optimal.
As a consequence, under policy N , the sharing of information regarding a product’s actual
quality is not necessary, which simplifies collaboration between the firm and retailer.
Interestingly, when considering the structure of the firm’s profit (4.4) under optimal con-
tract kN , the pricing decision is as if the firm acquires the products directly from product
holders without an intermediary. This observation is discussed in more depth in Section 4.7.
With regard to the optimal acquisition price pN0 , we make the following structural obser-
vations: the denominator of the characterizing ratio consists of the acquisition cost fraction,
δ, multiplied by the change in product holder’s offer acceptance probability. It is intuitive
that the size of δ has a negative effect on the magnitude of the optimal acquisition price
because the more expensive for the retailer (and hence, for the firm) it is to acquire products,
the smaller the optimal acquisition price should be. The numerator can be interpreted as
the weighted sum of revenues achieved through acquisition of a good product and revenues
through acquisition of a bad product. The corresponding weights are the likelihood of the
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corresponding product quality times the probability of acceptance of the offered price.
Based on the optimal price’s structure, several sensitivities can be observed, which are
summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1 (Price Sensitivities - Undifferentiated Acquisition). The optimal
acquisition price pN0 is unique, increases in m and β, decreases in δ, is constant in q, and
satisfies 1/δ − FG(pN0 )/fG(pN0 ) ≥ pN0 ≥ m/δ − FB(pN0 )/fB(pN0 ).
First, uniqueness is a simple implication of the concavity of firm’s profit by Assumption
4.2. The stated sensitivities are intuitive. Due to pN0 balancing revenues through acquisition
of good and bad products, depending on how numerous they are relative to one another, it
is obvious that the more valuable a bad product is (m), or the larger the likelihood of a good
product being offered (β), the larger is pN0 because acquisition is basically more profitable. As
already discussed, the reverse holds for δ: the more costly the acquisition is, the lower is the
point (pN0 ) that optimally balances the acceptance probability and profit through acquisition
trade-off. Obviously, when there is no upfront testing, the informational quality of a testing
outcome, q, cannot play a role.
Finally, the bounds for the optimal price imply that it is less than 1/δ, i.e., it cannot be
optimal for the firm to make the retailer lose more through acquisition (δpN0 ), as the firm
can gain at most (value of a good product 1).
4.5. Acquisition with Quality Differentiation
After having investigated the simple case of undifferentiated acquisition, we now turn our
attention to acquisition policies with upfront testing and differentiated prices.
We briefly recap the most important differences from the undifferentiated acquisition: the
retailer’s decisions comprise (i) the choice of testing effort, e ∈ {h, l}, which affects quality
of testing outcome and testing cost, and (ii) based on testing outcome s ∈ {g, b}, the choice
of acquisition price to offer, p ∈ {pg, pb, 0}. The testing effort and outcome are the retailer’s
private information. Again, the decisions of the firm comprise the choices of acquisition prices
and contracts.
We have a typical principal-agent setting here5. By the revelation principle, we focus
on contracts that induce truth-telling, i.e., that make the retailer offer acquisition prices
corresponding to testing outcomes (p = ps for each outcome s ∈ {g, b}). Technically speaking,
5see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
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the contract payments have to satisfy certain constraints to cause the desired behavior from
the retailer.
Besides the retailer’s offer behavior, there is the effort decision, which has an impact on
both the retailer’s and the firm’s excepted profits. Note that it is not obvious upfront whether
high- or low-effort testing by the retailer is more beneficial from the firm’s perspective. The
firm’s contract payments influence the retailer’s effort decision in a manner that one choice
is more profitable than the other one given that the retailer adheres with offers to testing
outcomes.
As a result with regard to the retailer’s effort decision, this leaves us with two different
acquisition policies with quality differentiation for the firm: policy H, in which the offered
contract is chosen such that it prompts the retailer to test with high effort and to make
truthful offers, and policy L, in which the contract is chosen such that it prompts the retailer
to engage in low-effort testing and truthful offering.
We can summarize both policies in the following optimization problem T . Offering the
retailer a contract that induces e = h and e′ = l refers to application of policy H (exertion
of high testing effort is more profitable for the retailer due to constraint (4.8)). Similarly, a
contract that induces e = l and e′ = h refers to policy L.
T : max
t=(k,pg,pb)
Π(t|e, p = ps) (4.6)
s.t. pi(p = ps|s, e, t) ≥ pi(p = p′|s, e, t) ∀s ∈ {g, b}, ∀p′ 6= ps (4.7)
pi(e, p = ps|t) ≥ pi(e′, p = ps|t) ∀e′ 6= e (4.8)
pi(e, p = ps|t) ≥ pi0 (4.9)
As already touched upon, constraint (4.8) is the incentive-compatibility constraint regard-
ing effort exertion. Depending on contract k, the retailer exerts testing effort e instead of e′
due to it being more profitable, given that the retailer will adhere to the testing outcomes
with offers afterward. Constraint (4.7) ensures that the retailer actually follows this offer
behavior. This constraint represents four different constraints: one ensures that when there
is a good testing outcome, the retailer is better off offering pg instead of pb. The second one
ensures the same with 0 instead of pb. Then, it ensures that the retailer is better off offering
pb instead of pg given a bad testing outcome and, finally, that offering pb is more profitable
than offering 0 given a bad testing outcome. Finally, constraint (4.9) ensures the retailer’s
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participation if he acts according to the other constraints, i.e., if he is truthful and exerts
effort according to (4.8).
To repeat and punctuate, we separately investigate policy H, which is equivalent to solving
problem T for e = h and e′ = l, and policy L, in which the efforts are reversed. Thereby, we
can determine the optimal contracts and acquisition prices (summarized as tH = (kH , pHg , p
H
b )
for policy H and the same expression but with superscript L for policy L) that maximize
the firm’s profits under the respective policies. Only afterward can we then determine which
of the policies, H, L, or N , is the most profitable via comparison of the resulting optimal
profits.
4.5.1. High-Effort Testing
In this section, we investigate policy H, in which the firm offers the retailer a contract that
induces the retailer to engage in high-effort testing and truthful offers. To this end, we
consider problem T with e = h.
The solution to the resulting problem can again be found by performing the following
two steps: first, the determination of the optimal contract kH given arbitrary but fixed
acquisition prices pg, pb, and second, based on the resulting profit, through insertion of the
optimal contract, the determination of the optimal acquisition prices pHg , p
H
b .
The following proposition characterizes the optimal quality-differentiated acquisition policy
with high-effort testing.
Proposition 4.2 (Optimal Differentiated Acquisition - High-Effort Testing).
Let C ≡ 2(ch − cl)/((1− β)(2q − 1)), ρB,g ≡ (1− β)(1− q), and ρB,b ≡ (1− β)q.
(i) A contract kH solves problem T given e = h and fixed but arbitrary pg and pb if and
only if for rΘ,s = FΘ(ps)(kHΘ,s − δps) for all Θ, s, it holds that
rB,b ∈ [0, (pi0 + ch)/ρB,b],
rB,g ≤ rB,b − C,
rG,b ≤ (pi0 + ch − (1− β)rB,b)/β,
rG,g = (pi0 + ch − (ρB,grB,g + ρB,brB,b))/β.
77
IV. Used-Product Acquisition Through an Intermediary
(ii) The firm’s profit given prices pg and pb and optimal contract k
H is
Π(kH , pg, pb) =βFG(pg)(1− δpg) + ρB,gFB(pg)(m− δpg)
+ ρB,bFB(pb)(m− δpb)− ch − pi0.
(4.10)
(iii) Acquisition prices pHg and p
H
b maximize (4.10) if and only if
pHg =
β(fG(pHg )− δFG(pHg )) + ρB,g(fB(pHg )m− δFB(pHg ))
δ(βfG(pHg ) + ρB,gfB(pHg ))
, (4.11)
pHb =m/δ − FB(pHb )/fB(pHb ). (4.12)
First, note that rΘ,s is just the expected revenue from offering ps for a product in quality
Θ and is used to more clearly present the optimality conditions for kH .
Considering the conditions in (i), it can be observed that any optimal contract can be
generated by first fixing kHB,b in the corresponding interval given in r
H
B,b’s characterization.
Then, kHB,g and k
H
G,b can be chosen accordingly, satisfying the bounds depending on k
H
B,b.
Finally, kHG,g can be determined based on k
H
B,b and k
H
B,g.
In particular, note the second optimality condition corresponding to kHB,g. It is connected
to the effort constraint (4.8) and ensures that the retailer exerts high testing effort instead
of low effort. This can be explained as follows: a sufficiently large gap between the payment
for a bad product that was bought for pg and the payment for a bad product that was
bought for pb induces a sufficiently large benefit of more-thorough testing to reduce the risk
of accidentally paying pg for a bad product due to a “false” testing outcome. Sufficiently
large means large enough to outweigh the relative testing cost difference C.
C as a measure of how the difference between low- and high-effort testing cost, ch − cl,
relates to the actual benefit of high- versus low-effort testing deserves a bit more discussion.
Intuitively, testing effort is only relevant because of the existence of bad products since
testing, as we defined it, means searching for errors. Errors can only be detected for bad
products. Therefore, the more bad products exist (probability 1− β) and the more accurate
high-effort testing is compared to low-effort testing (the size of q), the larger the benefit of
high-effort testing is relative to low-effort testing. Since the denominator of C decreases in β
and q, C becomes larger the less beneficial high-effort testing is relative to low-effort testing
given the absolute testing cost difference.
Moreover, the payment for a good product that was bought for pb (kG,b) can be chosen to
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be arbitrarily small as long as it is below a certain threshold. Then, the retailer adheres to a
good testing outcome, and it does not affect the retailer’s and firm’s profits (adherence leads
to kG,b never being paid because a good product can never generate a bad testing outcome,
and therefore, the retailer never offers pb for a good product).
The condition for rG,g is remarkable. This basically stems from making the participation
constraint (4.9) binding. Intuitively, this implies that the firm can always press down the
retailer’s profit to a minimum to just guarantee collaboration. Hence, at optimum, the firm
completely extracts the retailer’s information rents.
With regard to optimal prices, both pHg and p
H
b have a structure similar to p
N
0 . The
differences in the undifferentiated price rest upon the fact that after testing, the relation
between probabilities for the product being of good/bad quality is shifted. For a good
outcome, it is more likely that the product is of good quality as before and hence under policy
N . Before testing, it is β. Afterward, when the outcome is good, it is β/(β+ (1−β)(1− q)).
Therefore, the optimal price offer under a good outcome is greater than the undifferentiated
price offer. For a bad outcome, the probability for the product being of bad quality even
becomes one, leading to β becoming zero. Therefore, pHb ’s characterization is identical to
that of pN0 when β is set equal to zero.
The resulting sensitivities in the following corollary are easy implications of Corollary 4.1
together with the similarities between optimal prices.
Corollary 4.2 (Price Sensitivities - Differentiated Acquisition H). The optimal
acquisition prices pHg and p
H
b are unique. p
H
g increases in q, m and β, decreases in δ, and
satisfies 1/δ−FG(pHg )/fG(pHg ) ≥ pHg ≥ m/δ−FB(pHg )/fB(pHg ). pHb increases in m, decreases
in δ, and is constant in β and q. It holds that pHg ≥ pN0 ≥ pHb .
It is notable but not very surprising that pHg increases in q. Intuitively, the more accu-
rate high-effort testing is (larger q), the higher the probability is for the product being of
good quality after a good testing outcome. Therefore, the acquisition is more valuable in
expectation, which makes it optimal for the firm to offer more for the product. That pHb
is independent of β and q is easily observed by noting that after reception of a bad testing
outcome, there is no remaining uncertainty about the product being of bad quality.
Finally, the presented ordering of prices can be intuitively explained by the fact that
a good product is more valuable than a bad product and that all three prices balance
the profits achievable through acquisition of good and bad products but with different
weights/probabilities: pHg is offered when the likelihood for the product being of good quality
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is larger than before testing, whereas pN0 is offered when the likelihood for the product being
good is not updated due to no testing. pHb is offered when the likelihood for the product
being good is zero.
4.5.2. Low-Effort Testing
Now that we have determined how to optimally manage policy H, we turn to optimally
managing the acquisition policy with upfront low-effort testing, L. Therefore, we again
consider optimization problem T , but with e = l.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal differentiated acquisition policy with
low-effort testing.
Proposition 4.3 (Optimal Differentiated Acquisition - Low-Effort Testing).
Let C ≡ 2(ch − cl)/((1− β)(2q − 1)).
(i) A contract kL solves problem T given e = l and fixed but arbitrary pg and pb if and only
if for rΘ,s = FΘ(ps)(kLΘ,s − δps) for all Θ, s, it holds that
rB,b ∈ [0, 2(pi0 + cl)/(1− β)],
rB,g ∈ [rB,b − C, rB,b],
rG,b ≤ (pi0 + cl − (1− β)rB,b)/β,
rG,g = (pi0 + cl − (1− β)(rB,g + rB,b)/2)/β.
(ii) The firm’s profit given prices pg and pb and optimal contract k
L is
Π(kL, pg, pb) =βFG(pg)(1− δpg) + (1− β)FB(pg)(m− δpg)/2
+ (1− β)FB(pb)(m− δpb)/2− cl − pi0.
(4.13)
(iii) Acquisition prices pLg and p
L
b maximize (4.13) if and only if
pLg =
β(fG(pLg )− δFG(pLg )) + (1− β)(fB(pLg )m− δFB(pLg ))/2
δ(βfG(pLg ) + (1− β)fB(pLg )/2)
, (4.14)
pLb =m/δ − FB(pLb )/fB(pLb ). (4.15)
Again, as for policy H, we can successively determine each optimal contract by first fixing
kLB,b, then k
L
B,g, k
L
G,b and, finally, k
L
G,g.
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Compared to the optimal contracts for policy H, the most notable difference concerns the
relation between kLB,g and k
L
B,b. Under policy L, it is important to have those payments close
to one another such that the benefit of more precise information through high-effort testing is
not worth the higher relative testing cost difference C. This incentivizes the retailer to only
test with low effort and is captured by the second condition characterizing rB,g depending
on rB,b.
Moreover, note that also under policy L, it is optimal for the firm to press down the
retailer’s profit to the minimum participation profit pi0, thereby completely extracting the
retailer’s information rents. This is captured by rG,g’s characterization, which is identical to
constraint (4.9) of problem T given e = l being binding.
Regarding the firm’s profit under optimal contract kL and the optimal prices, there is
nothing new compared to policy H because pricing for policy L basically boils down to
pricing for H in the special case where q = 1/2. Hence, it also holds that pLb = p
H
b . For
completeness, the following corollary presents the remaining results with regard to optimal
prices.
Corollary 4.3 (Price Sensitivities - Differentiated Acquisition L). The optimal
acquisition prices pLg and p
L
b are unique. p
L
g increases in m and β, decreases in δ, is constant
in q, and satisfies 1/δ − FG(pLg )/fG(pLg ) ≥ pLg ≥ m/δ − FB(pLg )/fB(pLg ). It holds that pHg ≥
pLg ≥ pN0 ≥ pHb = pLb .
As already mentioned, we basically observe the same price sensitivities as under policy H.
The stated results are all immediate consequences of Corollary 4.2.
4.6. Optimal Acquisition Policy
Now that we investigated the firm’s optimal policies separately, we want to characterize the
exogeneous conditions that favor one acquisition policy over the others. For expositional
clarity, we denote the maximum profit under policy ∗ ∈ {N,H,L} by Π∗. These profits
result from combination of optimal contracts and optimal acquisition prices determined in the
previous sections. Moreover, we use simplifying notation to shorten the terms corresponding
to firm’s expected revenues if a certain price is offered for a product of a certain quality. We
let κ∗G,x ≡ FG(p∗x)(1− δp∗x) and κ∗B,x ≡ FB(p∗x)(m− δp∗x) for ∗ ∈ {N,H,L} and x ∈ {g, b, 0}.
The following proposition characterizes when one acquisition policy is superior to the other
ones.
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Proposition 4.4 (Optimal Acquisition Policy). Let
γ1 ≡ β[κHG,g − κLG,g] + (1− β)((1− q)[κHB,g − κLB,g] + (q − 1/2)[κHB,b − κLB,g]), (4.16)
γ2 ≡ β[κHG,g − κNG,0] + (1− β)(1− q)[κHB,g − κNB,0] + (1− β)q[κHB,b − κNB,0], (4.17)
γ3 ≡ β[κLG,g − κNG,0] + (1− β)[κLB,g − κNB,0]/2 + (1− β)[κLB,b − κNB,0]/2. (4.18)
(i) γ1, γ2, γ3 are independent of ch, cl, and pi0. It holds that γ1, γ2, γ3 ≥ 0.
(ii) γ1 and γ2 are increasing in q, whereas γ3 is constant in q.
(iii) H is the firm’s optimal acquisition policy if and only if γ1 ≥ ch − cl and γ2 ≥ ch. L
is optimal if and only if γ1 ≤ ch − cl and γ3 ≥ cl. N is optimal if and only if γ2 ≤ ch and
γ3 ≤ cl.
(iv) If ch = cl = 0, then Π
H ≥ ΠL ≥ ΠN .
(v) If m = 1 and FB = FG, if β = 0, if β = 1, or if δ = 0, then γ1, γ2, γ3 = 0, i.e., the
firm’s optimal acquisition policy is N .
First, note that γ1, γ2, γ3 are the gains that the firm incurs through (more thorough) testing
based on the three policies’ optimal profits adjusted for corresponding testing cost ch and cl.
Results (i) and (iii), which together imply (iv), support the strong intuition that if testing is
not costly, it is best to test as thoroughly as possible before acquisition to be able to fully
exploit quality differences based on reliable information.
Result (ii) shows that the more accurate the testing outcomes yielded by high-effort testing
are, the larger the gains are compared to low-effort and no testing. This also implies that
the firm is willing to invest more in making the retailer test with high effort the better his
testing capabilities are.
Result (iii) gives a full characterization of when to apply which policy. It shows that if
the additional gains through testing compared to undifferentiated acquisition outweigh the
additional cost, then one should choose differentiated acquisition. Moreover, if the addi-
tional information accuracy through more precise testing pays off compared to the difference
between high- and low-effort testing cost, then policy H should be applied.
Result (v) presents conditions under which testing becomes irrelevant, i.e., the additional
gains that come with (thorough) testing converge to zero. Hence, if there are no additional
gains, then it cannot be profitable to invest in costly testing, and policy N is the policy of
choice. Policy N is preferred if bad products exhibit the same values as good products for
the firm and product holders because then, there is no benefit in testing and offering differ-
entiated prices. In contrast, note that it suffices to have only firm or only product holders
82
IV. Used-Product Acquisition Through an Intermediary
value products differently to make testing and differentiated pricing beneficial. No value dif-
ferentiation may be the case for, e.g., very old mobile phones. Even if there exist phones that
are well functioning and have excellent optical conditions, they may be as valuable as if they
were damaged. The reason could be that the firm is only interested in the materials inside.
Furthermore, if almost all products are exclusively bad (good), then testing is unnecessary
because the retailer/firm does not face quality uncertainty, which has to be resolved. This
might apply to very old (new) product generations. Finally, δ being close to zero implies that
the fraction of acquisition prices the retailer loses through acquisition is almost negligible.
Then, all acquisition prices pg, pb, and p0 can be chosen to be extremely large. Thereby, all
products are collected without any loss for the retailer or the firm. However, then, invest-
ment in testing is not necessary. Therefore, giving out vouchers instead of paying money for
products is in favor of a no-testing policy because it is less expensive.
The reverse of (v) leads to conjectures about when differentiated acquisition is profitable
or relevant: if good and bad products significantly differ in value for firm or product holders,
if the likelihood for a good product submission does not deviate too much from that for
a bad product submission, and if paying acquisition prices is costly for the retailer, then
differentiated acquisition with upfront testing can be beneficial (depending on how expensive
it is). Whether high-effort or low-effort testing should be applied depends on the information
accuracy and testing cost trade-off.
Figure 4.1 illustrates how the choice of acquisition policy is driven by different parameters.
For each area, the indicated policy is the most profitable one for the corresponding parameter
combinations. On the left-hand side, we see how policy choice depends on low-effort testing
cost cl and quality of testing outcomes under high-effort testing q. Since both policies, N and
L, are not affected by q, there is a cl-threshold such that policy L is preferred when testing
costs are smaller and that N is preferred otherwise. Since N and H are not dependent on cl,
there is a q-threshold such that H is preferred only if quality q is large enough and thereby
outweighs corresponding testing cost ch. For H and L, we have the following relation: high-
quality q and high low-effort testing cost cl are in favor of H, whereas low-quality and low
low-effort testing cost are in favor of L. When one of both parameters is low and the other
one is high, then both policies are likely to be comparably profitable.
On the right-hand side, we see how policy choice is driven by testing cost cl and ch. Due to
ch ≥ cl, the upper gray area is irrelevant. In the upper-right part of the relevant area, policy
N is optimal. This is intuitive since here, high- and low-effort testing costs are sufficiently
large that they outweigh the additional gains from differentiated acquisition. In the areas in
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Figure 4.1.: The Firm’s Optimal Acquisition Policy
(a) (b)
The graphs plot an example of the firm’s optimal acquisition policy depending on (a) the relation
between q and cl and (b) the relation between ch and cl. The remaining parameter values are the
following: β = 0.5, m = 0.4, δ = 0.8, pi0 = 0, q = 0.8, ch = 0.01, FG(p) = p/2, and FB(p) = 3p/4 on
[0, 4/3].
which N is not optimal, we have a line characterized by the difference between ch and cl,
which represents ΠH = ΠL. If cl is below that line, the difference is larger, and hence, policy
L is more profitable. H is more profitable if the difference between ch and cl is less than
this threshold-difference because then, the additional gains from high-effort testing outweigh
the additional cost. Finally, note that the impact of high-effort testing accuracy q on graph
(b) is to shift the line separating H from N and the line separating H from L to the right.
This is due to Propositions 4.4 (ii) and (iii), i.e., the optimal profit under H increases in q,
whereas ΠN and ΠL are not affected.
4.7. Supply-Chain Efficiency
Thus far, we have determined how to optimally apply the considered acquisition policies
in the presented decentralized setting and when to apply which policy. Still, another open
question we want to answer concerns the efficiency of the considered acquisition channel. To
this end, we clarify how the decentralized profits relate to the centralized profits, which are
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the achievable profits in a situation in which the firm and retailer act as one entity.
For the sake of expositional clarity, we denote the optimal centralized supply chain profit
under policy ∗ ∈ {H,L,N} Π∗C and the optimal decentralized supply chain profit Π∗D, which
is the sum of the firm’s and retailer’s optimal profits under policy ∗.
The following proposition presents how centralized and decentralized profits relate to one
another and how the decentralized profit is split up between firm and retailer.
Proposition 4.5 (Efficiency of Acquisition Channel). For any acquisition policy
∗ ∈ {H,L,N}, the firm is able to coordinate the supply chain, i.e., the total decentralized
supply chain profits are identical to the profits of a centralized supply chain (Π∗C = Π
∗
D). The
retailer’s and firm’s profit shares are pi0/Π
∗
D and 1− pi0/Π∗D, respectively.
Moreover, independent of policies, the retailer’s share decreases in m and increases in δ.
It decreases in q under policy H only.
Proposition 4.5 is in line with the profits (4.4), (4.10), and (4.13) together with the fact
that in optimum the firm fully extracts the retailer’s information rent and never pays the
retailer more than necessary to make him collaborate, which results in pi = pi0. Due to the
magnitude of retailer’s profit being independent of the firm’s chosen policy, the optimal policy
is the same for the centralized and decentralized systems.
To summarize, the investigated decentralized acquisition channel is efficient from the
supply-chain perspective since the centralized optimal supply chain profit is obtained ir-
respective of chosen policy. Unfortunately, there is one drawback for firms that use this
acquisition channel. Depending on how much negotiating power the retailer has, the corre-
sponding minimal participation profit pi0 might be quite high, and therefore, even though
both parties could benefit from it (Π∗D > 0 when ∗ is optimal), it might not be profitable for
the firm to collaborate (Π∗D − pi0 < 0). Moreover, the retailer never receives more than the
minimal participation profit pi0, of which the retailer should be aware when negotiating.
The stated sensitivities are intuitive. The retailer’s share exhibits the reversed behavior
as the firm’s profit. Comprehensibly, the more value bad products imply for the firm or the
less costly acquisition is for the retailer, the larger the firm’s optimal profit and hence the
smaller the retailer’s share. Additionally, the more accurate high-effort testing is, the larger
the firm’s optimal profit is under policy H.
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4.8. Contract Simplification
Thus far, we assumed that on the one hand, the actual quality, which is determined by the
firm, is verifiable for the retailer. On the other hand, we assumed that the prices that the
retailer paid for acquired products are verifiable for the firm. Both aspects of verifiability
request close collaboration and disclosure of information on both sides, which one or the
other party may not be willing to provide even though it is profitable.
Therefore, in this section, we address the question under what conditions simplification
of the presented contracts does not reduce the acquisition channel’s performance. First,
note that this is only interesting for acquisition with quality differentiation because undif-
ferentiated acquisition can always be set up with a fixed-fee contract (see also discussion of
Proposition 4.1). Here, information transfer can be reduced to a minimum by paying for
acquired products irrespective of actual quality or price paid.
Starting from our four-payment contract for differentiated acquisition, we consider (i) price-
only contracts, in which payments only depend on paid acquisition prices, not on actual qual-
ity (kG,s = kB,s), (ii) quality-only contracts, in which payments are quality-dependent but
not price-dependent (kΘ,g = kΘ,b), and (iii) fixed-fee contracts, in which there is only a single
transfer payment independent of the actual qualities and prices paid. Those simplifications
imply that (i) the firm does not have to report testing outcomes, and the retailer does not
have to verify them, (ii) the retailer does not have to report paid acquisition prices, and
the firm does not have to verify them, and (iii) both information aspects do not have to be
reported or verified.
For both differentiated acquisition policies H and L, the following proposition characterizes
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the presented simplified contracts being optimal.
Proposition 4.6 (Optimality of Simplified Contracts). All ξ are positive and only
depend on β, q, FΘ(p∗s). See the proof for the concrete ξ. Let C ≡ 2(ch−cl)/((1−β)(2q−1)).
(i) An optimal price-only contract exists under policy H if and only if C ≤ (pi0 + ch)ξ1. It
always exists under policy L.
(ii) An optimal quality-only contract exists under policy H if and only if C/FB(pHg ) ≤
δ(pHg − pHb ) ≤ (pi0 + ch)ξ2. It exists under policy L if and only if δ(pLg − pLb ) ≤ min{(pi0 +
cl)ξ3, (pi0 + cl)ξ4 + Cξ5}.
(iii) An optimal fixed-fee contract exists under policy H if and only if (pi0 + ch)ξ6 +Cξ7 ≤
δ(pHg − pHb ) ≤ (pi0 + ch)ξ8. It exists under policy L if and only if (pi0 + cl)ξ9 ≤ δ(pLg − pLb ) ≤
min{(pi0 + cl)ξ10, (pi0 + cl)ξ9 + Cξ11}.
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First, note that the conditions in Proposition 4.6(iii) can define non-empty sets, i.e., there
actually exist situations in which optimal fixed-fee contracts exist for policies H and L. This
makes the discussion relevant. For an example of fixed-fee contract optimality under policies
H and L, see the proof of Proposition 4.6.
Interestingly, for policy L, it is never necessary for the firm to verifiably share information
regarding products’ actual qualities. Intuitively, the firm only has to compensate the retailer
for the prices paid (irrespective of actual qualities) and can thereby press down the retailer’s
gains to the minimum participation profit. This suffices to incentivize the retailer to make
truthful offerings and test with low effort. For policy H, the relative testing cost difference C
(which was discussed in Section 4.5.1) has to be sufficiently less than pi0 to make a price-only
contract’s optimality possible. Another supportive condition is that testing cost are both
sufficiently high and sufficiently similar to result in a small relative testing cost difference.
Intuitively speaking, if it is expensive to make the retailer participate or if testing costs do
not differ much, then a price-only contract is likely to be sufficient to achieve optimality.
With regard to quality-only contracts, under H, structurally similar conditions as for
price-only contracts have to hold. The relative testing cost difference has to be small, or
making the retailer participate has to be expensive. However, additionally, the acquisition
cost difference between paying the price for a bad and a good product, δ(pHg − pHb ), has
to be between relative testing cost difference and the term including pi0. Intuitively, this
transforms the “or” condition for price-only contracts to an “and” condition under policy
H: if it is expensive to make the retailer participate and if testing costs do not differ much,
then a quality-only contract is likely to be sufficient to achieve optimality. For policy L, the
acquisition cost difference δ(pLg − pLb ) has to be sufficiently less than retailer’s participation
profit and relative testing cost difference to allow for quality-only contract optimality under
policy L. This implies that as long as acquisition is inexpensive (small δ) or acquisition prices
are close to one another, an optimal quality-only contract under L is likely to exist.
Finally, the most restrictive conditions—more restrictive than just taking those in (i) and
(ii) together—are those for optimality of fixed-fee contracts, which is intuitive: if there is a
fixed-fee contract, then this is also a price-only and quality-only contract. However, if there
exists a price-only contract and a quality-only contract, those do not have to coincide. Under
an H policy, structurally, the conditions are similar to those of a quality-only contract, with
the difference that pi0 is also a part of the lower bound for the acquisition cost difference
δ(pHg − pHb ). For L, it is similar: compared to a quality-only contract, the conditions for
optimality of a fixed-fee contract are similar, with the difference that now pi0 (and cl) build a
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lower bound for δ(pLg −pLb ). To conclude, irrespective of policy, for the existence of an optimal
fixed-fee contract, in addition to the already-discussed conditions for the more complicated
contracts, the minimum profit that guarantees the retailer’s participation must not be too
large.
In summary, there are situations in which collaboration between firm and retailer can
be simplified by reduction of information exchange without losing contract optimality. In
particular, for policy L, there always exists an optimal price-only contract.
4.9. Conclusions
Some firms from the business field of recommerce collaborate with retailers in order to gen-
erate additional supply with used products besides running their online acquisition channels.
Due to the quality heterogeneity of used products, the acquisition is executed with differ-
entiated prices, which are set by the firm. To be able to apply price differentiation, the
retailer has to test products before acquisition in order to gain (imperfect) knowledge about
their qualities. This testing procedure as source of information asymmetries may lead to
conflicting incentives between the firm and the retailer. Therefore, the firm has to carefully
decide which contract to offer. Additionally, the question of whether upfront testing and
differentiated acquisition is beneficial arises.
Our work’s contribution lies in the investigation of this not-yet-examined acquisition chan-
nel, which exhibits the following features: quality heterogeneity of used products, setting
of acquisition prices and contracts by the firm, and testing and price offers at the retailer,
where testing effort and testing outcomes are private information. Moreover, to the best our
knowledge, the presented cost-accuracy trade-off in testing has not yet been considered in
research regarding used-product acquisition management.
We clarify how to optimally manage this acquisition channel by contracting and price
setting for different acquisition policies: undifferentiated acquisition without upfront testing
and differentiated acquisition with high-/low-effort testing. Afterward, we characterize which
circumstances favor one policy over the others in terms of profitability. For example, if the
amount of products of one quality strongly dominates those of other qualities, then upfront
testing is not valuable. If testing is very inexpensive, then one is always better off testing.
We furthermore find that the presented acquisition channel is efficient in the sense that no
matter which policy the firm chooses, optimal centralized supply chain profit is reached. How
this profit is split up depends on the negotiating power of the parties involved. Finally, we
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discuss how the restriction of information exchange drives optimality of the resulting simpler
contracts. We find that undifferentiated acquisition can always be managed by a fixed-fee
contract. Differentiated acquisition with low-effort testing can always be set up optimally
with a price-only contract. Hence, if the firm wants to apply that policy, she can always do so
without having to communicate the products’ actual qualities. As a last result, we find that
there actually exist situations in which for both differentiated acquisition policies, optimal
fixed-fee contracts do exist.
Our findings have several managerial implications: first, to the best of our knowledge,
the presented acquisition channel is not very common. Based on our findings, collaboration
between firms and retailers in the presented manner can be beneficial for both sides and could
be exploited a lot more. Furthermore, what we found in practice is that the same acquisition
prices as for the online channel are used. However, as proven in this work, depending on
how accurately products’ qualities can be determined, prices should be chosen differently.
Another reason for this conclusion is that the ratio between good and bad products may differ
between online sellers and retailer’s customers. Finally, even though almost all recommerce
providers apply quality-differentiated online acquisition, those firms should thoroughly decide
about whether to do this in the considered setting because the success strongly depends on
the retailer’s capabilities and cost structure. Therefore, for some products, undifferentiated
acquisition through retailers might be better.
Our model has some limitations that should be mentioned. To maintain tractability and
present a comprehensible model, we made some simplifying assumptions. Products’ possible
qualities and the retailer’s testing effort are binary. It would be more realistic to have multiple
qualities and effort levels. Nevertheless, it suffices our purposes to determine the differences
between differentiated and undifferentiated acquisition and the differences between different
testing effort levels. Moreover, we assume the firm to be a price-taker when selling the
acquired products by assuming that products represent certain quality-dependent values.
An interesting avenue would be to decide about selling and acquisition prices in parallel in
the considered setting. Furthermore, the setting that we investigate is static. It would be
interesting to also consider dynamic effects and investigate how to choose contracts and prices
when beliefs about the distribution of products’ qualities and/or values change over time.
Previous research has not investigated the cost-accuracy trade-off in upfront testing be-
fore acquisition, which builds the basis for quality-differentiated pricing. Additionally, the
management of such a decentralized system is important since various firms, as in the mo-
tivating example, are not able to obtain access to retailers’ customers otherwise. The aim
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and contribution of this paper is to present this new method of managing used-product ac-
quisition through intermediaries and hopefully inspire firms to build fruitful collaborations
in order to secure additional used-product supply and thereby reduce waste and sustain the
environment.
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Proofs of Chapter II
Proof of Proposition 2.1. To prove the claim, we first derive the firm’s optimization problem
P and then solve P to determine the optimal compensation scheme and the firm’s expected
profits.
The Optimization problem: By the revelation principle, we restrict attention to the optimal
contract that induces high-effort testing and truth telling by all experts. This, however,
requires several incentive constraints to be satisfied. To derive those, we need to ensure
that high-effort testing and truth telling is indeed optimal for each expert i ∈ I, given the
assumptions that all other experts exert high effort and report truthfully, and that the firm
chooses the ex post optimal design alternative.
After having received all recommendations, the firm chooses the design alternative for
development that offers the highest ex post expected net contribution and for which there is
a good recommendation (in case there is no good recommendation at all, the firm develops
none of the designs). Given ri = g, design i’s ex post expected net contribution is qi(vi−uig)−
(1 − qi)uib −
∑
k 6=i uka. Constraint (2.5) orders the designs according to their maximum ex
post expected net contribution and thus ranks them according to their relative attractiveness
to the firm; represented by the index j in y
(j)
i .
We now derive the incentive compatibility constraints for design i that is the jth most
attractive alternative. Given ei = h and upon receiving a good signal (si = g), expert
i receives an expected utility of piggij = (qiuig + (1 − qi)uib)/2j−1 + (1 − 1/2j−1)uia when
making a good recommendation (ri = g), and pi
bg
ij = uia + uit/2
n−1 when making a bad
recommendation (ri = b). Similarly, given ei = h and upon receiving a bad signal (si = b),
expert i receives an expected utility of pigbij = ((1 − qi)uig + qiuib)/2j−1 + (1 − 1/2j−1)uia
when making a good recommendation (ri = g), and pi
bb
ij = uia+uit/2
n−1 when making a bad
recommendation (ri = b). Also, given truth telling, expert i’s expected utility from exerting
high effort is piij(h) = (qiuig + (1− qi)uib)/2j + (uia + (1/2)n−juit)/2j + (1− 1/2j−1)uia − c,
and piij(l) = (uig/2 + uib/2)/2
j + (uia + (1/2)
n−juit)/2j + (1− 1/2j−1)uia from exerting low
effort. The incentive compatibility constraints follow from setting piggij ≥ pibgij , pibbij ≥ pigbij , and
piij(h) ≥ piij(l) for all i, j ∈ I, and multiplying these inequalities with y(j)i . Finally, because
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wages must be non-negative, we require uig, uib, uia, uia + uit ≥ 0, and (2.6) follows from
noting that each design i must be assigned to exactly one attractiveness rank, and each rank
j is hold by exactly one design.
The firm’s expected profit consists of the expected market value of the chosen design net
of development costs and the experts’ expected wages. Given y
(j)
i = 1, the firm develops
design i with probability 1/2j and receives an expected value of qivi−K. The expected wage
payments to expert i are uig with probability qi/2
j , uib with probability (1− qi)/2j , uia with
probability 1 − 1/2j , and uit with probability 1/2n. Summing over i, j ∈ I gives the firm’s
expected profit Π.
(i) Suppose the designs in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 +2i+1c[qi/(2qi−1)−
2qi+1/(2qi+1 − 1)]+ for all i ∈ I\{n}. To solve the optimization problem P , we first derive
the solution of a relaxed variant of P by dropping constraints (2.5), and then show that this
solution is also feasible—and thus optimal—in P .
Given the structure of P without (2.5), maximizing the firm’s expected profit is equivalent
to separately minimizing the wage payments associated with each design i ∈ I whenever
y
(j)
i = 1. Obviously, (2.4) implies that uig > uib, which allows us to rewrite (2.2) and (2.3)
as qiuig + (1− qi)uib ≥ uia + 2j−nuit ≥ (1− qi)uig + qiuib. It follows that wage payments for
design i with relative attractiveness j are minimized when uia + 2
j−nuit = (1− qi)uig + qiuib,
and uig and uib are chosen as low as possible. By (2.4) and (2.7), these minimal payments
are uig = 2
j+1c/(2qi−1) and uib = 0. Moreover, (2.1) reveals that the firm prefers paying uit
over uia; therefore uia = 0 and uit = 2
n+1(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1). Inserting these payments into
(2.1) and using (2.6) gives ΠP =
∑n
j=1
∑n
i=1 y
(j)
i (qivi/2
j)−∑ni=1 2c/(2qi−1)−∑nj=1K/2j .
By the assumed ordering, we have qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, and it follows that in optimum y(i)i = 1
for all i ∈ I, and y(j)i = 0 for all i 6= j. Moreover, this candidate optimal solution satisfies
(2.6) and is thus feasible.
It remains to show that the solution also satisfies (2.5). However, this is obvious because
we can rewrite this condition by qivi−(2i+1qic/(2qi−1)) ≥ qi+1vi+1−(2i+2qi+1c/(2qi+1−1)),
which is true by assumption.
(ii) This result follows directly from (i).
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The optimization problem M can be derived in a similar way to
the proof of Proposition 2.1. In particular, for each i ∈ I, piggi = qiuig + (1 − qi)uib, pibgi =
pibbi = uia+P(sj = b ∀j > i)δn−iuit, pigbi = (1− qi)uig + qiuib, pii(h) = (qiuig + (1− qi)uib)/2 +
(uia + P(sj = b ∀j > i)δn−iuit)/2− c, and pii(l) = (uig/2 + uib/2)/2 + (uia + P(sj = b ∀j >
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i)δn−iuit)/2. Since for design i = n, una and unt are paid simultaneously, we only require
una + unt ≥ 0 to ensure non-negative wages.
As for the firm’s profits, the firm develops design i with probability P(ri = g, rj = b ∀j < i)
and receives a discounted expected value of δi−1(qivi − K). The expected wage payments
to expert i are δi−1uig with probability P(Θi = G|si = g)P(si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), δi−1uib
with probability P(Θi = B|si = g)P(si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), δi−1uia with probability
P(si = b, sj = b ∀j < i), and δn−1uit with probability P(si = b, sj = b ∀j 6= i). Summing
over i ∈ I gives the firm’s expected profit Π.
(i) Given the structure of M , maximizing the firm’s expected profit is equivalent to sepa-
rately minimizing the wage payments associated with each design i. Note that (2.11) implies
that uig > uib, which allows us to rewrite (2.9) and (2.10) as qiuig + (1 − qi)uib ≥ uia +
2i−nδn−iuit ≥ (1−qi)uig+qiuib. It follows readily that uia+2i−nδn−iuit = (1−qi)uig+qiuib,
and uig and uib should be chosen as low as possible. By (2.11) and (2.12), these minimal
payments are uig = 4c/(2qi−1) and uib = 0. Moreover, the firm is indifferent between paying
uia or uit, so without loss of optimality we can choose uia = 4(1− qi)c/(2qi− 1) and uit = 0.
Finally, uia/uig = 1− qi < 1/2 because qi > 1/2.
(ii)-(iii) Given the optimal contract, we can rewrite the firm’s expected profit as ΠM =∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)(qivi−K−4c/(2qi−1)). Since (δi−1/2i) is decreasing in i, the firm maximizes
ΠM by testing the designs in decreasing order of qivi − 4c/(2qi − 1).
Proof of Proposition 2.3. Define the expert’s expected continuation utility before testing de-
sign i ∈ I by pˆii−1 = (qiuig+(1−qi)uib+uia−2c+δpˆii)/2, with pˆin = 0. With this definition,
the derivation of S is identical to that of M as given in the proof of Proposition 2.2. In par-
ticular, for each i ∈ I, piggi = qiuig+(1−qi)uib, pibgi = pibbi = uia+δpˆii, pigbi = (1−qi)uig+qiuib,
pii(h) = (qiuig+(1−qi)uib)/2+(uia+δpˆii)/2−c, and pii(l) = (uig/2+uib/2)/2+(uia+δpˆii)/2,
and limited liability enforces non-negative wage payments.
As for the firm’s profits, the firm develops design i with probability P(ri = g, rj = b ∀j < i)
and receives a discounted expected value of δi−1(qivi − K). The expected wage payments
to expert i are δi−1uig with probability P(Θi = G|si = g)P(si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), δi−1uib
with probability P(Θi = B|si = g)P(si = g, sj = b ∀j < i), and δi−1uia with probability
P(si = b, sj = b ∀j < i). Summing over i ∈ I gives the firm’s expected profit Π.
(i) Using the definition of pˆi0, we can rewrite the firm’s expected profit as ΠS =
∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)
(qivi −K − 2c) − pˆi0. Thus, maximizing ΠS is equivalent to minimizing pˆi0, which we do in
the following. As a first step, we derive the minimum feasible pˆii−1 for given fixed pˆii.
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Case (a): δpˆii < 4(1−qi)c/(2qi−1). The optimal payments are uig = 4c/(2qi−1), uib = 0,
and uia = 4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii, and it follows that pˆii−1 = (3− 2qi)c/(2qi − 1).
Case (b): 4(1 − qi)c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1). The optimal payments are uig =
4c/(2qi − 1), uib = 0, and uia = 0, and it follows that pˆii−1 = c/(2qi − 1) + δpˆii/2.
Case (c): δpˆii > 4qic/(2qi − 1). The optimal payments are uig = δpˆii/qi, uib = 0, and
uia = 0, and it follows that pˆii−1 = δpˆii − c
Taken together, Cases (a)-(c) imply that pˆii−1 is non-decreasing in pˆii for all i ∈ I. As
such, minimizing pˆi0 is equivalent to separately minimizing pˆii for each i ∈ I, starting with
pˆin = 0 and using Cases (a)-(c) for backwards induction. Thus, the optimal contract satisfies
uig = 4c/(2qi − 1) + [δpˆii/qi − 4c/(2qi − 1)]+, uib = 0, and uia = [4(1− qi)c/(2qi − 1)− δpˆii]+
for all i ∈ I.
(ii) If the designs in I can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1, qi ≥ qi+1 and (1 −
qi)4c/(2qi − 1) ≤ δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ I\{n}, then Cases (a) and (b) imply that
qiuig + (1− qi)uib+uia < qi+1ui+1g + (1− qi+1)ui+1b+ui+1a for all i ∈ I\{n}. By (2.13) and
the assumption that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 it follows readily that it is optimal to test the designs in
increasing order of i.
(iii) This result follows directly from inserting Proposition 2.3(i) in (2.13) and rearranging
terms.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. (i) By Proposition 2.2(iii), ΠM =
∑n
i=1(δ
i−1/2i)(qivi−K−4c/(2qi−
1)), which reveals that the sign of the net profit contribution of each design i ∈ N is
independent of the number and identity of the other designs to be tested. As a result,
the firm finds it optimal to include all designs i ∈ N into the testing set IM for which
qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0.
(ii) Consider the optimization problem P . By (2.2)-(2.4), we have uig ≥ 2j+1c/(2qi−1) and
uia + 2
j−nuit ≥ (1− qi)uig for all i, j ∈ I such that y(j)i = 1. Hence, the profit contribution
of design i with relative attractiveness j is Π
(j)
i ≤ (qivi − K − qiuig − uia − 2j−nuit)/2j ≤
(qivi − K − uig)/2j ≤ (qivi − K)/2j − 2c/(2qi − 1). A necessary condition for i ∈ IP is
that (qivi − K)/2j − 2c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0 for some j ∈ IP . However, this can only be true if
qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1) ≥ 0. Comparing this condition with IM completes the proof.
(iii) By Proposition 2.2 (ii) and (iii), it is optimal to have design n in the optimal set of
designs for testing since it is profitable to test and eventually develop this design due to the
stated condition qnvn −K − 4c/(2qn − 1) > 0. Furthermore, all designs j with qj ≥ qn and
vj ≥ vn belong to this optimal set because then, we also have qjvj−K−4c/(2qj−1) > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2.5. (i) Suppose δ < 1. For c = 0, we have IP = IM = IS = N and
designs are tested in decreasing order of qivi. By Propositions 2.1-2.3, it follows readily that
Π∗P > Π
∗
M = Π
∗
S . Thus, by continuity of the expected profits in c, there exists c > 0 such
that Π∗P > max{Π∗M ,Π∗S} for all c < c.
(ii) Let IP be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a parallel testing strategy, and
assume that the designs in IP can be ordered such that qivi ≥ qi+1vi+1 + 2i+1c[qi/(2qi−1)−
2qi+1/(2qi+1 − 1)]+ for all i ∈ IP\{n}. Then, by Proposition 2.1(iii), Π∗P =
∑
i∈IP ((qivi −
K)/2i − 2c/(2qi − 1)). Now, if the firm fixes the identity and ordering of designs, but
instead uses a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, then ΠM (IP ) =
∑
i∈IP δ
i−1(qivi −
K − 4c/(2qi − 1))/2i. By comparing the different profits, we have ΠM (IP ) > Π∗P if c > c ≡∑
i∈IP ((1− δi−1)(qivi−K)/2i)/
∑
i∈IP ((2(1− (δ/2)i−1)/(2qi−1)). Moreover, since IP need
not be optimal under a multi-expert sequential testing strategy, it follows that if c > c, then
Π∗P < ΠM (IP ) ≤ Π∗M ≤ max{Π∗M ,Π∗S}.
(iii) Let IM be the optimal set of designs to be tested under a multi-expert sequential
testing strategy, with IM optimally ordered according to Proposition 2.2(ii). By Proposition
2.2(iii) and 2.3(iii), we have Π∗M =
∑
i∈IM (δ
i−1/2i)(qivi −K − 4c/(2qi − 1)) and ΠS(IM ) =∑
i∈IM δ
i−1(qivi − K − max{4qic/(2qi − 1), δpˆii, 4c/(2qi − 1) − δpˆii})/2i ≤ Π∗S . Clearly, a
sufficient condition for ΠS(IM ) ≥ Π∗M is that δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi − 1) for all i ∈ IM .
By (2.17), we have δpˆin = 0 and δpˆii−1 increases in δpˆii for all i ∈ IM . Moreover, if δpˆii =
4qic/(2qi− 1), then δpˆii−1 = δ(4qic/(2qi− 1)− c). Thus, by induction, if δpˆii ≤ 4qic/(2qi− 1),
then δpˆii−1 ≤ δ(4qic/(2qi−1)− c), and δ(4qic/(2qi−1)− c) ≤ 4qi−1c/(2qi−1−1) if qi ≥ qi−1.
Finally, it is easy to show that q
i
≤ qi and qi ≤ 5/6.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. (i) Note that I fbseq = {i ∈ N | qivi −K − 2c ≥ 0}. Comparing this
with IM as given in Proposition 2.4(i) immediately yields IM ⊆ I fbseq. We next show that for
any i ∈ IS , qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−1) ≥ 0; implying that IS ⊆ I fbseq. Consider an arbitrary design
i ∈ IS . By Proposition 2.3(i), if the firm receives a good recommendation for this design, the
expected value of developing it is given by qivi−K−qiuig−(1−qi)uib ≤ qivi−K−4qic/(2qi−
1). Obviously, the firm only develops design i if the development generates a nonnegative
expected value; i.e., qivi −K − 4qic/(2qi − 1) ≥ qivi −K − qiuig − (1− qi)uib ≥ 0. Suppose
to the contrary that there exists a design i ∈ IS such that qivi−K − qiuig − (1− qi)uib < 0.
Obviously, the firm would never develop this design as the firm’s outside option has zero, and
thus greater value. In equilibrium, the expert anticipates the firm’s development decision,
and as a result, it is impossible for the firm to motivate the expert to exert high testing
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efforts. Hence, since design i will never be tested anyways, it is optimal for the firm to erase
it from the set of designs to be tested.
(ii) We prove the claim by example. Consider a setting with three design alternatives and
the following parameters: q1 = 0.55, q2 = 0.64, q3 = 1, v1 = 100, v2 = 85, v3 = 53, K = 50,
and c = 0.6. In this case, the optimal set of designs to be tested under first-best conditions
is I fbpar = {1, 2}, leading to an expected profit of Πfbpar = 2.4. In contrast, under delegation,
we have IP = {3} with an expected profit of Π∗P = 0.3. It follows that IP ∩ I fbpar = ∅.
(iii) For brevity, let |IM | = nM , |IP | = nP , |I fbseq| = nseq, and |I fbpar| = npar. With
symmetric test efficiencies (i.e., qi = q for all i ∈ N ), under any sequential testing strategy
it is always optimal to test designs in decreasing order of vi, and under any parallel testing
strategy the designs attractiveness decreases in vi. It follows from Propositions 2.1-2.4 that
IP ⊆ I fbpar, IM ⊆ I fbseq, and consequently, nP ≤ npar, nM ≤ nseq. Without loss of generality,
we relabel the designs such that vi ≥ vi+1 for all i ∈ N . Given these preliminaries, we prove
the result by showing that for any nP ≥ 0, Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar implies Π∗M ≥ Π∗P .
Case (a): nP = 0. Since it always holds that Π
∗
P = 0 ≤ Π∗M , the claim is trivially satisfied.
Case (b): nP = 1. By Proposition 2.1(iii) and 2.2(iii), we have Π
∗
P = (qv1−K)/2−2c/(2q−
1) = ΠM (n = 1) ≤ ΠM (nM ) = Π∗M , where the inequality follows from the optimality of nM .
Case (c): nP ≥ 2. Define ∆Π(x, y) = Π(x) − Π(y). With this notation, we can
rewrite the firm’s first-best expected profits as Πfbseq(nseq) = ΠM (nM ) + ∆ΠM (nseq, nM ) +∑nseq
i=1 (c(δ/2)
i−1(3−2q)/(2q−1)), and Πfbpar(npar) = ΠP (nP )+∆Πfbpar(npar, nP )+
∑np
i=1(c(3−
2q)/(2q − 1)). Hence Πfbseq ≥ Πfbpar is equivalent to ΠM (nM ) ≥ ΠP (nP ) + ∆Πfbpar(npar, nP )−
∆ΠM (nseq, nM ) + c(3− 2q)/(2q − 1)(nP − (1− (δ/2)nseq)/(1− (δ/2))). The right-hand side
of this inequality is larger than ΠP (nP ), which proves the claim. To see this, note that
by optimality of npar and nM , we have ∆Π
fb
par(npar, nP ) ≥ 0 and ∆ΠM (nseq, nM ) ≤ 0, and
finally, nP − (1− (δ/2)nseq)/(1− (δ/2)) ≥ nP − 2 ≥ 0 because nP ≥ 2 by assumption.
Last, we prove that the converse statement is not always true. We do this by example.
Consider a scenario with the following parameters: N = 4, v1 = 10, v2 = 8, v3 = 6, v4 = 4,
q = 1, δ = 0.8, K = 2, c = 0.2. Then Π∗P = 3.6 ≤ Π∗M = 3.82, but Πfbpar = 4.2 ≥ Πfbseq =
4.14.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. First, note the optimal decision in stage (III). Additionally, co∗ij <
aj always holds. Hence, product holder never states j if vi ≥ aj . For vi < aj , it always
holds that vi ≤ pi(j|i, vi) ≤ aj , where pi(j|i, vi) is the holder’s expected payoff for handing in
and stating j. This holds because the product holder can at most gain aj , and if there is a
counteroffer that is less than vi, the product is sent back.
The remaining proof consists of three steps: (a) we show that if it is optimal for a product
holder with vi ∈ [vi, vi] to hand in and state j, then this is also optimal for any product
holder with a smaller residual value; (b) we show that the stated action in (II) in Proposition
3.1 is the optimal response to players acting in the manner determined in the first step; and
(c) we show that the stated actions in (I) of Proposition 3.1 are optimal.
(a) Consider a holder’s expected payoff for handing in and stating j given vi:
pi(j|i, vi) = P(Π(co∗ij(mi)|j,mi) ≤ mi − aj) · aj
+P(Π(co∗ij(mi)|j,mi) > mi − aj) ·
∫
Π(co∗ij(mi)|j,mi)+aj>mi
max{vi, co∗ij(mi)}dmi
Note that the optimal response of the firm is not yet specified and depends on the updated
belief about vi if a certain quality is stated. pi(j|i, vi) exhibits the following properties:
(1) For  > 0, we have pi(j|i, vi) > vi ⇒ pi(j|i, vi − ) > vi − . Hence, if handing in is
profitable for vi, it is also profitable for all smaller residual values.
(2) pi(j|i, vi) is continuous in vi.
Now, assume an arbitrary but rationally updated belief of the firm about vi if statement
j is observed, i.e., every vi is assigned to keeping the product or to handing in and stating a
certain quality (including j). The firm determines her optimal action in stage (II) based on
that belief. By (1) and given the firm’s updated belief, there is wi ∈ [vi, vi], s.t. for all vi ≥ wi,
handing in is not profitable, and for all vi < wi, handing in is profitable. Furthermore, there
are l and v′i < wi, s.t. pi(l|i, vi) ≥ pi(k|i, vi) for all k 6= l and for all vi with v′i < vi ≤ wi.
First, consider k and l, s.t. pi(l|i, vi) > pi(k|i, vi) for all vi with v′i < vi < wi. Assume
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that there is a smallest v′i ≥ vi for which the conditions apply. Denote it by v′′i . Then,
due to (2), v′′i has to be an intersection point; hence, pi(l|i, v′′i ) = pi(k|i, v′′i ). Then, for all
vi with wi > vi > v
′′
i , it is more profitable to hand in and state l than to state k. This is
anticipated by the firm; hence, it is rational to pay at most v′′i if k is stated. However, then,
v′′i = pi(k|i, v′′i ) = pi(l|i, v′′i ). Therefore, it is not profitable for v′′i to hand in and state l, which
contradicts (1) because it is profitable to hand in and state l for all vi with v
′′
i < vi < wi.
Hence, there is no smallest v′i for which the stated conditions apply, and there cannot be any
intersection between pi(l|i, vi) and pi(k|i, vi) for vi < wi. Therefore, l has to coincide with
the observed statement j, and it is optimal for all vi < wi to hand in and state j, whereas
vi ≥ wi do not hand in.
Now, assume there are l and k 6= l s.t. pi(l|i, vi) = pi(k|i, vi) for all vi with v′i < vi < wi.
Assume again that there is a smallest v′i ≥ vi for which the conditions apply. Denote it
again by v′′i . Then, pi(l|i, v′′i ) > pi(k|i, v′′i ) would have to hold. Hence, for v′′i , it is more
profitable to state l than to state k. Assume that l was stated. Then, the firm cannot
differentiate whether vi ≤ v′′i , or v′′i < vi < wi applies. In this case, all vi < wi act the same
by handing in and stating l. Now, assume indifferent holders with vi in (v
′′
i , wi) would state
k. Then, the firm would know that pi(l|i, vi) > pi(k|i, vi) cannot apply for vi. Therefore,
stating l for vi ≤ v′′i would lead to the firm paying at most v′′i . Hence, for v′′i , it holds that
v′′i = pi(l|i, v′′i ) < pi(k|i, v′′i ) by (1). This contradicts pi(l|i, v′′i ) > pi(k|i, v′′i ). Therefore, if
product holder with vi is indifferent between stating k and l, it is optimal for holders with
smaller residual values to follow the action of the product holder with higher residual value
if handing in is profitable for him.
(b) Now, we show that the stated action in (II) of Proposition 3.1 is the optimal response
to product holders’ behavior. First, note that the updated belief about vi being below a
counteroffer coij if j was stated (which is important for anticipating the optimal action in
stage (III)) is P(vi ≤ coij |j) = (coij − vi)/(wi − vi) if vi ≤ coij ≤ wi and P(vi ≤ coij |j) = 1
if coij ≥ wi. wi denotes the cut-off level for vi for handing in and stating j, i.e., vi ∈ [vi, wi)
hand in and state j and vi ∈ [wi, vi] do not hand in. Note that wi ≤ min{aj , vi} has to hold.
Assume that wi > vi; otherwise, no product holder with quality i hands in and states j. The
expected payoff for making a counteroffer is as follows:
Π(coij |j,mi) =

coij−vi
wi−vi (mi + c− coij)− c if wi ≥ coij ≥ vi
mi − coij if coij ≥ wi
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Differentiating Π(coij |j,mi) with respect to coij , setting equal to zero and rearranging with
respect to coij leads to co
∗
ij = min{(mi + c+ vi)/2, wi}. Therefore, we have co∗ij ≥ vi.
Now, we compare the payoff for making the optimal counteroffer to the payoff for accepting
the offer aj :
Π(co∗ij |j,mi)− (mi − aj) =

(wi−co∗ij)2+(aj−wi)(wi−vi)
wi−vi if co
∗
ij =
mi+c+vi
2
aj − wi if co∗ij = wi
It always holds that aj ≥ wi ≥ co∗ij . Hence, in both cases, the terms are greater than 0 if
and only if aj > co
∗
ij . The terms are equal to 0 if and only if aj = co
∗
ij , which means that
counteroffering does not yield any benefit. Therefore, in this case, the firm ends the game
by accepting the offer. This gives us that the stated action for (II) is indeed the optimal
response to product holders acting, as determined in the first step.
(c) Now, we can insert the optimal response in stage (II) into the product holder’s expected
payoff for handing in and stating j, giving us
pi(j|i, vi) = 1
mi −mi
∫ mi
mi
max{vi,min{wi, co∗ij(mi)}}dmi
⇔ pi(j|i, vi) =P(wi ≤
mi + vi + c
2
) · wi
+P(wi >
mi + vi + c
2
≥ vi) ·
∫
wi>
mi+vi+c
2
≥vi
mi + vi + c
2
dmi
+P(
mi + vi + c
2
< vi) · vi
=P(2wi − vi − c ≤ mi) · wi
+P(2wi − vi − c > mi ≥ 2vi − vi − c)
·
∫
2wi−vi−c>mi≥2vi−vi−c
mi + vi + c
2
dmi
+P(mi < 2vi − vi − c) · vi
It is obvious that from product holder’s perspective, the firm is at most paying min{aj , (mi+
vi+ c)/2, vi}. That means that if vi is less than this term, there is a positive probability that
they gain more than vi from handing in and stating j, resulting in pi(j|i, vi) > vi. If vi ≥ aj , j
is not stated because it is not profitable. There exists no vi > vi. If vi ≥ (mi+vi+c)/2, there
is also no chance of getting paid more than (mi+vi+c)/2 because this is the largest imaginable
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optimal counteroffer if smaller than aj and vi. Hence, wi = min{aj , (mi + vi + c)/2, vi}.
Now, it is also obvious that if ak < min{(mi + vi + c)/2, vi}, then for aj > ak, it holds
that pi(j|i, vi) > pi(k|i, vi). For ak ≥ min{(mi + vi + c)/2, vi} and aj > ak, it holds that
pi(j|i, vi) = pi(k|i, vi). Hence, the optimal actions in stage (I) and the corresponding optimal
response in stage (II) hold. Due to the fact that the optimal counteroffer co∗ij has the same
structure for all optimal quality statements, the index j referring to the quality statement is
dropped.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. Assume that there is a participation fee of  that is subtracted from
every payoff for a holder in stages (II) and (III) and added to every payoff for the firm in
(II) and (III). Then, for an arbitrary cut-off level wi
′, where vi ≤ wi′ ≤ vi, the firm’s optimal
counteroffer solves
Π′(co∗i |j,mi) =(
co∗i − (vi − )
wi
′ − (vi − ) (mi + + c− − co
∗
i )− c+ )′
=
mi + c− co∗i − co∗i + (vi − )
wi
′ − (vi − ) = 0
if co∗i ≤ wi′, resulting in co∗i = (mi + vi + c− )/2. If co∗i ≥ wi′, it is optimal to offer wi′.
The cutoff level for handing in and stating j, wi
′, is at most equal to wi −  in the former
proof because the new expected payoff for handing in is at most equal to the expected payoff
without effort minus . This is due to the fact that the optimal counteroffer is lower than in
the case without effort. Therefore, the firm will at most pay wi − . This is anticipated by
the product holder leading to a cutoff level that is at most equal to wi − 2. This can again
be anticipated by the firm, and so on. In the end, there is k such that wi − k ≤ vi, leading
to the stated equilibrium at which no one hands in.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. The statement follows immediately by differentiating ΠiACP with re-
spect to aˆ, setting it equal to zero and rearranging. Inserting the optimal term for aˆ into the
profit gives the presented terms.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. We have
ΠACP (aˆ) =
n∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi [(mi − cˆo
∗
i (aˆ))(cˆo
∗
i (aˆ)− wi(aˆ)) + (wi(aˆ)− cˆo∗i (aˆ)) · (−c)]
=:
n∑
i=1
ΠiACP (aˆ)
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and
Π′ACP (aˆ) =
n∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi [−2cˆo
∗
i (aˆ) · a∗′i (aˆ) + a∗′i (aˆ) · (wi(aˆ) +mi + c)
+cˆo∗i (aˆ) · wi′(aˆ)− wi′(aˆ) ·mi − wi′(aˆ) · c].
aˆ∗ 6= vi, v∗i for all i locally maximizes ΠACP if and only if Π′ACP (aˆ∗) = 0 and Π′′ACP (aˆ∗) > 0.
For any aˆ 6= vi, v∗i for all i, there are indices j, k, l, where 0 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ l ≤ n such that
aˆ > v∗i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j, co∗i < aˆ < v∗i for all j < i ≤ k, vi < aˆ ≤ co∗i for all k < i ≤ l, and
aˆ < vi for all l < i ≤ n. This is due to the fact that vi ≤ co∗i ≤ v∗i for all i, and these values
are increasing in their quality indices. Hence, the first and second derivative in aˆ have the
following structures:
Π′ACP (aˆ) =
k∑
i=j+1
δi
vi − vi · (−c) +
l∑
i=k+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2aˆ+ vi +mi)
Π′′ACP (aˆ) =
l∑
i=k+1
− 2 · δi
vi − vi
We immediately see that l 6= k has to hold for a proper maximum. Setting the first derivative
equal to zero and rearranging with respect to aˆ leads to
aˆ∗ =
∑k
i=j+1
δi
vi−vi · (−c) +
∑l
i=k+1
δi
vi−vi · (mi + vi)
2
∑l
i=k+1
δi
vi−vi
, which is the term stated in the proposition. Note that for co∗i 6= vi, v∗i , the left-sided and
right-sided derivatives exist and coincide. Therefore, the analysis also holds for aˆ = co∗i if
the conditions are satisfied.
Now, we want to investigate the aˆ values for which ΠACP is not differentiable, which are
vi and v
∗
i for all i. If ΠACP was maximized by such a value, it would have to hold that
Π′ACP (x) > 0 for x smaller and very close to that value and Π
′
ACP (y) < 0 for y larger and
very close to that value.
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First, consider v∗q for some quality class q. For x < v∗q but very close to v∗q , we have
Π′ACP (x) =
k∑
i=q
δi
vi − vi · (−c) +
l∑
i=k+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2x+ vi +mi)
For y > v∗q but very close to v∗q , we have
Π′ACP (y) =
k∑
i=q+1
δi
vi − vi · (−c) +
l∑
i=k+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2y + vi +mi)
It is obvious that for x, y very close to v∗q , we can never have Π′ACP (x) > 0 > Π
′
ACP (y) due
to limx↑v∗q Π
′
ACP (x) = limy↓v∗q δq(−c)/(vq − vq) + Π′ACP (y).
Now, consider vq for some quality class q. For x < vq but very close to vq, we have
Π′ACP (x) =
k∑
i=j+1
δi
vi − vi · (−c) +
q−1∑
i=k+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2x+ vi +mi)
For y > vq but very close to vq, we have
Π′ACP (y) =
k∑
i=j+1
δi
vi − vi · (−c) +
q∑
i=k+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2y + vi +mi)
It is obvious that for x, y very close to vq, we can never have Π
′
ACP (x) > 0 > Π
′
ACP (y) due
to limx↑vq Π′ACP (x) = limy↓vq Π
′
ACP (y)− δq(−2y + vq +mq)/(vq − vq).
The number of possible maxima only depends on the amount of values of the form v∗i , vi
and co∗i . When increasing aˆ starting with aˆ = 0, we pass at most 3n such values. We know
that there are no maxima for aˆ ≤ v1 because there, the profit is constant and equal to zero.
We know that there are no maxima for aˆ ≥ co∗n because there, the profit is linearly decreasing
in aˆ or constant. Due to the structure of the locally optimal aˆ, we know that every time we
pass such a value, we have a potential locally optimal candidate until we pass the next value
given by the term for the optimal price. Because there are at most 3n − 2 such intervals
(note that v∗n ≥ co∗n) with at most one local maximum each, this is the maximum number of
local maxima that the profit function can have.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Choosing the price and bonuses with respect to conditions (i)-(iv)
signals the product holders that if they state the true quality i of their products, they receive
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a+ bi with probability one. If they state a worse quality < i, they will get paid less anyway,
and if they state a better quality > i, they will either not get paid the corresponding bonus
with probability one or they are paid the same bonus as for stating the true quality i.
Condition (i) is natural because a negative bonus does not incentivize a product holder to
make a true quality statement. Condition (ii) leads to P(vi < a|j) = 0 for all i, j because v1
is the smallest residual value. Condition (iii) signals to the product holder that he is paid
the bonus for stating the true quality. For deciding about paying the bonus for a true quality
statement, the firm has to compare ΠABP (no bi|i,mi) and mi − a − bi in (II). Because of
(ii), ΠABP = −c holds. The choice of bi as a signal for the product holders has to satisfy
−c ≤ mi − a − bi for all mi ∈ [mi,mi], which is captured by condition (iii). Condition (iv)
makes sure that product holders either receive the signal that they do not get paid a bonus
if they state a higher quality than the actual one with probability one or do not benefit from
stating the next higher quality because the bonus is the same as for stating the true quality.
The condition that bi ≥ mi−1 + c − a tells every product holder with quality i − 1 that
ΠABP (no bi|i,mi−1) = −c ≥ mi−1 − a − bi for all mi−1 ∈ [mi−1,mi−1]. Due to infeasibility
through mi−1 > mi and for the sake of more possible choices for bonuses, bi = bi−1 allows
for not satisfying the former condition. This condition makes a product holder indifferent
between stating i − 1 and i and therefore yields no incentive for stating the wrong quality.
In particular, the former condition then does not have to be satisfied.
In the end, these conditions lead to a situation in which the expected payoff for stating j
if the true quality is i is equal to a + bj for j ≤ i and bj ≤ bi. If j > i the expected payoff
for stating j is a+ bi if bi = bj or a if bj > bi. Therefore, product holders will state the true
quality if acquisition price and bonuses satisfy the conditions.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. The proof is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.3, with the differ-
ence that mi, mi, mi and c are replaced by mi + , mi + , mi +  and c−  and every payoff
for the product holder after handing in is reduced by .
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Consider problem P2 − S. For fixed bˆ 6= vl, vl for all l ∈ I with
mj−1 + c ≤ bˆ ≤ mj + c, we have indices s, t ∈ I, such that j ≤ s ≤ t and bˆ > vl for j ≤ l ≤ s,
vl < bˆ < vl for s < l ≤ t and bˆ < vl for t < l. We have
ΠI′ABP (bˆ) =
s∑
i=j
δi
vi − vi · (−1) · (vi − vi) +
t∑
i=s+1
δi
vi − vi · ((−1) · (bˆ− vi) + (mi − bˆ))
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ΠI′′ABP (bˆ) =
t∑
i=s+1
−2δi
vi − vi
Due to the second derivative, s 6= t has to hold for a proper maximum. Setting the first
derivative equal to zero and rearranging with respect to bˆ gives us the term for bˆ∗ in Lemma
3.2.
In bˆ = vp, for some p ∈ I, we have a maximum if the stated conditions in Lemma 3.2 hold.
Next, we consider the bounds for bˆ. If ΠI′ABP (mj−1 + c) < 0, or if Π
I′
ABP (mj + c) > 0, then
ΠIABP is locally maximized by these bounds. Since ΠABP is just the sum over these Π
I
ABP
and these are locally maximized, then the same holds for the objective function.
Finally, we cannot have maxima in any vp for all p ∈ I. To this end, consider
lim
x↑vp
ΠI′ABP (x) = lim
x↑vp
(
s∑
i=j
δi
vi − vi · (−1) · (vi − vi) +
p−1∑
i=s+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2x+ vi +mi)
)
Furthermore, we have
lim
x↓vp
ΠI′ABP (x) = lim
x↓vp
(
s∑
i=j
δi
vi − vi · (−1) · (vi − vi) +
p∑
i=s+1
δi
vi − vi · (−2x+ vi +mi)
)
We always have limx↑vp ΠI′ABP (x) ≤ limx↓vp ΠI′ABP (x), but for a maximum, we would need
limx↑vp ΠI′ABP (x) > 0 > limx↓vp Π
I′
ABP (x)
Inserting the optimal bonuses into the objective function under consideration of s and t
gives the presented profit.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. This is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.2, where instead of
considering just one index set and one corresponding bonus, multiple are considered. Still,
no additional complexities come into play.
Proof of Corollary 3.5. Consider one quality class i. It is easily seen that b∗i = min{vi, (mi+
vi)/2} maximizes
ΠiABP (bi) =
δi
vi − vi (mi − bi)(min{max{vi, bi}, vi} − vi)
Hence, choosing b∗i as presented for all i solves the unconstrained problem P2 and therefore
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solves P2 if it satisfies the constraints. Then, for b∗i = min{vi, (mi + vi)/2}, we have
ΠiABP (b
∗
i ) =
 δivi−vi (
mi−vi
2 )
2 if
mi+vi
2 ≤ vi
δi(mi − vi) if mi−vi2 ≥ vi
For P1, we consider three cases: for aˆ ≥ v∗i , we have
ΠiACP (aˆ) =
 δivi−vi ((
mi−vi
2 )
2 − c24 − c(v∗i −
mi+vi+c
2 )) if
mi−vi
2 ≤ vi
δi(mi − vi) if mi+vi2 ≥ vi
For co∗i ≤ aˆ < v∗i (note that co∗i < v∗i implies co∗i = (mi + vi + c)/2), we have
ΠiACP (aˆ) =
δi
vi − vi ((
mi − vi
2
)2 − c
2
4
− c(aˆ− mi + vi + c
2
))
For vi ≤ aˆ ≤ co∗i , we have
ΠiACP (aˆ) =
δi
vi − vi (mi − aˆ)(aˆ− vi)
It always holds that ΠiABP ≥ ΠiACP . This holds for every quality class and completes the
proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5. First, we show that Π∗ACP is equal to the three different terms
under the indicated conditions by making use of Proposition 3.2. Then, we show that Π∗ABP
is equal to the four different terms by making use of Lemma 3.2.
(1) By Proposition 3.2, k 6= l is necessary for a proper maximum. If l = i for some
i ∈ {1, ..., n}, then k = j = i − 1 has to hold due to the fact that vi−1 ≤ vi for all i ≥ 2 by
assumptions (i)-(iv). Therefore, there are n local maxima: aˆ = (mi + vi)/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Due to assumption (iv), the global one can be found via a marginal analysis. The structure
of the optimal profit depends on how co∗r and v∗r for r < i look like. There are three different
cases (see Proposition 3.1): co∗r = (mr+vr+c)/2 and v∗r = (mr+vr+c)/2, co∗r = (mr+vr+c)/2
and v∗r = vr, and co∗r = v∗r = vr.
(a) (K +L+ c)/2 ≤ 2K ⇔ (mi + vi + c)/2 ≤ vi for all i. Therefore, cˆo∗i = min{(mi + vi +
c)/2, aˆ} = min{(i− 1)R+ (K + c)/2, aˆ} and v∗i = min{(mi + vi + c)/2, aˆ} = min{(i− 1)R+
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(K + Lc)/2, aˆ}. Due to the fact that aˆ = (mj + vj)/2 for some j, the profit is then given by
ΠACP (
mj + vj
2
) = [
j−1∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi ((mi −
mi + vi + c
2
)(
mi + vi + c
2
− vi)
−c(mi + vi + c
2
− mi + vi + c
2
))] +
δj
vj − vj (mj −
mj + vj
2
)(
mj + vj
2
− vj)
=[
j−1∑
i=1
δi
2K
(
(K − c)2
4
− cL
2
)] + δj
K
8
= [
j−1∑
i=1
δi(
K
8
− c(2L+ c)
8K
)] + δj
K
8
Now, we compare profits ΠACP ((mj + vj)/2) := Πj and ΠACP ((mj+1 + vj+1)/2) := Πj+1
for an arbitrary but fixed j ≤ n − 1: Πj ≥ Πj+1 ⇔ [
∑j−1
i=1 δi(K/8 − (c(2L + c))/(8K))] +
δjK/8 − [
∑j
i=1 δi(K/8 − (c(2L + c))/(8K))] − δj+1K/8 ≥ 0 ⇔ c(2L + c)/(K2) ≥ δj+1/δj .
Due to assumption (iv), δj+1/δj is decreasing in i. Therefore, for the optimal j, it has to
hold that δj/δj−1 ≥ c(2L+ c)/(K2) ≥ δj+1/δj .
(b) (K + c)/2 ≤ 2K ≤ (K + L + c)/2 ⇔ (mi + vi + c)/2 ≤ vi ≤ (mi + vi + c)/2
for all i. Therefore, cˆo∗i = min{(mi + vi + c)/2, aˆ} = min{(i − 1)R + (K + c)/2, aˆ} and
v∗i = min{vi, aˆ} = min{(i− 1)R + 2K, aˆ}. Again, because aˆ∗ = (mj + vj)/2 has to hold for
one j, the profit is then given by
ΠACP (
mj + vj
2
) = [
j−1∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi ((mi −
mi + vi + c
2
)(
mi + vi + c
2
− vi)
−c(vi −
mi + vi + c
2
))] +
δj
vj − vj (mj −
mj + vj
2
)(
mj + vj
2
− vj)
=[
j−1∑
i=1
δi
2K
(
(K − c)2
4
− c(2K − K + c
2
)] + δj
K
8
= [
j−1∑
i=1
δi(
K
8
− c(6K − c)
8K
)] + δj
K
8
Comparing profits ΠACP ((mj + vj)/2) := Πj and ΠACP ((mj+1 + vj+1)/2) := Πj+1 for an
arbitrary but fixed j ≤ n − 1 leads to Πj ≥ Πj+1 ⇔ [
∑j−1
i=1 δi(K/8 − c(6K − c)/(8K))] +
δjK/8 − [
∑j
i=1 δi(K/8 − c(6K − c)/(8K))] − δj+1K/8 ≥ 0 ⇔ c(6K − c)/(K2) ≥ δj+1/δj .
Due to assumption (iv), δj+1/δj is decreasing in i. Therefore, for the optimal j, it has to
hold that δj/δj−1 ≥ c(6K − c)/(K2) ≥ δj+1/δj .
(c) 2K ≤ (K + c)/2 ⇔ vi ≤ (mi + vi + c)/2 for all i. Therefore, cˆo∗i = v∗i = min{vi, aˆ} =
min{(i − 1)R + 2K, aˆ} holds for all i. Again, aˆ∗ = (mj + vj)/2 has to hold for one j. The
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profit is then given by
ΠACP (
mj + vj
2
) =[
j−1∑
i=1
δi
vi − vi ((mi − vi)(vi − vi)− c(vi − vi))]
+
δj
vj − vj (mj −
mj + vj
2
)(
mj + vj
2
− vj)
=[
j−1∑
i=1
δi
2K
(K − 2K)(2K)] + δjK
8
= [
j−1∑
i=1
δi(−K)] + δjK
8
Comparing profits ΠACP ((mj + vj)/2) := Πj and ΠACP ((mj+1 + vj+1)/2) := Πj+1 for an
arbitrary but fixed j ≤ n−1 leads to Πj ≥ Πj+1 ⇔ [
∑j−1
i=1 δi(−K)]+δjK/8−[
∑j
i=1 δi(−K)]−
δj+1K/8 ≥ 0⇔ 9 ≥ δj+1/δj . Therefore, for the optimal j, it has to hold that δj/δj−1 ≥ 9 ≥
δj+1/δj .
(2) Note that assumptions (i)-(iv) ensure that mi−1+c ≤ mi+c, mi−1+c ≤ vi and vi−1 ≤ vi
for all i ≥ 2. This has several implications for the bonuses solving P2. Ifmi−1+c ≤ bi ≤ mi+c
induces vi ≤ bi ≤ mi, then yi = 0 for all i ≥ 2 in P2 because forcing bi = bi−1 cannot generate
profit in quality class i due to bi ≤ mi−1 + c ≤ vi for all i ≥ 2. If it is the case that bi has
to be chosen larger than mi due to mi−1 + c ≥ mi for all i ≥ 2, then yi = 1 for all i ≥ 2 is
optimal, preventing losses in every quality class i ≥ 2. Here, b1 = b2 = ... = bn ≤ m1 + c
has to hold. The solution for the unconstrained P2 is (mi + vi)/2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n under
assumptions (i)-(iv). Hence, how this term relates to mi−1 + c, and mi + c determines the
optimal bi.
(a) R + K ≤ K + L + c⇔ mi−1 + c ≥ mi ∀i ≥ 2. Therefore, as mentioned above, yi = 0
for all i ≥ 2 is optimal, forcing b1 = ... = bn = (m1 + v1)/2 = K/2. Note that this is feasible
due to R + K ≤ K + L + c ⇒ c ≥ L ⇒ c + K2 ≥ L ⇔ (mi + vi)/2 ≤ mi + c with regard to
constraint (3.7). Inserting into the objective function gives
ΠABP (
K
2
, ...,
K
2
) =
δ1
v1 − v1 · (m1 −
K
2
) · (K
2
− v1) = δ1
2K
· (K − K
2
) · (K
2
− 0) = δ1K
8
(b) R + K/2 ≤ K + L + c ≤ R + K ⇔ (mi + vi)/2 ≤ mi−1 + c ≤ mi for all i ≥ 2
due to the assumptions. Therefore, by the previous discussion yi = 1 for all i ≥ 2 and
bi = mi−1 + c = (i− 2)R+K +L+ c for i ≥ 2 and b1 = (m1 + v1)/2 = K/2 is optimal. The
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profit is
Π∗ABP =
δ1
2K
(k − K
2
)(
K
2
− 0)
+
n∑
i=2
δi((i− 1)R +K − ((i− 2)R +K + L+ c))((i− 2)R +K + L+ c− (i− 1)R)
2K
=(1− δ1)(R− L− c)(K − (R− L− c))
2K
+ δ1
K
8
=
K
8
− 1
8K
(1− δ1)(K − 2(R− L− c))2
(c) K + L + c ≤ R + K/2 ≤ R + K − L + c ⇔ mi−1 + c ≤ (mi + vi)/2 ≤ mi + c ∀i ≥ 2.
Therefore, the optimal solution for the unconstrained bonuses optimization is the optimal
solution for P2. That means that bi = (mi + vi)/2 = (i− 1)R + K/2 for all i ∈ {1, ..., n} is
optimal. Inserting into the objective function leads to
Π∗ABP =
n∑
i=1
δi
2K
((i− 1)R +K − ((i− 1)R + K
2
))((i− 1)R + K
2
− (i− 1)R)
=
1
2K
K2
4
=
K
8
(d) R+K −L+ c ≤ R+K/2⇔ mi + c ≤ (mi + vi)/2 ∀i. That implies that bi = mi + c =
(i− 1)R +K − L+ c for all i solves P2. The resulting profit is
Π∗ABP =
n∑
i=1
δi((i− 1)R +K − ((i− 1)R +K − L+ c))((i− 1)R +K − L+ c− (i− 1)R)
2K
=
K
8
− 1
8K
(2(L− c)−K)2
Proof of Lemma 3.3. (i) L ≤ c + K/2 ≤ R − L ⇔ K + L + c ≤ R + K/2 ≤ R + K − L + c
ensures that Π∗ABP = K/8. This term is larger than every possible optimal value for Π
∗
ACP
in Proposition 3.5.
(ii) L+ c ≥ 3K is equivalent to being in the second or third cases for Π∗ACP in Proposition
3.5. Therefore, c ≥ 2K has to hold since L ≤ K. For the second case, (K + c)/2 ≤
2K ⇔ c ≤ 3K has to hold. Therefore, c(6K − c)/(K2) ≥ 2K(6K − 3K)/(K2) = 6 with
regard to the second case. Due to the condition δi+1/δi ≤ 6 in Lemma 3.3 (ii), the optimal
aˆ∗ = (mj+vj)/2 = (m1 +v1)/2 = K/2. Therefore, Π∗ACP = δ1K/8. If c ≥ 3K, the third case
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for Π∗ACP from Proposition 3.5 applies. In this case, since 9 > 6, again, aˆ
∗ = (mj + vj)/2 =
(m1 +v1)/2 = K/2 is optimal, and the optimal profit is equal to δ1K/8. Comparing this term
to the optimal profits Π∗ABP shows that Π
∗
ABP can never be smaller than Π
∗
ACP = δ1K/8.
(iii) L + c ≥ R implies that the first case of Π∗ABP in Proposition 3.5 applies. Comparing
to Π∗ACP in Proposition 3.5 shows that Π
∗
ACP can never be smaller than Π
∗
ABP in this case.
(iv) c ≤ K/16 and L ≥ 3K/4 imply L ≥ K/2 + c⇔ R +K − L+ c ≤ R +K/2, meaning
for Π∗ABP , the fourth case in Proposition 3.5 applies. Furthermore, c ≤ K/16 induces that
the first case for Π∗ACP applies. With regard to Π
∗
ACP , it holds that c(2L + c)/2 ≤ (K/16 ·
(2K + K/16))/(K2) = 33/256 ≤ 1/7. Because δi+1/δi ≥ 1/7 by assumption, the optimal j
for aˆ∗ = (mj + vj)/2 is equal to n. That leads to Π∗ACP = K/8 − (1 − δn)c(2L + c)/(8K).
If a lower bound for Π∗ACP that is larger than a upper bound for Π
∗
ABP is found, then the
proof is completed. Due to the fact that 0 ≤ c ≤ K/16 and 3K/4 ≤ L ≤ K, we have
Π∗ACP =
K
8
− (1− δn)c(2L+ c)
8K
≥K
8
− (1− δn)K/16 · (2K +K/16)
8K
=
K
8
(
256− 33 + 33δn
256
) =
K
8
(
223 + 33δn
256
)
≥K
8
223
256
and
Π∗ABP =
1
8K
(L− c)(K − L+ c) ≤ K(K − 12K
16
+
k
16
) =
K
8
5
16
Since 223/256 ≥ 5/16, the proof is completed.
(v) It can easily be seen that the different cases for Π∗ABP and Π
∗
ACP are either not depen-
dent on L or decreasing in L for 0 ≤ L ≤ K. The same holds for the relation between Π∗ACP
and c.
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Appendix C
Proofs of Chapter IV
Proof of Proposition 4.1. (i) We write F0Θ instead of FΘ(p0). Problem N dependent on k
having price p0 fixed is as follows:
N : max
k
Π(k|p = p0)|p0 = βF0G(1− kG) + (1− β)F0B(m− kB) (C.1)
s.t. βF0G(kG − δp0) + (1− β)F0B(kB − δp0) ≥ 0 (C.2)
βF0G(kG − δp0) + (1− β)F0B(kB − δp0) ≥ pi0 (C.3)
It is easily seen that the stated conditions for kN are optimality conditions (binds constraint
(C.3), which is parallel to the objective). The insertion of such a contract into the firm’s
profit function (which builds the basis for (iii) and proves (ii)) results in
Π(kN , p0) = βF
0
G(1− δp0) + (1− β)F0B(m− δp0)− pi0. (C.4)
(iii) For Π and p, instead of ΠN (k
N , p0) and p0, the first-order condition for p
N , which is
necessary and sufficient for optimality due to Assumption 4.2, is
∂Π/∂p|pN = β[fG(pN )(1− δpN )− δFG(pN )] + (1− β)[fB(pN )(m− δpN )− δFB(pN )] = 0.
(C.5)
(C.5) is only necessary for optimality without Assumption 4.2. Note that interior solutions
(0 < pN < 1/δ) are guaranteed since ∂Π/∂p|p=0 > 0 and ∂Π/∂p|p>1/δ < 0.
Proof of Corollary 4.1. Uniqueness is easily derived from the concavity of Π(kN , p0) due to
Assumption 4.2. We use Π and p instead of Π(kN , p0) and p0.
In order to determine the sensitivities, by the implicit function theorem, we use the identity
∂p/∂x = −(∂2Π/(∂p∂x))/(∂2Π/∂p2) and the fact that ∂2Π/∂p2 < 0 in optimum.
By (C.5), we have ∂2Π/(∂p∂δ) ≤ 0, ∂2Π/(∂p∂m) ≥ 0, and ∂2Π/(∂p∂q) = 0, resulting in
∂p/∂δ ≤ 0, ∂p/∂m ≥ 0, and ∂p/∂q = 0, the stated sensitivities.
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For ∂p/∂β, we employ the following observation: the monotone probability ratio order
(Assumption 4.1) implies fG(p)/FG(p) ≥ fB(p)/FB(p) for all p ∈ [0, τ ] (see, e.g., Hopkins
et al. 2003). This implies (fG(p)/FG(p))(1−δp)−δ ≥ (fB(p)/FB(p))(m−δp)−δ for p ≤ 1/δ.
Therefore, with regard to (C.5), it has to hold that (fG(pN )/FG(pN ))(1 − δpN ) − δ > 0 >
(fB(pN )/FB(pN ))(m− δpN )− δ, which gives us the stated bounds for pN .
Finally, using this information together with ∂2Π/(∂p∂β)|pN = [fG(pN )(1−δpN )−δFG(pN )]−
[fB(pN )(m− δpN )− δFB(pN )] results in ∂2Π/(∂p∂β)|pN ≥ 0, which proves ∂p/∂β ≥ 0.
Derivation of Problem T . For simplicity, we write FsΘ instead of FΘ(ps). The concrete opti-
mization problem T for general e and e′ is
T : max
k,pg,pb
Π(k, pg, pb|e, p = ps)
= βFgG(1− kG,g) + (1− β)((1− qe)FgB(m− kB,g) + qeFbB(m− kB,b))
(C.6)
s.t. βFgG(kG,g − δpg) + (1− β)(1− qe)FgB(kB,g − δpg)
− (βFbG(kG,b − δpb) + (1− β)(1− qe)FbB(kB,b − δpb)) ≥ 0
(C.7)
βFgG(kG,g − δpg) + (1− β)(1− qe)FgB(kB,g − δpg) ≥ 0 (C.8)
FbB(kB,b − δpb)− FgB(kB,g − δpg) ≥ 0 (C.9)
FbB(kB,b − δpb) ≥ 0 (C.10)
(qe − qe′)(FbB(kB,b − δpb)− FgB(kB,g − δpg)) ≥ (ce − ce′)/(1− β) (C.11)
βFgG(kG,g − δpg) + (1− β)(1− qe)FgB(kB,g − δpg)
+ (1− β)qeFbB(kB,b − δpb)− (pi0 + ce) ≥ 0
(C.12)
The reasoning is as follows: the firm’s expected profit if the retailer participates, makes
offers corresponding to testing outcomes, and exerts effort e is Π = P(Θ = G)(P(s =
g|Θ = G & e)FgG(1 − kG,g) + P(s = b|Θ = G & e)FbG(1 − kG,b)) + P(Θ = B)(P(s =
g|Θ = B & e)FgB(m − kB,g) + P(s = b|Θ = B & e)FbB(m − kB,b)) = βFgG(1 − kG,g) +
(1 − β)((1 − qe)FgB(m − kB,g) + qeFbB(m − kB,b)). To make the retailer participate, the
firm has to ensure that the retailer’s payoff, pi, is at least pi0, which is obviously cap-
tured by constraint (C.12) if the retailer exerts effort e and makes truthful offers. Now,
we turn to the incentive-compatibility constraints (C.7)-(C.10), which ensure the retailer’s
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adherence to testing outcomes. If the retailer receives a good testing outcome and ex-
erted effort e, the retailer’s payoffs for offering pg, pb, and 0 are pi(p = pg|s = g & e) =
(βFgG(kG,g − δpg) + (1 − β)(1 − qe)FgB(kB,g − δpg))/(β + (1 − β)(1 − qe)), pi(p = pb|s =
g & e) = (βFbG(kG,b − δpb) + (1 − β)(1 − qe)FbB(kB,b − δpb))/(β + (1 − β)(1 − qe)), and
pi(p = 0|s = g & e) = 0, respectively. To ensure p = pg if s = g, it has to hold that
pi(p = pg|s = g & e) ≥ max{pi(p = pb|s = g & e), pi(p = 0|s = g & e)}, which is cap-
tured by constraints (C.7) and (C.8). Correspondingly, if there is a bad testing outcome,
the retailer’s payoffs for offering pg, pb, and 0 are pi(p = pg|s = b & e) = FgB(kB,g − δpg),
pi(p = pb|s = b & e) = FbB(kB,b − δpb), and pi(p = 0|s = b & e) = 0, respectively. To
ensure p = pb, it has to hold that pi(p = pb|s = b & e) ≥ max{pi(p = pg|s = b & e), pi(p =
0|s = b & e)}, which is ensured by constraints (C.9) and (C.10). Finally, the exertion
of testing effort e is more profitable than exertion of effort e′ if, afterward, the retailer
adheres with offers to testing outcomes if pi(e, p = ps) ≥ pi(e′, p = ps). It holds that
pi(e, p = ps) = βF
g
G(kG,g − δpg) + (1 − β)((1 − qe)FgB(kB,g − δpg) + qeFbB(kB,b − δpb)) − ce.
Correspondingly, we have pi(e′, p = ps) and hence constraint (C.11).
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (i) Consider the concrete problem T under e = h and e′ = l. Let
rΘ,s ≡ FsΘ(kΘ,s − δps), ρB,g ≡ (1 − β)(1 − q), ρB,b ≡ (1 − β)q, and C ≡ 2(ch − cl)/((1 −
β)(2q − 1)). For fixed pg and pb, problem T is then
max
k
Π(k|e = h, p = ps)|(pg,pb)
= βFgG(1− kG,g) + ρB,gFgB(m− kB,g) + ρB,bFbB(m− kB,b)
(C.13)
s.t. βrG,g + ρB,grB,g − (βrG,b + ρB,grB,b) ≥ 0 (C.14)
βrG,g + ρB,grB,g ≥ 0 (C.15)
rB,b − rB,g ≥ 0 (C.16)
rB,b ≥ 0 (C.17)
rB,b − rB,g − C ≥ 0 (C.18)
βrG,g + ρB,grB,g + ρB,brB,b − (pi0 + ch) ≥ 0 (C.19)
First, note that constraint (C.19) is parallel to the firm’s profit. Hence, if it is binding, the
contract is optimal.
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Assume that (C.19) is binding. This leads to rG,g = (pi0+ch−(ρB,grB,g+ρB,brB,b))/β. This,
taken together with constraints (C.15) and (C.17), leads to rB,b’s characterization. (C.19)
being binding, together with (C.14), leads to rG,b’s characterization. (C.18) gives rB,g’s
characterization. Finally, (C.16) is dominated by (C.18), which is why it is not considered.
The conditions can always be satisfied. Hence, (C.19) is indeed binding in optimum.
The insertion of an optimal contract into the firm’s profit (which builds the basis for (iii)
and proves (ii)) gives
Π(kH , pg, pb) = βF
g
G(1− δpg) + ρB,gFgB(m− δpg) + ρB,bFbB(m− δpb)− ch − pi0. (C.20)
(iii) For Π instead of Π(kH , pg, pb), the first-order conditions for p
H
g and p
H
b , which are
necessary and sufficient for optimality due to Assumption 4.2, are the following:
∂Π/∂pg|pHg =β[fG(pHg )(1− δpHg )− δFG(pHg )] + ρB,g[fB(pHg )(m− δpHg )− δFB(pHg )] = 0
(C.21)
∂Π/∂pb|pHb =(1− β)q[fB(p
H
b )(m− δpHb )− δFB(pHb )] = 0 (C.22)
The condition is only necessary for optimality without Assumption 4.2. Note that interior
solutions are guaranteed due to ∂Π/∂p|p=0 > 0 and ∂Π/∂p|p>1/δ < 0 by (C.21) and (C.22).
Proof of Corollary 4.2. Uniqueness is easily derived from the concavity of Π(kH , pg, pb). We
use Π instead of Π(kH , pg, pb).
For sensitivities, we again use the identity ∂p/∂x = −(∂2Π/(∂p∂x))/(∂2Π/∂p2) and the
fact that ∂2Π/∂p2 < 0 in optimum. This holds for both pg and pb.
By (C.22), we have ∂2Π/(∂pb∂β) = ∂
2Π/(∂pb∂q) = 0, resulting in ∂pb/∂β = ∂pb/∂q = 0,
∂2Π/(∂pb∂m) ≥ 0, resulting in ∂pb/∂m ≥ 0, and ∂2Π/(∂pb∂δ) ≤ 0, resulting in ∂pb/∂δ ≤ 0.
By the same reasoning, (C.21) results in ∂pg/∂δ ≤ 0 and ∂pg/∂m ≥ 0. For ∂pg/∂β and
∂pg/∂q, we again use the monotone probability ratio order (Assumption 4.1): fG(p)/FG(p) ≥
fB(p)/FB(p) for all p ∈ [0, τ ]. This implies (fG(p)/FG(p))(1− δp)− δ ≥ (fB(p)/FB(p))(m−
δp) − δ for p ≤ 1/δ. Therefore, with regard to (C.21), in optimum, it has to hold that
(fG(pHg )/FG(p
H
g ))(1− δpHg )− δ > 0 > (fB(pHg )/FB(pHg ))(m− δpHg )− δ, which again gives the
stated bounds for pHg .
Finally, this information, together with ∂2Π/(∂pg∂β)|pHg = [fG(pHg )(1−δpHg )−δFG(pHg )]−
(1 − q)[fB(pHg )(m − δpHg ) − δFB(pHg )] and ∂2Π/(∂pg∂q)|pHg = −(1 − β)[fB(pHg )(m − δpHg ) −
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δFB(pHg )], results in ∂
2Π/(∂pg∂β)|pHg , ∂2Π/(∂pg∂q)|pHg ≥ 0, which proves the remaining sen-
sitivities.
Proof of Proposition 4.3. (i) We consider problem T given fixed prices and e = l. We again
use the notation rΘ,s ≡ FsΘ(kΘ,s − δps) and C = 2(ch − cl)/((1− β)(2q − 1)). Problem T is
then
max
k
Π(k|e = l, p = ps)|(pg,pb)
= βFgG(1− kG,g) + (1− β)(FgB(m− kB,g) + FbB(m− kB,b))/2
(C.23)
s.t. βrG,g + (1− β)rB,g/2− (βrG,b + (1− β)rB,b/2) ≥ 0 (C.24)
βrG,g + (1− β)rB,g/2 ≥ 0 (C.25)
rB,b − rB,g ≥ 0 (C.26)
rB,b ≥ 0 (C.27)
rB,b − rB,g − C ≤ 0 (C.28)
βrG,g + (1− β)(rB,g + rB,b)/2− (pi0 + cl) ≥ 0 (C.29)
Again, constraint (C.29) is parallel to the firm’s profit. Hence, if it is binding, the contract
is optimal.
We assume that (C.29) is binding, which leads to rG,g = (pi0 +cl−(1−β)(rB,g+rB,b)/2)/β.
This, taken together with constraints (C.25) and (C.27), leads to rB,b’s characterization.
(C.29) being binding, together with (C.24), leads to rG,b’s characterization. (C.26) and
(C.28) leads to rB,g’s characterization. The conditions can always be satisfied. Hence, (C.29)
is indeed binding in optimum.
The insertion of an optimal contract into the firm’s profit (which builds the basis for (iii)
and proves (ii)) gives
Π(kL, pg, pb) = βF
g
G(1− δpg) + (1− β)(FgB(m− δpLg ) + FbB(m− δpb))/2− cl − pi0. (C.30)
(iii) Here, the same reasoning applies as for policy H with q = 1/2.
Proof of Corollary 4.3. This corollary easily follows from Corollary 4.2 and the fact that
pLg = p
H
g for q = 1/2 and p
H
b = p
L
b .
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Proof of Proposition 4.4. It is easily seen that γ1 = Π
H + ch− (ΠL+ cl), γ2 = ΠH + ch−ΠN ,
γ3 = Π
L + cl − ΠN by the optimal profits in Propositions 4.1-4.3.
(i) Independence of ch, cl, pi0 is clear by definition. It is easily seen that γ1, γ2, γ3 ≥ 0 by
noting that pHg maximizes βFG(p)(1−δp)+(1−β)(1−q)FB(p)(m−δp), pHb = pLb maximizes
FB(p)(m− δp), and pLg maximizes βFG(p)(1− δp) + (1− β)FB(p)(m− δp)/2.
(ii) It is easily seen that ΠH increases in q, whereas ΠN and ΠL are constant in q. Therefore,
we have the stated sensitivities (see also the proof of Proposition 4.5).
(iii) Immediately follows from the initially stated identities.
(iv) Immediately follows from (i) and (iii).
(v) If m = 1 and FB = FG, then pHg = p
L
g = p
N
0 = p
H
b = p
L
b = m/δ + FB(p
L
b )/fB(p
L
b ) by
Propositions 4.1-4.3. Furthermore, ΠN = FG(pLb )(1− δpLb )− pi0 = ΠH + ch = ΠL + cl. The
same reasoning applies for β = 0.
If β = 1, then pHg = p
L
g = p
N
0 = 1/δ − FG(pN0 )/fG(pN0 ) by Propositions 4.1-4.3. Addition-
ally, ΠN = FG(pN0 )(1− δpN0 )− pi0 = ΠH + ch = ΠL + cl.
If δ = 0, then pHg = p
L
g = p
N
0 = p
H
b = p
L
b = ∞. This results in ΠN ,ΠH + ch,ΠL + cl =
β + (1− β)m− pi0.
Proof of Proposition 4.5. We use ρB,g ≡ (1 − β)(1 − q), ρB,b ≡ (1 − β)q. Adding pi0, which
is the retailer’s profit in optimum, to the firm’s optimal profit results in
ΠND = Π
N + pi0 = βF
0
G(1− δpN0 ) + (1− β)F0B(m− δpN0 ) (C.31)
ΠHD = Π
H + pi0 = βF
g
G(1− δpHg ) + ρB,gFgB(m− δpHg ) + ρB,bFbB(m− δpHb )− ch (C.32)
ΠLD = Π
L + pi0 = βF
g
G(1− δpLg ) + (1− β)(FgB(m− δpLg ) + FbB(m− δpLb ))/2− cl (C.33)
It is easily seen that these terms have to be the optimal profit-terms in a centralized
scenario, depending on the chosen policy, N , H, or L.
To show the sensitivities, it suffices to show that ∂ΠH/(∂m), ∂ΠL/(∂m), ∂ΠN/(∂m) ≥ 0,
∂ΠH/(∂δ), ∂ΠL/(∂δ), ∂ΠN/(∂δ) ≤ 0, and ∂ΠH/(∂q) ≥ 0.
For m and by using ∂Π(pg, pb, k
H)/(∂pg)|pHg = ∂Π(pg, pb, kH)/(∂pb)|pHb = 0, we have
∂ΠH/(∂m) = ∂Π(pHg (m), p
H
b (m), k
H)/(∂m) = (1− β)((1− q)FB(pHg (m)) + qFB(pHb (m))) ≥
0. For L, setting q = 1/2 yields the same result. For N , the same reasoning applies:
∂ΠN/(∂m) = ∂Π(pN0 (m), k
N )/(∂m) = (1− β)FB(pN0 (m)) ≥ 0.
For δ and by using ∂Π(pg, pb, k
H)/(∂pg)|pHg = ∂Π(pg, pb, kH)/(∂pb)|pHb = 0, we have
∂ΠH/(∂δ) = ∂Π(pHg (δ), p
H
b (δ), k
H)/(∂δ) = −pHg (δ)(βFG(pHg (δ))+(1−β)(1−q)FB(pHg (δ)))−
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pHb (δ)(1− β)qFB(pHb (δ)) ≤ 0. Again, the same reasoning leads to ∂ΠL/(∂δ) ≤ 0. For N , we
have ∂ΠN/(∂δ) = −pHg (δ)(βFG(pHg (δ)) + (1− β)FB(pHg (δ))) ≤ 0.
Finally, we have ∂ΠH/(∂q) = (1−β)(FB(pHb (q))(m−δpHb (q))−FB(pHg (q))(m−δpHg (q))) ≥
0.
Proof of Proposition 4.6. For simplicity, we write pg and pb instead of p
∗
g and p
∗
b for ∗ ∈
{H,L} and FsΘ instead of FΘ(ps). Recall the optimality conditions of the H and L contracts:
for H, consider the conditions in Proposition 4.2, which are equivalent to kB,b ∈ [δpb, δpb +
(pi0 + ch)/((1 − β)qFbB)], kG,b ≤ δpb + (pi0 + ch − (1 − β)FbB(kB,b − δpb))/(βFbG), kB,g ≤
δpg + (FbB(kB,b− δpb)−C)/FgB, kG,g = δpg + (pi0 + ch− (1− β)(1− q)FgB(kB,g − δpg)− (1−
β)qFbB(kB,b − δpb))/(βFgG).
For L, the conditions in Proposition 4.3 are equivalent to kB,b ∈ [δpb, δpb+2(pi0 + cl)/((1−
β)FbB)], kG,b ≤ δpb+(pi0 + cl− (1−β)FbB(kB,b−δpb))/(βFbG), kB,g ∈ [δpg +(FbB(kB,b−δpb)−
C)/FgB, δpg +F
b
B(kB,b− δpb)/FgB], kG,g = δpg + (pi0 + cl− (1−β)(FgB(kB,g− δpg) +FbB(kB,b−
δpb))/2)/(βF
g
G).
(i) A price-only contract (it holds that kg = kB,g = kG,g and kb = kB,b = kG,b) is optimal
under H (L) if it satisfies the corresponding optimality conditions. To find the conditions
under which a price-only contract is optimal, we first insert kg and kb for the corresponding
payments. Then, by use of the equality condition for kG,g, we replace kg in all inequalities
through the corresponding term depending on kb. As a result, we have inequalities only
depending on one variable, kb. Then, we rearrange with respect to kb, which gives us several
lower and upper bounds for the choice of kb. If those bounds define a non-empty set, then
there exists an optimal price-only contract. Therefore, in a last step, we compare the upper
and lower bounds for kb and thereby find the conditions under which the upper bounds are
above the lower bounds and hence the conditions for the existence of an optimal price-only
contract. By this procedure, we find for H that C ≤ (pi0 +ch)β(FgGFbB−FbGFgB)/((βFgG+(1−
β)(1− q)FgB)(βFbG+(1−β)FbB)) ≡ (pi0 + ch)ξ1 is the existence condition. For L, we find that
there always exists an optimal price-only contract (e.g., kb = δpb+(pi0+cl)/(βFbG+(1−β)FbB),
and kg = δpG + (pi0 + cl)(2βFbG + (1− β)FbB)/((2βFgG + (1− β)FgB)(βFbG + (1− β)FbB))).
(ii) For quality-only contracts (kG = kG,g = kG,b and kB = kB,g = kB,b), a similar
procedure can be applied as for price-only contracts: the use of the equality condition to
generate inequalities with only one variable, rearrangement with respect to that variable
and derivation of conditions for upper and lower bounds implying non-empty sets for that
variable. This procedure results in the following existence conditions under H: an optimal
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quality-only contract exists if and only if C/FgB ≤ δ(pg−pb) ≤ (pi0+ch)(FgG−FbG)/(FbG(βFgG+
(1−β)(1−q)FgB)) ≡ (pi0 +ch)ξ2. For L, we have existence of an optimal quality-only contract
if and only if δ(pg − pb) ≤ (pi0 + cl)(FgG − FbG)/(FbG(βFgG + (1− β)FgB/2)) ≡ (pi0 + cl)ξ3 and
δ(pg−pb) ≤ (pi0+cl)(FgB−FbB)(FgG−FbG)/(βFgGFbG(FgB−FbB)+(1−β)FgBFbB(Fgg−FbG))+C(1−
β)(FgGF
b
B−FbG(FgB−FbB)/2)/(βFgGFbG(FgB−FbB)+(1−β)FgBFbB(Fgg−FbG)) ≡ (pi0+cl)ξ4+Cξ5.
(iii) For fixed-fee contracts (k = kG,g = kG,b = kB,g = kB,b), again, a similar procedure
can be applied. We only have to insert k for all payments. Then, we can replace k in each
inequality by the corresponding term from the identity condition. The remaining payment-
independent inequalities then have to be investigated with regard to feasibility. This results in
the existence of an optimal fixed-fee contract under H if and only if δ(pg−pb) ≥ (pi0+ch)(FgB−
FbB)/(F
b
B(βF
g
G+(1−β)FgB))+C(βFgG+(1−β)((1−q)FgB+qFbB))/(FbB(βFgG+(1−β)FgB)) ≡
(pi0 + ch)ξ6 +Cξ7 and δ(pg−pb) ≤ (pi0 + ch)(β(FgG−FbG)+(1−β)(1− q)(FgB−FbB))/((βFgG+
(1− β)(1− q)FgB)(βFbG + (1− β)FbB)) ≡ (pi0 + ch)ξ8. For L, there exists an optimal fixed-fee
contract if and only if δ(pg− pb) ≥ (pi0 + cl)(FgB −FbB)/(FbB(βFgG + (1−β)FgB)) ≡ (pi0 + cl)ξ9
and δ(pg − pb) ≤ (pi0 + cl)β(FgG−FbG) + (1− β)(FgB −FbB)/2)/((βFgG + (1− β)FgB/2)(βFbG +
(1− β)FbB)) ≡ (pi0 + cl)ξ10 and δ(pg − pb) ≤ (pi0 + cl)(FgB − FbB)/(FbB(βFgG + (1− β)FgB)) +
C(βFgG + (1− β)(FgB + FbB)/2)/(FbB(βFgG + (1− β)FgB)) ≡ (pi0 + cl)ξ9 + Cξ11.
Finally, there exist situations in which there exist optimal fixed-fee (and hence, optimal
price-/quality-only) contracts due to the following example. Consider the following parameter
setting: β = 0.5, m = 0.5, q = 0.8, ch = 0.006, cl = 0.001, δ = 0.5, and pi0 = 0.3.
Furthermore, let FG(p) = [1− 0.1/p]+ and FB(p) = [1− 0.05/p]+ defined on [0,∞).
Then, for H, the optimal prices are pHg = 0.41833001 and p
H
b = 0.2236068. The optimal
fixed-fee contract for H is then kH = 0.56312466. The optimal profit is ΠH = 0.14105927.
For L, the optimal prices are pLg = 0.38729833 and p
H
b = 0.2236068. The optimal fixed-fee
contract for L is then kL = 0.55790769. The optimal profit is ΠL = 0.14012455.
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